

ВЛАДИМИР  
БУКОВСКИЙ



НАСЛЕДНИКИ ЛАВРЕНТИЯ  
**БЕРИЯ**  
ПУТИН И ЕГО КОМАНДА

## Abstract

Vladimir Konstantinovich Bukovsky - writer, political and public figure, neurophysiologist - is known as one of the founders of the dissident movement in the USSR. In total, he spent 12 years in prisons and in compulsory treatment. In recent times, Vladimir Bukovsky was nominated as a candidate for the presidency of Russia in the 2003 elections, but his candidacy was not registered by the CEC. In 2008, Bukovsky took part in the organization of the

Solidarity opposition movement, in 2009 he became a member of the leading body of the movement - the Bureau of the Solidarity Federal Political Council. In his book, V.K. Bukovsky analyzes the activities of V.V. Putin as president of Russia. According to the author, Putin's team, which mainly consists of former state security officers, continues the tradition of the "greatest manager of the 20th century" Lavrenty Beria in governing the country. What does this mean, what is politics and economics in the Putin era, what is "Putin-style democracy" - V. Bukovsky gives his answers to all this. You can agree with him or not, but the position of V. Bukovsky, of course, chills attention ...

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**Vladimir Bukovsky The  
heirs of Lavrenty Beria. Putin and  
his team**



## Instead of a preface

I am not in my place anywhere...

(Interview for Gazeta Wyborczy, Poland. Presenter I.

Levandovskaya. Translated from Polish by Y. Sereda)

“When I was last in Russia, I was struck by the language - a pretentious mishmash of thieves' jargon and English words used completely meaninglessly. And endless lies. Communism, it seems, no longer exists, but permanent lies remain. What kind of work could there be for me?” Vladimir Bukovsky says — What is Russia for you now? - Russia? I haven't been to Russia for five years. There is no

work for me. Everything returned

to its old places. The old party bureaucratic nomenklatura is in power again.

- Again? Or maybe it has always been? — You are right, but there were moments when Russia moved away

from communism. Now everything is turning

back. Take, for example, the question of the availability of archives. All archives are closed again. Even those documents that I copied and published a few years ago are now classified as top secret. Funny, right? Have you ever thought about returning to Russia? - I'm used to the fact that my life is subordinated to some business. And if any specific case

appears, such that I need to go to Russia, I will go.

But now there is nothing like that. - Is Russia none of your business?

“Today I can say with confidence that it's not mine. I think that nothing will change for the rest of my life. Everything develops according to the obvious scenario. I am convinced

that there is no place for me in it. Disintegration, political divisions, emptiness, apathy, everyone is fed up with everything ... What would I do there? The new generation is just growing up. Of course, it will ripen, of course, other people will come and do what is necessary, only I will be gone by that time. - And in 1976, when you were exchanged for Luis Corvalan and you flew in a plane from the USSR and did not know where this plane would land, you

thought that the time will change and you will be able to return?

- I always knew that this regime would end, but I thought that this could happen not earlier than the end of our century, when I would already be an old man. And all my life, whether I like it or not, I will have to spend abroad. Therefore, I never made any personal plans related to Russia.

Is it hard for you to live in a foreign country? - I'm used to it. I have never lived in my own country. In the USSR, I always felt like a foreigner, even when I was 15 years old. So I'm used to the fact that I'm nowhere in my place. Are Russia and the Soviet Union one and the same? - Of course not.

Although now they are not very different, at least not to such an extent that I feel like

Houses.

- Don't you feel at home there? - No.

—

Which country is closest to you? -

Perhaps, I will not be able to name such a country. — Where

is your house? — In Cambridge, where I have been living for 20 years. However, this is not a problem for me at all - land, a house ... When Nabokov was asked where he would like to live, he replied: "If possible, in a large comfortable hotel." And for me it is not important - I very quickly get used to a new environment,

customs, language. - I don't really believe it. After all, you are constantly

engaged in Russia. "I spend most of my time doing neurophysiology of the brain. What about books about Russia?.. It doesn't depend on me, but on the publisher - the market, demand, etc. And I listen to the publisher. For example, now I will write a book about the West.

- I ask you so hard about this, because many Russian writers say that they could not live outside their country. And I want to understand why they couldn't write there, but you can?

- Firstly, most Russian writers do not know foreign languages, and literature and language are inseparable for them. To tell the truth, of the Russian writers who were forced to emigrate, only Viktor Nekrasov spoke a little French, but

Andrei Sinyavsky did not know a word, just like Vladimir Maksimov. I had the impression that Maksimov is intuitively afraid that the French language will "dilute" his Russian, and with it his creative possibilities. And I, like Brodsky or

Nabokov, write in English and even prefer it to Russian. (However, perhaps the fact is that I do not write poetry or short stories, only essays, and they can be written in any language.) The Russian language is very elastic, romantic and very imprecise. It is impossible to write briefly in Russian. When American or English newspapers order me an article, they usually say: 1200-1800 words. In Russian, this is absolutely impossible, a person will not even have time to start! - You say that in the USSR you

felt like a foreigner. Why did you do things there for which you had to pay such a terrible price? — I didn't do it for Russia. We, dissidents, told each other directly:

we are doing this for ourselves. It happens that a person cannot behave differently, because then he will cease to be himself. It was, if you will, the defense of one's own human sovereignty. This was, incidentally, typical of the dissident movement in Russia. In Poland or Czechoslovakia it was a little different. There, in the activities of the opposition, there was more politics and a sense of national lack of freedom. Russian dissidents were free from nationalism. When I now see militants with swastikas on the streets of St. Petersburg, I don't understand what is happening.

One more thing. Both in Russia and, later, in the West, I understood our fight against communism as a global, international affair, because communism was a global evil. Although history wanted it to first nest in Russia, but then there was Eastern Europe, China, Cuba, half of Africa. Communism can be fought anywhere in the world. It's like a mirror image - the communists also fought for communism everywhere: Trotsky in Mexico, others in Spain. So we could fight communism anywhere, even in some "red corner", under the portrait of Lenin. - So, Russia for you is just a country in which you were born?

— Yes... No, not really. I took some part of Russian culture with me. But I am not associated with any point on the globe. I am connected with ideas, concepts, principles. I went to Russia in 1991, still under communism. Then I asked myself: there must be some kind of sentimental reaction. - And what? - And nothing.

The TV people took me to the school where I studied.

- And

what? - And nothing. It just seemed to me much smaller than I remembered. My house was no longer there. My sentimental road failed. And if I felt something, then only sadness. It was a pity for the people who expected so much, and now sit over the ruins of their illusions. - And you? -

Well, I work quietly. I have a big garden, where a hefty cat walks. He thinks he is the owner of this garden. He even kicked out his mother - he does not tolerate any competition. I have a very complicated relationship with him - this is an absolutely immoral person. Walks around in a spotted field uniform, terrorizes everyone around. And in general, this may be Bulgakov's Behemoth. I meet him somehow on the street, far from home: "What are you doing here?" He looked at me: "What do you want? You have your business, I have mine." And he went further. Sometimes she comes to me to complain about women: "Yesterday everything was fine, but today she doesn't want to look at me." "They are like that," I explain. Then he goes to sleep under a cypress that grows in the garden. — What

struck you when you were last in Russia? - Relentless lies. It seems that communism no longer exists, but the permanent lie remains. Perennial habit. You are now returning to

Cambridge to write a book about the West. But are you going to visit Russia from time to time? Yes, just like any other country. By the way, the last time

I could not get a visa to Russia. In 1996. - Are you joking. -

Not at all. I was invited by Inkombank, the fifth largest in Russia, to celebrate its eighth anniversary. A week later



they call: "The Foreign Ministry does not give you a visa." I do not know why. Maybe because my "Moscow Trial" just came out, which someone in Russia did not like. And even then Alexander Nikitin was in prison, accused of espionage (in fact, he gave the Norwegian environmental organization previously published information about environmentally hazardous radioactive waste buried on the Kola Peninsula), and I then suggested to my friends in St. Petersburg to organize something someday, when I arrive, a small demonstration or a press conference in defense of Nikitin. Or maybe someone wanted to wag a finger at Inkombank, with which the authorities had some problems at that time.

The explanation was: "Bukovsky is a citizen of Russia, why does he need a visa?" The usual lie, I renounced Russian citizenship long ago, almost immediately, when it was returned to me, in 1992. And the funny thing is that thanks to all this, I did not leave the Russian television screens. There was a constant discussion about my visa - to give or not to give? Crazy house. Under communism, this country was paranoid-schizophrenic, but then there was some purpose to it. Today, this schizophrenia is absolutely incomprehensible. Thing in itself...

Have you ever met Luis Corvalan, on whom you were traded in 1976?

- No never. He always refused such meetings on principle. Once upon a time, Italian television offered us to perform in one program. He categorically refused. And recently he said to some Western newspaper: well, we Communists have always been right. And we did exactly the right thing.

Wait, we're still  
we'll be back. It's just such a short break.

"Maybe he's right?" Could something like communism really be making a comeback? - It's out

of the question. Even if Stalin were revived, what could he do? At the most, I would become an underground mafioso. Everything has changed, a completely different dynamics of social development, social structures have changed. And Stalin himself is no longer Stalin. But even without it, my scenario for Russia is quite

pessimistic.

I think ecological catastrophes are possible; I'm not sure that nuclear arsenals are well guarded; corruption is rampant. And all this cannot but affect Russia's closest neighbors. However, you Poles already feel it. But the old model of relationships will never return, when a change of government in Russia causes a crisis in Poland - they cough in Moscow, and you drink medicine. This will never happen again. — Will it be better in Russia itself? "It's bad there, and if anything changes, it's only for the worse. There is a crisis in Russia, and there is no end in sight. 1998

## What does the Putin regime mean for Russia?

Russia on the hook of the KGB (VK Bukovsky's election manifesto, 2007) This image, proposed by one of the ideologists of the current KGB government, contrary to his intention, extremely accurately reflects the state of the country in the last decade. Yes, Russia fell for the KGB hook and hung on it, as if on a medieval rack, tortured and robbed by its rulers of their executioners. No matter how hard the KGB ideologists and their political plumbers try to interpret what happened now, the facts are undeniable - the power in the country has been completely and completely usurped by the KGB, who, like the Bourbons of the Restoration period, did not understand anything and did not learn anything. Having declared the collapse of the USSR a catastrophe, they are systematically and stubbornly restoring the Soviet regime. The institutions of democracy are systematically destroyed, elections become a formality, no place is left for opposition in politics, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly and demonstration are suppressed by police measures. The legal basis of Russian statehood has been violated - sovereignty of the subjects of the Federation.

For the sake of self-assertion of the KGB power, a small Caucasian nation is being destroyed, which led to the spread of the war to the entire North Caucasus. Conceived by the Chekists as a "small victorious war", as a means to usurp power in Russia, it turned into a festering wound on the body of the country. By means of threats and blackmail, and direct interference in the internal affairs of neighboring states, the former "sphere of Soviet influence" is being restored. The country's oil and gas wealth is used as a strategic weapon in the struggle for world domination, instead of serving as a source of people's well-being. The "hostile environment" reappeared, the desire to impose on the West an arms race that once led to bankruptcy

our country. Xenophobia and spy mania are stubbornly propagated, ultra-nationalist and simply fascist movements are being encouraged. Political

prisoners have appeared again, which for Russia, with its history, is tantamount to the symptoms of a deadly disease. Asthmatic Mikhail Trepashkin suffocates in his cell. The crippled Boris Stomakhin was transferred to the camp. A number of scientists have been convicted, whose entire fault was in their contacts with Western colleagues.

Recalcitrant businessmen are

exiled to hard labor. Political

assassination has become the norm. Military-patriotic education is returning to schools. Russian history is being rewritten again, from which it is ordered to remove any mention of the crimes of the Soviet regime, and the executioner of our people, who exterminated tens of millions of our compatriots, is called the "wise leader."

The economy, divided by KGB mafias, is deprived of the opportunity to develop. In fact, the renationalization of the most important industries has been carried out. Small and medium businesses are stifled by extortions. Today, when

any Russian citizen at any moment can be arbitrarily persecuted, become a victim of a "custom" case, or even end up in a psychiatric hospital without any medical reason, when even according to polls, up to 4 percent of citizens a year are subjected to torture or ill-treatment by law enforcement agencies, and the courts ceased to fulfill their function of impartial and objective guardians of the rule of law, a normal political process became simply impossible. Arbitrariness reigns in the country on such a scale that not a single person can feel safe. As a result, hundreds of thousands of our compatriots annually "vote with their feet" - they flee the country in search of a more decent life. In Russia again there is no government, but there is power. There are no citizens, but there are subjects. Public life as such was over, only

squabbles between various clans of Chekists remained. In fact, even these subjects are not really needed by them, well, maybe 15-20 million to serve the pipe, and their own needs. The rest - the sooner they die, the better for the authorities. Less problems.

These are the results of eight years of the board of the KGB corporation. And this is the "stability" that the Kremlin is so proud of? It is not difficult to guess what will happen to it as soon as oil prices fall - the country will split into dozens of fragments. Is this the "Great Power" that we

are all supposed to be proud of? "The world is afraid of us again!" - the Kremlin political plumbers happily report. So after all, they are also afraid of madmen, why is there to rejoice?.. These results were quite predictable 15 years ago (at least I

have been predicting them since 1993). Roughly speaking, in politics - as in war: if there is no courage (or resources) to attack, then a retreat is inevitable. I spent many hours in 1991 persuading the Yeltsin leadership to organize a trial of the communist regime, preferably under the Nuremberg Statutes. Well, well, if not a trial (they did not like the idea of a trial), then at least an international commission of historians, but openly, under television cameras, and with an autopsy of all the crimes of the regime. He persuaded everyone (even Bakatin, the then head of the KGB), but Yeltsin balked. Either he was afraid for his position (after all, a former candidate member of the Politburo), or he really didn't want to "rock the boat" (as he told his assistants), but the case was blocked. And I left, knowing full well that the restoration of the Soviet regime was coming. A year later, Yeltsin was already on the defensive (and I even went to help him in the Constitutional Court), and a couple of years later he surrendered everything - both his team and his policy. I didn't go anymore — I didn't have the strength to look at this disgrace. And soon they blocked my entry, they stopped giving me a visa. After 1993, he was no longer the owner, having become a hostage of the "siloviki", and there was nothing for me to do there. Restoration was inevitable. However, I am far from thinking of blaming Yeltsin alone. After all, Russian society was very sharply opposed to such a trial at that time, and the West blocked our efforts in every possible way as a "witch hunt". Well, now the witches

have come to life, they will now hunt us. Yes to the West

it doesn't seem like much.

Without a doubt, if we had started the process of decommunization then, in 1991, if we had held our Nuremberg, the Chekists would not have been able to recover so quickly and seize power.

Indeed, in order to catch the country on a hook, it took them a long time and persistently to introduce several myths into the minds of people, just for misunderstanding of the communist system and calculated.

Myth one: the democrats destroyed the Soviet Union and everything became very bad.

This phrase alone contains so many lies that several volumes are not enough to dispel this myth. First, the Soviet Union collapsed on its own, under the weight of its own stupidity. Rather, one should be surprised at how long he existed with his idiotic "building of communism", the State Planning Commission, socialist competitions, collective farms and political studies. It was doomed from the start, since it was originally created not as a normal state, but as a springboard for the coming world revolution. And as soon as it became clear that this revolution was not coming, the Soviet Union was doomed to die. Lenin understood this and promptly introduced the NEP. Stalin tried to speed up the world revolution, bringing it to Europe on the bayonets of the Red Army. All subsequent rulers desperately tried to somehow save this unviable system through reforms. Only the last of them, Gorbachev, realized that the system was unreformable, and even then only towards the end of his reign. Nevertheless, they all continued to wage their "class struggle" with the "world of capital" to the very end, which in the post-war years was expressed, on the one hand, in an arms race, on the other, in the creation and maintenance of gangs of thugs around the world ( "liberation movements"). Both of these required huge expenditures. Add here the "cost e. the maintenance of the same unviable empires" - the so-called "socialist countries" that the Soviet Union itself spawned all over the world, and it becomes clear that the collapse was inevitable. Simply put, the USSR went bankrupt, overstrained, because its Gorbachev's economic base was too small for its global ambitions. perestroika only accelerated the collapse, but was not its cause, no matter what legends are now composed about his "betrayal". It is even more absurd to attribute this event to the evil will of the so-called "democrats", that is, the Yeltsin administration. Yes, the country was going through a

deep crisis, everyone felt very bad. But why are people who have just come to power blamed for this, and not those who led the country to this crisis for 73 years? Democrats only



inherited a country virtually destroyed by communist rule. They did not exterminate 40 million of their compatriots, the flower of Russian society. They did not exterminate 10 million of the best peasants, they did not invent collective farms. It was not they who unleashed the Second World War with its gigantic destruction. They did not exhaust their country in the name of "world revolution", they did not invent the arms race. Is it their fault that 73 years of Marxism-Leninism brought Russian peasants to general drunkenness, theft, weaned them from working? Yes, they dissolved the USSR, and

they did the right thing. Look, for 8 years already Russia has been unable to cope with Chechnya, which you can't even see on the map. And what would we do if there were 15 such Chechnyas, moreover, some of them would be the size of Ukraine or Kazakhstan? It is necessary to recognize a simple fact: in 1991, the empire had already collapsed, and the Belovezhskaya Accords just legalized this fact. The second myth, which

follows from the first, is that democracy does not suit Russia. So, we tried it, and you see what happened ... Yes, it's

not true, they haven't tried any kind of democracy in Russia yet. They just tried, and even then very timidly and inconsistently. And the Democrats were not yet in power. Those who were called by this word in the early 90s were almost all former communists. True, they have already become disillusioned with communism, and I believe quite sincerely, but this has not yet made them democrats. Moreover, they did not understand anything in a market economy. Well, tell me how, for example, Yegor Gaidar, who spent his whole life either in the magazine "Communist" or in the economic department of the newspaper "Pravda", suddenly turned out to be a market economist and democrat? I willingly believe that he read some books about the market (secretly from his party bosses), but he never lived in a country with a market economy and had no idea how it all works. Hence his ugly "market reforms", his voucher "privatization", degenerated into a simple scam. As a result, in just two years, such "democrats" have managed to discredit what we have been fighting for for 30 years.

In fairness, it should be recalled that they were not free in their actions. The then legislative body - the Supreme Soviet - controlled by the communists, blocked

almost all of their undertakings, and therefore must share with them the responsibility for what happened in equal measure. However, no one wants to remember this. So the legend about the bad democrats who collapsed the country remained in Russia.

Yes, finally, and this experiment lasted only a couple of years. Here is a riddle: communism reigned in our country for 73 years, and a very controversial and relative experiment with democracy for only two, but we firmly decided that democracy does not suit us, but somehow we did not decide anything about communism.

The third myth: because of the democrats, Russia fell into the abyss and would have perished there, but there were honest, courageous people, statesmen who selflessly served the Motherland all their lives, the Chekists, who managed to save the country on the verge of death.

It would seem that in Russia, where there is no such family, in which someone would not suffer at the hands of state security, such a statement should cause a friendly laugh, at least an outburst of indignation. The Chekists and their political plumbers are lying: they did not serve the Motherland, but the Party. And they were created, in the words of Lenin, as "an armed detachment of the Party." And the task was set for them - to protect the Party from the people, to maintain its power over them. It was they who tortured and shot millions of our compatriots on the orders of the Party. They also dispossessed kulaks, drove the peasants to collective farms and to the Gulags. Even in relatively vegetarian times, after the death of Stalin, what did the Chekists do? Jews were imprisoned for wanting to leave for Israel, and Volga Germans for wanting to leave for Germany. Believers were imprisoned for gathering for prayers, and the intelligentsia for spreading samizdat. What state interests did all this serve?

Unfortunately, there were many people who were impressed by the cheap KGB agitation "17 Moments of Spring". But we, living in the West, know very well these Stirlitz people, who, hiding under the roofs of embassies and risking absolutely nothing, speculated on vodka, caviar and cigarettes, and reported the contents of local newspapers to the Center.

Thus, it should be noted that the corporation of the Chekists, now posing as the "saviors of Russia", just more than anyone else, contributed to its collapse as watchdogs.

the Soviet regime. The only time they failed to fulfill their function was in August 1991. None of them dared risk their own skin to save the rotten communist regime. They didn't even stand up for Felix. Now their plumbers are trying to present the matter

as if Russia "died" in the 1990s without any participation of the Chekists, and after 2000 "reborn" under their wise leadership. In reality, throughout the 1990s, the KGB corporation was preparing to seize power, promoting its people into the administration, the Duma, big business, and even organized crime. Were they not the ones who organized the first gangs that racketed businessmen so that these latter would turn to them for "protection"? Were they not the ones who organized the sabotage of democratic reforms in the Supreme Soviet (and later in the Duma)? Didn't their proteges become the very "oligarchs" with whom they then so courageously dealt with? Were they not the ones who provoked both wars in Chechnya in order to become in demand again?

In a word, to paraphrase the words of Lenin, they supported the falling Russia, as a rope supports a hanged man. Let's directly call a spade a spade: the Chekist corporation, deeply conspiratorial, prepared and carried out a coup d'état. And having come to power, they returned to their traditional occupation: to drag and not let go. They regard the restoration of the Soviet regime, under which they lived so well, as a boon for the country. Not realizing that the collapse of the Soviet system was inevitable, they are now trying to imitate it, both inside the country and outside. It is not difficult to predict that they will end up in the same way as their predecessors - they will lead the country to a catastrophe, and they themselves will again evade responsibility. So, if now it is necessary to save the country, then it is from the KGB hook. It follows from the

above that Russia needs to change the entire political system. Everything that the Chekists have done over the past eight years needs to be redone or canceled. The constitutional coup carried out by them should be declared a state crime, and those responsible for its organization and conduct should be brought to justice.

It is necessary to conduct a judicial investigation of all the crimes of the Soviet regime and its heirs - above all, the leadership of the CPSU and the KGB-FSB - on the basis of the Nuremberg Statutes. All crimes of the regime must be uncovered and made public.

At the same time, legal guarantees must be developed against the possibility of restoring the old regime or its elements. The most important of these should be the law on lustrations, which prohibits former members of criminal organizations from holding public and elective posts. Without this, it is impossible to proceed to the next step - the establishment of democracy and a market economy - without fear of sabotage.

Unfortunately, in the 1990s, no one explained to the country that neither one nor the other could be created without a radical revision of the foundations of both human relations and relations between organizations, both private and public. Speaking of the Germans, Winston Churchill once said: "The Germans are always either at your feet or at your throat" (that's why it took so long for a stable democracy to be established in Germany). Due to our difficult history, something similar happened to us. As they joked in Soviet times, "You are the boss, I am Mr. I am the boss, you are Mr. That is, translating into a civilized language, we do not have the habit of partnerships. This was especially evident in the eight years of the KGB due to their professional characteristics and led to the destruction of the legal basis of Russian statehood. There was no need to cancel the election of governors - on the contrary, it is necessary to actively develop local self-government, without which neither democracy nor statehood is possible. The totalitarian state is built from the roof and therefore eventually falls apart; democratic is built from the foundation, and because of this, it can stably exist and develop. In a totalitarian state, the "top" controls the "bottom"; in a democratic society, the "lower classes" control the "top", control over power always remains in the hands of society. Today's "electoral system" in Russia is a mockery of the elections and a mockery of the

voters. Elections should be held only on the basis of the majoritarian system (in single-member constituencies). Members must represent their

voters and be accountable to them, not to the party that nominated him. Parties can and should play their role in the life of society and parliament, in accordance with the legal norms on freedom of association. However, in elections representatives of parties should not have privileges in comparison with independent candidates.

In addition, the notorious "vertical of power" only breeds corruption more and more, which was enough without it. Naturally, the more officials and the more power officials have, the more corruption. It is absolutely impossible to fight it in the conditions of today's vertical Russia. Administrative measures to combat corruption have always been the least effective, as they leave the fight against itself in the hands of the bureaucracy. This is especially impossible in conditions when the freedom of the press, which is the most effective means of fighting corruption, is suppressed. Today, any journalist who exposes corruption can end up in prison on a fabricated case, or in a lunatic asylum, and just get a bullet. Therefore, the first measures to combat corruption should be precisely the destruction of the "vertical of power", a sharp reduction in bureaucracy, a revision of existing legislation in order to reduce the role of an official in the daily life of citizens and, if possible, a revision of those laws that require all kinds of permissions from the bureaucracy. All this, together with the revival of freedom of the press, will radically reduce corruption in the country. In democratic countries, conservative parties often campaign under the banner of "law and order". In our

country, over the past decades, a strange opinion has been established that one is incompatible with the other. Let there be no observance of the law under the Chekist regime, they tell us, but at last order has been established. It is time to understand that one is impossible without the other.

The so-called law enforcement agencies of today's Russia need more than reform. It is the cops and security officers who are not so much tools as the perpetrators of tyranny, arbitrariness and crime. Therefore, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the modern "law enforcement" system must be completely eliminated and replaced with a new one.

The basis of the new system should be the municipal police, headed by democratically elected chiefs. Such bosses should be responsible only to their constituents and interact only with local authorities and courts. Executive interference in police affairs must be strictly limited.

However, the activities of the police itself must be carried out in strict accordance with legal norms. We need the most reliable guarantees against corruption, arbitrariness and abuse. It's better to let a criminal get away with it than to let a cop run wild.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs, the FSB and other special services should be completely disbanded. As necessary, special police services of the regional and federal levels can be created, on a new basis and with strictly limited powers. But, like the entire state system, police structures should be built from the bottom up, not from the top down. The heads of regional and federal police services must be elected. All these services must remain as independent as possible from the executive branch. Of course, the reform of law enforcement agencies should go hand in hand with judicial

reform. Full independence of the judiciary must be ensured and its powers expanded. In the judiciary, it is necessary to restore the independence of judges, the election of magistrates and a much wider use of jury trials.

It is necessary to expand the capabilities of the Commissioners for Human Rights, as well as other public institutions to oversee the administration of the rule of law.

The slave-owning principle of army formation (universal military service) must be abolished. The army must be drastically reduced, become professional and be formed on a contract basis ... The economic prosperity of Russia,

organized by a thrifty Chekist government, is a myth. The point here is not the Chekists at all, but the extremely favorable situation on the world market for oil and gas exporters. For the first time in many centuries, Russia was lucky - and it must be a disaster that our luck fell on the period of the Chekist



board. It will be a tragedy if they again, as in the days of the Soviet Union, spend the wealth that has unexpectedly fallen on us on an arms race and other international adventures. Instead, oil profits should have been more widely invested in the creation of infrastructures, in the reform of the economy, the army, the law enforcement system and the courts. But no: the Chekists will flatter their sick pride, butting heads with America, and as there were no roads in the 19th century, there are none now, in some places there is no electricity. The current rulers are sitting

on hundreds of billions of their "stabilization fund" (which for some reason is kept abroad). And what do they stabilize by this, besides their pride? Even the ruble has not yet been converted. Instead, they conducted an expensive PR campaign to "improve the image of the ruble" by banning the entire country from mentioning any foreign currency. It's already some kind of voodoo

economy.

A situation is unacceptable when the entire economy is based on the extraction of energy resources and the country turns into a raw material appendage. The oil rain will end one day, and what will we do then?

However, even within the country, in the economy itself, processes are taking place that could negate our historical chance. As a result of eight years of KGB rule, there was a radical monopolization, and in some areas of the economy, renationalization. Practice has shown that such a process is harmful to the economy, leads to a drop in profits, destroys competition and the "dictatorship of the consumer" in the market.

The role of the state in the economy should be reduced to a minimum, and the activities of big business should be limited by antimonopoly legislation. This latter should be developed, and not only at the federal, but also at the regional level, and its strict implementation should be ensured. It is well known that

small and medium-sized businesses contribute much more to the well-being of the population than large ones: they increase employment, expand competition, and adapt flexibly to the needs of the consumer. It is this type of business that is now in a complete corral, crushed by bureaucracy, extortion, and restrictive legislation. A simple principle is visible: the more

country bureaucracy, the smaller the middle class. It is necessary to promote the development of small and medium-sized

businesses in every possible way. Another KGB legend is that Western countries dream of destroying or weakening Russia. Sometimes such statements by Russian leaders sound simply like Gogol: they say, it's flattering for everyone to offend a widow.

Having lived in the West for thirty years, I can guarantee that there are no such sentiments here, neither in society nor in governments. Even now, when Russia again behaves like a street bully and tries in every possible way to cause tension in relations, this does not cause either hatred or anger towards the Russians. People here shrug their shoulders in bewilderment, not understanding the reasons for such bitterness of the Russian authorities. On the contrary, the majority here would like to see Russia strong, since a strong partner is always more desirable than a weak one. Unlike Russia and pre-war Germany, the main Western countries have long been accustomed to building their relations on the principles of partnership. It's time for us to get used to it.

The cold and hot wars of the old regime must go with it. In its foreign policy, Russia should focus not on dictatorial and totalitarian regimes, but on developed democratic countries. Interference in the internal affairs of neighboring states and subversive activities against them must be stopped. It's time to drop the concept of "spheres of Russian influence" from the political vocabulary.

It is necessary to make peace with the Chechen Republic and establish a stable Russian-Chechen border. Russian troops must withdraw from the North Caucasus. The further fate of the Caucasian republics must be decided on the basis of the self-determination of nations and other principles of international law.

You can continue this program indefinitely, pointing out every aspect of life. However, the election program is not a set of dreams. A program is a promise solemnly made to the voter. But I cannot make far-reaching promises, since their fulfillment depends not so much on me as on you. Changing the political system is a grandiose task in itself, and with a ruthless and treacherous opponent in front of you, who has been strengthening his position for eight years, it is generally impossible.

We need a miracle. And only the mass will of the people can become such a miracle. We don't know if this will happen or not. All we can do is try and hope. Skeptics tell us that the ratings of the current

government are too high, and the population is too apathetic. Is it so? The alternative we offer is completely black and white. For the first time in the electoral arena, a Russian citizen will face such a choice: either a convict or a cop. In a country with Gulag traditions, where, of course, there are more ex-cons than cops, I can't imagine that they would prefer a cop. There are no such prisoners who would like to live in the "red

zone."

The past eight years have shown everyone what the police authorities are leading to. Do you want this to continue? Do you want your children and grandchildren to tremble with fear when they see a police uniform ahead? Are you ready to pay tribute to every bandit in uniform who knocks on your door? Will you continue to meekly give your children to Moloch's army to be slaughtered? Give them to torture and humiliation in the new Gulag and psychiatric hospitals? Well, this is how we will flee from power century after century - to Siberia, to the Don, to distant lands? So we will hang on the KGB hook?

Or, finally, we decide to protect our home from the next occupiers? If yes, then here is your chance. And I'm afraid it's the last one.

## Seven questions to President Bush about his friend President Putin

Dear Mr. President! Today you are receiving the President of Russia in your country. We have always been confident that Russia will continue to play an important role in the modern world. We are sure that you understand this.

Mr. President, you invariably emphasize that Mr. Putin is not only the President of Russia, but also your personal friend. Every person has the right to choose his friends. But friendship presupposes the existence of common

values. The US influence in the world is enormous. Therefore, it is important that in your friendship the following questions

do not go unanswered. Mr. President, do

you know: 1. That independent democratic institutions in Russia have been destroyed during Putin's presidency? Parliament, courts, mass media are actually placed under the control of the authorities, and the elections have become a fiction? Thus, the Russian constitution of 1993, which opened the way for the democratic development of the country, was destroyed? 2. What

military

crimes and genocide in Chechnya?

3. That there are numerous suggestions about the involvement of Russian special services in the explosions of residential buildings in September 1999, when 294 people died? That these attacks became a pretext for a war in Chechnya? That the Kremlin suppressed the parliamentary investigation of these attacks and classified all the information?

4. That in October 2002, to prevent a terrorist attack in a theater center in Moscow, the secret services used deadly gas, resulting in the death of 129 civilians? 5. That anti-Semitism and xenophobia

are used by the secret services to demonize big business and whip up military hysteria, as happened in Germany during the seizure and consolidation of power by the Nazis?

6. During the years of Putin's rule, people from the special services - veterans of the Soviet KGB - occupied more than half of the most important government posts?

7. That law enforcement agencies are used for political purposes, criminal cases are fabricated, the international community is involved in the suppression of political opposition through extradition processes? The public was shackled by fear, opposition politicians and journalists are increasingly becoming victims of unsolved assassination attempts. That for the first time in 10 years political prisoners reappeared in Russia?

We are well aware that the United States also has many unresolved problems. But the United States is a democratic country in which no one can be silenced, the opposition cannot be suppressed.

Democratic traditions allow your country to find way out of the most difficult situations.

In the 90s of the last century, Russia was able to defeat the communist totalitarian system. We are sure that even today there are enough forces in the country to independently solve our problems. But for this it is very important that the leading democracies of the world clearly follow the principles proclaimed by President R. Reagan: "We must be firm in our convictions that freedom is not the prerogative of a happy minority, but an inalienable and universal right of all mankind." Mr. President, on June 16, 2001, at the beginning of your acquaintance

with President Putin, you said: "I looked this man in the eye and found him direct and trustworthy. He is an honest straight man who loves his country, loves his family. We have many common values." Mr. Bush, take a chance - look into your friend's eyes again. Boris Berezovsky - leader of the Liberal Russia party, deputy

secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation in the government of B.

Yeltsin Elena Bonner - chairman of the Andrei Sakharov Foundation  
Vladimir Bukovsky - former political prisoner Ivan Rybkin - leader of the Liberal

Russia party, chairman of the First State Duma of the Russian Federation, secretary of the Council security of the Russian Federation in the government of B. Yeltsin

Ruslan Khasbulatov - the first head of the Russian parliament in  
2003



# Who is Putin?.

(Interview on BBC World, UK. Hosted by S. Sacker) Steven Sacker: Vladimir Putin's

tenure as president of Russia is coming to an end, but he holds on to power, as always, strongly. In December, parliamentary elections will be held, as a result of which he will receive new power in the Duma, and the outcome of the presidential elections in March is also likely to be what Putin personally wants. My today's guest is thinking of running for

president himself, but he is still a dissident and has been living outside of Russia for a long time, so he clearly has few prospects. We'll talk to him about why Russians love stability over democracy. Vladimir Bukovsky, welcome to the HARDtalk program. Vladimir Putin is an excellent track record. When he came to power, Russia

was on its knees, the economy and politics were in chaos. Today it is experiencing a period of rapid economic growth. Are you ready to admit that Putin has achieved a lot? Vladimir Bukovsky: No. It has nothing to do with the growth of the material well-being of citizens. All this happened

only thanks to luck, thanks to the rise in oil and gas prices. He brought nothing to the economy and did nothing in it. He just got lucky.

Stephen Sacker: And if you compare the chaos under Boris Yeltsin with the organization and stability that came under Putin? You say he didn't do anything. Vladimir Bukovsky:

He did nothing, absolutely nothing, in regard to the financial situation of the country. It all happened only because prices soared tenfold. This would work for anyone. If Yeltsin had lived to see this as president, he would have been lucky too. In general, to attribute all this to Putin is actually unfair. However, he did something: he brought a cohort of KGB officers to

power. They say that under him about 80 percent of the top positions in

politics, business, everywhere - everything is occupied by KGB officers. Naturally, such power becomes more

homogeneous. He destroyed the majority of democratic institutions, canceled local elections of governors, he redid the electoral laws in such a way that it became absolutely impossible for a person "from the street" or an opposition party to get into power. Today, these laws are aimed precisely at this, and it comes to ridiculous things.

Steven Sacker: In your personal manifesto, which is called, if I'm not mistaken, "Russia on the Hook of the KGB," you actually argue that Putinism - if there is such a word - is nothing more than a return to Soviet authoritarianism. Vladimir Bukovsky: More or less

it is. Stephen Sacker: And you think that's true? Vladimir Bukovsky: Oh yes. Actually, he himself, Putin, does not hides. He publicly says that.

Steven Sacker: Well, I think he would argue with anyone who would say that he is taking the country back to Soviet

times. Vladimir Bukovsky: Not at all. He publicly stated that the collapse of the Soviet Union - the disappearance of the Soviet Union - was the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century.

Stephen Sacker: Here he meant a little differently. He meant the role of Russia in the world. We will come back to this later, but for now I would like us not to deviate from your statement that Putin's Russia is just as authoritarian and just as repressive as Soviet Russia, the Soviet Union.

Vladimir Bukovsky: Well, he is trying to make it so. Stephen

Sacker: Well, that's a slightly different point of view, don't you think? Vladimir

Bukovsky: I'm not saying that Russia is exactly the same today, and I don't think that Russia will ever reach the same level that it reached under Brezhnev or Andropov - simply because the world has changed. Judge for yourself: there are things that they are not able to change, the same technical progress. Today, when there is the Internet, satellite TV, mobile phones, they will not physically be able to close the country, and it is simply impossible to build a totalitarian regime if the country is not closed.

Steven Sacker: Let's look at you, for example: in the 60s and 70s, you spent a lot of time in prisons or psychiatric hospitals - well, so-called psychiatric hospitals. Under the Soviet regime, you suffered a lot, but in the end you were allowed to leave the Soviet Union, and you have been living outside your country for almost three decades. However, the fact remains that today you can travel to Russia as much as you like. Vladimir Bukovsky: Firstly, I was not "allowed to leave". I was exchanged. Stephen Sacker: Traded, right. Vladimir

Bukovsky: Yes, I was taken out in handcuffs. Secondly, today the country is not closed. People can

go abroad, and under the Soviet regime, as you remember, it was very difficult; and, of course, the complete closure of the country from an informational point of view today

impossible.

Steven Sacker: And this is where the most important question pops up for me: after all, Vladimir Putin does not have gulags, he does not put people like you in psychiatric hospitals for years. Vladimir Bukovsky: This is

not so. It's not like that anymore. Today alone, two dozen political prisoners are already behind bars in the country. Under Yeltsin, there was not a single one - and today, with Putin coming to power, we see more and more political repressions, more and more people are not only killed for political reasons, but also put in prison and in psychiatric hospitals. Only this year there was a big scandal when in Murmansk one woman was put in a psychiatric hospital for her journalistic work and criticism of local authorities. At least half a dozen such cases have already

There is.

In other words, the return is coming. The repressive policies of the Soviet Union are slowly returning. Of course, this is not what it was under Stalin ... Steven Sacker: Stop, stop, stop! You

know, when you add this "of course-it-was-not-what-it-was", you involuntarily wonder, why then directly compare one with the other? I started my sentence with the word "Gulag", and you did not try to convince me that Putin is slowly recreating the gulags...

Vladimir Bukovsky: Well, who knows, who knows. All gulags start with a few people being arrested for political reasons, and then it all grows and grows. And today we already have a couple of dozen of them - not counting the Chechens, by the way! We do not know how many Chechens are being held in the so-called "filtration camps" - perhaps thousands. There they are tortured, beaten, killed. I mean, we just don't know much about it. Stephen Sacker: Well,

let's stop looking at the private issue of human rights and look at the issue of the public mandate, democracy. No one will say that there was at least some kind of democracy under the Soviet system. But Putin has a mandate to power, won elections twice, and according to public opinion polls—including polls by independent pollsters—about 80 percent of the Russian people trust President Putin. Vladimir Bukovsky: Brezhnev had 99.9 percent. S.S: This is not a fact, since no one would take seriously either

one study conducted in the Soviet Union.

Vladimir Bukovsky: Why do you take the current polls seriously? When people know that there is political repression in the country, including psychiatric repression, people will not answer honestly.

SS: Do you mean to say that you do not agree that President Putin is popular today? Vladimir

Bukovsky: Well, not as popular as they say. He might have something.

SS: Do not leave the question. Do you agree or disagree that President Putin is popular with the Russian people today? Vladimir

Bukovsky: It is not known how many people actually support him. I doubt more than 50 percent. I doubt. Are they talking about 80 percent? They can say "one hundred percent", what's the difference? The whole system is already "charged" so much that people are afraid to say what they think. Therefore, these surveys cannot be taken seriously. They simply cannot be ignored. Stephen Sacker: Ah, tell me why, I wonder if you're so into it

Are you sure if you don't live in Russia?

Vladimir Bukovsky: I go to Russia. And then, today there is the opportunity to get all the information about what is happening there.

Stephen Sacker: How many times have you been to Russia in the last thirty years?

Vladimir Bukovsky: Well, for the last eleven years I have not been allowed to go there. I was not given a visa, but a month ago I was in Moscow.

Stephen Sacker: And how long did you stay? Vladimir Bukovsky: A few days. On Monday I'm also going to St. Petersburg.

Stephen Sacker: You are, without a doubt, a very influential dissident. In the 60s and 70s, you were an example of courage, and today people listen to you. But don't you think that talking about what the Russian people think, living abroad and spending only a few days in the country over the past ten years, is not the best way to use such influence?

Vladimir Bukovsky: To understand what is happening, you don't have to live there 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. Today, in the age of the Internet, you can find out exactly how people feel, what they think, how they react to being sent to prison - all this is not difficult to find out. Therefore, I say what the majority of the population thinks. I don't know how many percent are still following Putin, but I doubt very much that everything is as we are told. It's all set up, people are scared, they don't say what they think, because they don't want to be put in jail or in a psychiatric hospital. In Russia today there is practically no political process at all. Steven Sacker: You know, in

talking with you, I am sometimes tempted to forget one thing, which, nevertheless, must be remembered: there are opposition parties in Russia, they can campaign, they can participate in elections, and in the parliamentary elections that will take place in Russia in early December, they will also participate. Yabloko and SPS are reliable opposition parties committed to democracy and liberalism. They have only one problem: no one votes for them.

Vladimir Bukovsky: No, they still have a lot of problems: their campaign materials are confiscated, only last week there was a message that ten million were confiscated from the Union of Right Forces

leaflets. They just confiscated it - that's all, no explanations for you. They cannot - or find it difficult to do so - to find a single hall where their supporters could gather, they are persecuted, some of them are arrested, they are mocked. This is not an election! They will never be given time on evening television, everything goes only to the party authorities.

Steven Sacker: But isn't it - and here we go back to the fact that you've been away from Russia for a long time - that many ordinary Russian people associate the liberal democratic movement with the chaos, corruption, instability and horrendous poverty of the Yeltsin years, the 90s years? No one can escape from this, and you number.

Vladimir Bukovsky: Well, that's not my problem.

Steven Sacker: No, with all due respect, that's your problem. Vladimir Bukovsky:

No. I did not impose that regime on them. Stephen Sacker: I tell

Yaina that they imposed it. Let me quote you a person who spends quite a lot of time in Russia and constantly studies the public mood there - Laurent Vanetti from the Thomas More Institute. Here is what he writes: "After the Yeltsin years, democracy, from the point of view of the population of Russia, is a political disorder, the instability of power and its abuse in the interests of a narrow group of people." You will go to Russia and agitate the people there for liberal democracy - but this is what many residents of the country consider the end product of the process you propose.

Vladimir Bukovsky: But the people also see what Putinism - and Chekism - have done to them over the past eight years, and it's all the same! Steven Sacker:

You mean 7 percent economic growth every year for the last eight years, giving a lot of them material things they never had, cars, cell phones? Vladimir Bukovsky: Enough, enough! No need to dump everything in one heap! This is only 15 percent of the population, they all serve the

same industry - oil and gas. 15 percent of the population have all this, and the remaining 65 percent do not have all this!



Steven Sacker: So you're saying that with seven percent economic growth every year for the past eight years, ordinary Russian people have not been materially prosperous? Vladimir Bukovsky: Yes, I want to. Try driving a hundred

miles from Moscow and you will see that the people live in the same poverty as they lived under Brezhnev, Andropov, Khrushchev. Nothing changed! Maybe in the center of Moscow, St. Petersburg, big cities there is all this boom, all this prosperity, and I think this is the very 15 percent.

Stephen Sacker: Understood. But if you look at the studies of sociological centers

that are considered independent, they all write that the ordinary Russian really feels the difference - in material terms, and precisely under Putin. And if you go back to the Yeltsin era, then remember that in 1996 Boris Berezovsky said in his famous interview with Forbes magazine that he - he and half a dozen other businessmen - own half of Russia! Here is the difference. Vladimir Bukovsky: This is an exaggeration, they will never

belonged to half of Russia, they owned separate companies.

Stephen Sacker: But the mentality at the time was just that, and it is to this mentality that Russia does not want to return, no?

Vladimir Bukovsky: Possibly. I'm not saying that Berezovsky should be brought back to power - or even Khodorkovsky, despite the fact that he is in prison. I'm not talking about that. I am talking about the fact that lawlessness and persecution, which have become commonplace in Russia today, must stop. Do you know that, according to some public opinion polls, up to 4 percent of people in Russia - in different parts of it - say that in the last year they were either tortured or treated inhumanely or cruelly by law enforcement agencies? Four percent! Steven Sacker: It's interesting that you believe

these polls, but not the others that say Putin is popular. Let's put it this way: either polls can be trusted or not. Vladimir Bukovsky: Wait a minute! It takes a certain amount of courage

to say that you were tortured, and therefore it is an underestimate in any case. As for Putin, the more you

you praise him, the better for you - so there she is, on the contrary, overpriced.

Stephen Sacker: Well, we talked about the economy, about human rights. Now let's talk about foreign policy and national interests. When I look at the same opinion polls, when I see this rhetoric, one thought comes to my mind: Vladimir Putin speaks in unison with the Russian people when he says: we no longer need to apologize for our past, for who we are; it's time to stand up to your full height; we are Russians! And the Russian people answer him

same.

Vladimir Bukovsky: And what would you have said in 1950 if the Germans had said: "Stop apologizing for our past, we, proud Germans, are looking forward"? This is an insult to the millions of people killed under Stalin, killed by the communist regime. By the way, if we talk about

Putin's foreign policy, that's not all: he is reviving confrontation in the world, he is increasing friction, he wants to start an arms race again. He is already threatening the West with everything: bomber flights, the development of new weapons. He openly rattles all these weapons, he wants to intimidate the whole world. It goes back to what it was during the Cold War.

Stephen Sacker: This is very interesting. As I said at the very beginning, you are considering running for the presidency. And even if you don't, you will surely add your political weight and influence to the allies - Garry Kasparov, Boris Nemtsov and others who, like you, advocate democracy.

In general, you will certainly try to run a coordinated campaign. And what, as part of such a campaign, will you tell the Russian people: "We should not have any problems with the American missile defense system"?

Vladimir Bukovsky: Absolutely none. Stephen

Sacker: "We shouldn't be proactive about getting the most out of our oil and gas reserves"? Will you say it? Vladimir Bukovsky: Exactly! This is madness! The

Soviet Union collapsed precisely because it did not have enough strength. All these strategic programs, the arms race, imperial costs and

all that. And now, when we are so lucky with oil and gas prices, do the Russian people really want all this to be thrown into the wind again - as Putin suggests, on some aircraft carriers? Of course not!

Stephen Sacker: But Putin is just saying, "Stop rubbing us everywhere." If the United States is using Poland and the Czech Republic to build a missile defense system, then we reserve the right to target our missiles at those sites that could pose a threat to us. That's all he says, and the impression is that the Russian people like it.

Vladimir Bukovsky: What he says has nothing to do with military affairs. When the Russians claim that just ten missiles in Poland threaten its national security, this is simply ridiculous. In fact, they say this to show that no one is allowed to place weapons near us. For them, Eastern Europe is still "at hand". They still have an imperial mentality, they still have not recovered from this

imperial mentality. They want Soviet glory, when they can intimidate half the world, when they can saber-rattling, that's what. Is this good for the people? This is bad for the people! They've already burned out once because of this, and I don't think they need another one.

Stephen Sacker: Kosovo is another issue that is very significant to the Kremlin, at least for now. Again, imagine that you are speaking to the people - and for the next few days you will probably have to speak at rallies in St. Petersburg or somewhere else. So, would you say: "We need to abandon our allies in Serbia, we need to give independence to Kosovo and not support these traditional Russian interests"? Vladimir Bukovsky: Do you think that the population of Russia is

generally concerned about the issue of Kosovo? Half of them had never even heard of him! They are not interested! This is of interest only to politicians, and then mainly in the so-called "power ministries" - military, KGB, internal affairs. Only they think about these games. Actually, Putin is only using Kosovo to gain control over certain areas of Georgia - Abkhazia and Ossetia. For him, this is a game in which he gets the opportunity to put pressure on Georgia so that it returns to the Russian sphere of influence.

Steven Sacker: When you state your point of view on strategic issues - completely opposed to the Kremlin's point of view - I can't help but be reminded time after time that you have lived in the United Kingdom for the last three decades. Now you are a man of the West, not a man of Russia.

Let me quote you what Putin said at a rally just a couple of days ago: "There are still those inside the country who "jackal" at foreign embassies and count on the support of foreign funds and governments, and not on the support of their own people. Those who oppose us need a weak, sick Russia. They need a disorganized and disoriented society to do their business behind our backs." Is it about you by any chance?

Vladimir Bukovsky: I'm not interested in him. Who is he? The despicable Lieutenant Colonel of the KGB. People like him followed me through the streets of Moscow all my life when I lived in Russia. He is nothing! Steven Sacker: Unfortunately for you, he's very much something. He is the President of Russia, and as we have just discussed, even when he ceases to be the President of Russia, he will still be pulling the strings behind the scenes, either in the Duma or through a successor of his own choosing in the Kremlin. He is very much

something. Vladimir Bukovsky: It means nothing to me. Stephen Sacker: What does it mean, doesn't mean? He is in the Kremlin, Av another country, and don't you want to run for president?

Vladimir Bukovsky: When he talks about money, it makes me laugh, because they made it impossible to finance opposition parties. Political activity cannot be financed from abroad, and in Russia no business will give money to opposition parties after the Yukos affair and Khodorkovsky's imprisonment, because he was imprisoned precisely because he gave money to opposition parties. In general, all opposition forces are simply deprived of any resources whatsoever.

Stephen Sacker: What about people like Boris Berezovsky? Here, on the air of our program, he said that he wanted to overthrow Putin, that he had high-ranking acquaintances in the Kremlin. Vladimir Bukovsky: Don't believe him!

Steven Sacker: I'm just asking: here you are, living here in the United Kingdom, just like Berezovsky; The Kremlin claims that people like you work hand in hand with people like Berezovsky.

Vladimir Bukovsky: I am not. I don't work hand in hand with him.

Stephen Sacker: Do you keep in touch with him? Vladimir

Bukovsky: I know him. The last time I saw him was a year ago at Litvinenko's funeral, and I haven't seen him for a whole year, and we don't have any business with him. When he says that he has high-ranking acquaintances and influence, I think he is exaggerating, he is wishful thinking. Yes, he wants Putin out of power - we all want

the same - but I don't think he has any means to do so. As for finances, none of us and none of the opposition forces in Russia would have thought of taking money from Berezovsky: it's bad money. Taking money from Berezovsky is (laughs) the kiss of death.

Stephen Sacker: Well, you say you won't take any money from him. How are you going to change something in Russia? Again, let's go back to these polls: whether you, Kasyanov, Nemtsov, any opposition figure standing today at the forefront of the democratic movement - according to these polls, all of you have a rating of less than one percent. How are you going to change things?

Vladimir Bukovsky: As for me, my task is very limited. I know that I will not be allowed to run for president. The Electoral Commission has already stated this. Stephen Sacker:

Because you haven't lived in Russia in the last ten years? Vladimir Bukovsky:

Therefore, because I have a double citizenship is a lot.

Stephen Sacker: Well, I see. So, it will not be you, but you will give your political weight to one of these figures, maybe Kasparov or someone like him. How are you going to change Russia after that? Vladimir

Bukovsky: My task is to give

people courage, because they have lost it. They don't have the courage anymore. They think that the enemy is too strong, that there are too few of them, and my task is to come to them and say: almost fifty years ago, when we

rebelled against the Soviet system for the first time, there were even fewer of us, and the

enemy was even stronger. And today, when people are again afraid to say what they think, my task is to come to them and say: here I am, I'm here - I'm not afraid. As I was not afraid fifty years ago. That's all I can do. I can help people like my good friend Harry, or Nemtsov, anyone who goes.

Stephen Sacker: Do you think they are afraid? At one time, Kasparov was sitting in the very place where you are sitting now: he did not impress me as a person who is ready to literally lay down his life "for his friends", for changes in Russia - but are they afraid?

Vladimir Bukovsky: There are people who are ready to lay down their lives, if necessary. Maybe Harry might change his mind for some other reason. He is not a coward, he is a very brave man.

He and I are doing one thing: we are trying to mobilize as many people in Russia as possible, who are now in disarray, who have been struck by apathy, to mobilize them and say that today is the last chance. If we don't rise up today, there will never be democracy in Russia again.

Stephen Sacker: You say amazing things. According to you, Putin is nothing. Vladimir

Bukovsky: Right. Steven

Sacker: But Putin is not going anywhere, he will still dominate the political arena. How dangerous do you think the current time is - especially for relations between Russia and the West - I mean the next year or two?

Vladimir Bukovsky: He is dangerous. When I say "Putin is nothing," I mean that he is just a faceless representative of the old KGB corporation. He is not a player. He is a puppet that this corporation has brought to the stage and who only "manages affairs" on its behalf. I mean it. And the power behind it is a great power. These are millions of KGB officers, KGB agents and so on. And they are, of course, dangerous, because they want a confrontation with the West, and we do not know how this confrontation will unfold, especially in some hot spots. It can turn into terrible things.

2007

## Brezhnev is better than this Putin!

(From an interview for the newspaper La Repubblica, Italy. Translated by O.

Kameneva) "It is true that the winds that blow these days are reminiscent of the winds of the first Cold War. In any case, before the fall of the Berlin Wall, there was a clear confrontation between the two worlds: the communist totalitarian world on the one hand, the liberal and democratic world on the other. Today, on the contrary, in the Kremlin's ambitions there is only a revanchist spirit that would like to return Russia to its former imperial

greatness. So thinks Vladimir Bukovsky, writer and former Soviet dissident.

- Do you see signs of the Soviet model in the behavior of Medvedev and Putin? "Their

hysteria makes me think of Hitler. In contrast, the leaders of the Soviet era showed more apathy but more common sense. Were intoxicated with ideology, but maintained a balanced behavior.

- Putin, like Hitler, doesn't this comparison seem excessive? - The Russian Prime Minister is a very irritable, very nervous person, he has a lot of various complexes. I mean his inferiority complex, the same as Hitler's. Like the head of the Third Reich, who never ceased to complain about the fact that Germany was humiliated, Putin also endlessly repeats that Russia was insulted and that the West does not respect her dignity.

- You can say that you prefer Soviet dictators the current leaders of the Kremlin?

- Putin and his entourage seem to me more dangerous than the gerontocrats of the past, who are used to thinking before reacting. Despite that, they also made huge mistakes. "Such as the invasion of Afghanistan?"



- Yes. But then they realized that they had made a mistake. I happened to read the minutes of the Politburo meetings, at which the question was discussed: to send troops to Afghanistan or not. Complicated debates for a whole year with people saying, "Why should we go into Afghanistan? What will others say? We will be accused of being invaders. For what?".

Now it's a completely different matter. The logic of the attack on Georgia is similar to the logic of yard hooligans in the yard, who say: "Now we will show these scoundrels who beat us up." This is the idiotic logic of a bunch of

criminals. The situation in Russia can no longer end with a "round table"

- only judgment. It is necessary to save the country not together with them, but from them.

2008

## **The corporation of Chekists clung to power**

(Interview for Novaya Gazeta. Hosted by V. Beresnev) —

Vladimir Konstantinovich, Putin's regime is often compared to the Soviet one (which the president himself seems to have no objection to). Do you have the feeling that you came to the same country that exchanged you for Luis Corvalan? No, it's stupid to compare with that

time. Then there was a totalitarian regime, and now it is an authoritarian one. The difference is huge. A totalitarian regime differs from an authoritarian one, firstly, by the presence of an ideology, and secondly, by a complete monopolization of the truth, and today this is no longer possible. Russia is an open country: we will find out everything that happens here, literally on the same day via the Internet. This is a colossal difference: I remember with what difficulty and risk we managed to collect and disseminate information about repressions in the Soviet era. Today there is an exit from the country, and before people went to prison for someone's right to leave.

- But modern statesmen are distinguished by the steepness of morals. Previously, they could put them in a psychiatric hospital, send them to the West, but now

they just kill them. - It's true, they killed even then, but much less, because the Central Committee of the party was in charge of such issues. The Politburo of the Central Committee, just in case, controlled the work of the KGB, remembering how many people died in the thirties. The fact that today the Chekists are again out of control makes them even more dangerous.

And yet, don't misunderstand me: without Soviet planning, they won't be able to kill much. What they are doing is disgusting, criminal, but it cannot be compared not only with the Stalin era, but also with the times when we lived. Then you went to the square, stood for 30-60 seconds and were guaranteed to receive three years in the camps. And now they had a fight with OMON, and Garry Kasparov received five days. I feel sorry for Garik, but this is still not three years of camps. - There is already progress: in St.

Petersburg, journalist Andrushchenko received two months.

— I do not justify the authorities. Planting for political reasons is shameful for any country. But there is no need to compare with Soviet repressions, the present time is relatively easy. As a professional, I see how much more opportunities there are today. They put Larisa Arap in a psychiatric hospital - and all the press rose on its hind legs. And released almost immediately. And before - where could you make a fuss? It was unimaginable inside the country. We had to use Western broadcasting, Western human rights organizations, and it was impossible to protest inside the country.

“But Putin is acting gradually. What was impossible four years ago is possible now, and what is difficult to imagine now - for example, mass repressions - will be possible, God forbid, already tomorrow. Moreover, we have prepared a law on extremism, which allows every second person to be declared an extremist. — The fact that society in Russia is apathetic does not mean at all that it rejoices at these innovations. No one can be happy

about this, because he understands: he can be there tomorrow. Moreover, given the existing police arbitrariness, everyone understands that they can be seized, beaten, and tortured for no reason. Another thing is that people hope that if they sit quietly, this will not affect them. This is quite typical for people, and not only in Russia. However, the GB corporation seized power in a completely Leninist way and will not just leave. In addition, there is a lot of money, and before there was only an ideology,

position, privilege.

- But there was also the gold of the party. - The

Chekists have absolutely scrap money, which no one in the USSR even dreamed of: after all, they are all now billionaires. Some Bill Gates invented a whole system, created an efficient company to become a billionaire. And what did they do? They just stuck to the oil pipe - and immediately billionaires. One thing remains unchanged: the Gulag is still walking around the country. In Soviet times, Russia was a concentration

camp, in Yeltsin's time it was a big transfer, where there is no order, no one is responsible for anything, they will kill you and no one will notice. And now - the red zone, cop territory. The most interesting thing is that in modern Russia there are bribed leaders, and this amazes me. They don't seem to

sat. Here Putin says: to wet in the toilet, but he does not understand what it is. It's a pose, imposture, he pretends to be cool. Some Pavlovsky came up with this phrase for him. In fact, the term "soak in the toilet" came from Stalin's times, from the camp riots. As soon as a riot began, the informers were killed first of all so that they would not be told who the instigator of the riots was. The informers were really drenched in the toilet, because it is convenient: it is large, separate, they silently killed them and dumped them into the pit.

- Putin, of course, did not study thieves' vocabulary in the camps, but he grew up in that post-war Leningrad, where they played hair dryers well in the yards. And how an official was formed in gangster Petersburg and, they say, even communicated with many criminal authorities, now deceased or arrested. - The authority of Barsukov (Kuma) was just

now arrested. It seems to me that this was a signal to Putin himself: do not try to leave. If you leave, Kum will sing and tell a lot about you. Interestingly, immediately after the arrest of Barsukov, Putin announced that he would head the electoral list of United Russia. - So you think that Putin is a dependent person and is being

manipulated? "He looks like a weak man. I am a good physiognomist: where I was, a person had

to be assessed in 30 seconds. A newcomer enters the cell, and you must immediately understand who it is. Therefore (based on my experience) I think that Putin is a weak, thin person, petty, very vindictive, insecure, with great complexes. He has a fairly typical complex, characteristic of people of small stature. - But Stalin, and Hitler, and Napoleon were, to put it mildly, not

very high.

"Stalin was a first-class gangster, godfather. Putin clearly does not pull on Stalin. I think that Putin's real rating is no more than 20%. They all lie: it rarely happens that a president rules for eight years and does not bother anyone. Right now, Bush has a rating of 30%, and this is natural: he delayed two terms, he got fed up with everyone, he went off the rails with the war. Yes, and Putin went wrong with the war. I think that the situation is much worse for the president and his entourage, that's why they are so furious. Why else would the Marches of Dissent be dispersed? Everything c

in a civilized way: would Garry Kasparov and Boris Nemtsov really start throwing stones and breaking shop windows? Dispersal of marches is the best evidence that official polls and ratings are complete bullshit, because people who have an 80% rating do not disperse peaceful demonstrations.

Chekists in our time were far from professional: we, a small handful of dissidents, babbled them as we pleased and ultimately won. And now the level of the special services has fallen even more, because in the nineties the most professional security officers went into commercial structures, went into business. Today it is the level of the Zaraysk police department. They are not engaged in state security, they are engaged in extorting money.

"But the professional level of the opposition leaves much to be desired. For example, I don't understand why Berezovsky makes his scandalous statements about financing the "orange revolution in Russia"? After all, he only confirms the main postulate of the Kremlin propaganda that the opposition are agents of the West and fugitive oligarchs...

- Berezovsky is a mysterious man. I have known him for seven years, although I see him no more than once a year. He claims to finance the opposition, and lies at the same time. I told him: Boris, now they will nominate me for the presidency - do not try to say somewhere that you are giving me money, I will cut off your head. He is a petty vain fellow. "I came up with this," said the traveler frog and plopped into the swamp. After all, he harms himself: the British have already warned him: if you make such statements, we will deprive him of political asylum. And he still blathers - stupid, senseless and untrue.

- In my view, you are not so much a politician as a writer, a romantic. You stood at the base of the lighthouses when seditious verses were publicly read at the Mayakovsky monument in Moscow. Now it is even difficult to imagine that society can be awakened from apathy with poetry. - There

was a so-called Khrushchev thaw outside, people suddenly felt liberated, a lot of things were published that were not published later. From this era came the Soviet samizdat. There were many literary movements - you know, like in the twenties. There were quite talented guys, for example, Leonid Gubanov (leader of SMOG - The Youngest

Society of Geniuses. - V.B.), who wrote: "I am the thirty-seventh card that has nothing to beat." At the same time, we were still caught and beaten - the Komsomol operational detachments were engaged in this. - The then "Ours".

— Yes, the then Nashi. They were also expelled from universities, but they did not imprison. The first serious arrests occurred in 1961, when seven people were arrested at once.

In 1991, on my first return to Russia, I read at the monument to Mayakovsky the poems of the poet Yura Galansky, whose remains were brought to Moscow - he died in the camp, and now I read his "Human Manifesto" .... The main thing

is that I came up with this for political purposes. Then there was no Internet and it was impossible to create a page like "We are anti-Soviet", it was impossible to hang a poster: "Everyone who does not like Soviet power, come here." And I found this form: it seems to be nothing political - well, yes, we read the poems of banned, executed poets - but only anti-Soviet people came to listen.

2007

## Putin and Agatha Christie

(Interview for the RFI agency. Hosted by Y. Gorbonevsky) On February 29, 2012, the candidate for the post of President of Russia Vladimir Putin met with his supporters and confidants. The entrance of this meeting he blamed. I would like to say, in all sins, but to be more precise: Putin accused the opposition, firstly, of being ready to kill some prominent public figure, and then blame Putin for this. Second, Putin accused the opposition of intending to rig the elections, and then (again) blame Putin for this. In connection with this statement, we contacted Vladimir Bukovsky.

RFI: With us is Vladimir Bukovsky, a former Soviet political prisoner with ties to the Russian opposition and a longtime resident of England. We are writing to you today because you have

some experience with the KGB and because you live abroad. Vladimir Putin, accusing the opposition of being ready to kill, said in

in particular:

"They have been trying to apply it for ten years, first of all, those who are sitting abroad. (.) They are even looking for the so-called "sacred sacrifice" from among some prominent people. They will "bang" themselves, excuse me," Putin said, "and then they will blame the authorities."

You, Vladimir Konstantinovich Bukovsky, are just "sitting abroad." And if you are not going to "bang" someone yourself, then you probably know who is going to do it?

Vladimir Bukovsky: Of course, he did not mean me. He meant - they have already done this several times - Berezovsky, Zakayev, etc. Just now this disinformation has resumed, which the KGB scatters everywhere, that, they say, they killed Politkovskaya

joint forces.

In general, this technique is not a very new KGB, if you know the history of the GB. Ayas I deal with them - well, how much? - 50 years, a little

over 50 years. So, I studied them very well. They have always had this. They have two

propaganda tricks. The first, I would say, is from Chekhov: "Of course, it is flattering to offend everyone's widow." This is their main propaganda motive: the West wants to offend us, poor widow Russia, and sees the purpose of its existence in this.

And the second - from Gogol: "The non-commissioned officer's widow flogged herself." This is a typical KGB trick. So they killed Litvinenko - and their misinformation began: well, of course, he killed himself, he was transporting some radioactive substances - from where, where - it is not known - he killed himself, they killed him, Berezovsky killed him. Why would Berezovsky kill Litvinenko? Especially polonium, which

is produced only in Russia. And now he repeats. Normal pattern for them. For us, it sounds wild, like the stories of Agatha

Christie, but they do it routinely. Their technique is very simple: they set some person against you (split some groups), they set someone against you, fix the fact that you are enemies. Although you are not enemies - one

attacks others.

And then his cold corpse is found somewhere in the River Thames. And that's all - you are to blame, you are enemies with him. It's clear. And all the huge propaganda through all the agents of influence in the West starts shouting: "They are here, these are their internal squabbles," etc. And what does this have to do with internal squabbles? This is normal, routine work of the KGB.

RFI: You are talking about the KGB. But at one time you communicated not only with representatives of the KGB, but also with criminals - you were sitting with them in the same prison cells. Why am I talking about this, because in Putin's language, in his vocabulary, something clearly leans towards this criminal side. You, who are familiar with criminals in practice, noted this, can you say something about proximity to criminals, or does this not have serious grounds? Vladimir Bukovsky: How! Of course, it's very close. One of the first

commandments that thieves in law taught me was: "Never threaten anyone." Do you need to kill someone? Go and kill silently, but never threaten, because then they will kill and blame you.



In the criminal world, this is a normal thing, they all know it. I this I remembered the commandment, I never threatened anyone.

RFI: So now you are looking at Vladimir Putin through the eyes of the criminal world that you once encountered. But I asked a question about the criminal component of Putin himself, which can sometimes be found in his vocabulary. Is there such a component, or is it an impression from the outside? Vladimir Bukovsky: There is such a component, but it is artificial. I just see that one of his

image makers deliberately introduces him with criminal vocabulary, criminal phrases, criminal gestures, on purpose. I remember how he first built his image. He was prepared for the presidency - through the explosions of houses, the Chechen war began, and Putin was shown to us: here is a real strong man who will save us all from this threat. And he said the famous phrase "wet in the toilet." I looked and laughed for a long time - he doesn't even know why he's in the toilet? This is the same criminal expression that came from the camps, when there were camp uprisings in the final Stalinist period. And the

camps were huge then - there were 15-20 thousand in the camps. And huge toilets usually stood on a hillock with cesspools. And the first thing the rebels did was kill the informers and throw them into the toilet. Because they won't pump him out until spring, they won't find the corpse. That's what the situation was. And from here came the expression "wet in the toilet." This expression means "wet the informers." And Putin, of

course, completely without understanding - he is the same criminal as I am - the tenor of the Bolshoi Theater - but this image was prepared for him. I just saw how he approached this phrase, he artificially approached it in order to utter this prepared phrase: "Where we catch them, there we will, sorry, kill them. If we catch it in the toilet, we will soak it in the toilet." And why on earth would he catch terrorists in the toilets? What toilets, where? Why do terrorists have to go to the same toilet?

RFI: Let's go back to Putin's February 29 speech to his campaign headquarters. Here is what he said: "Our opponents are preparing for these events, they are preparing, unfortunately, - I will now say this publicly, criticism will immediately begin, they will say: "give evidence" - in principle, we will present them

we can, they are preparing to use some kind of mechanisms that would confirm that the elections are rigged. They will throw it in themselves, control it themselves, then present it themselves."

How can you assess this statement by Vladimir Putin?

Vladimir Bukovsky: This is again from Gogol's series "non-commissioned officer's widow flogged herself." It turns out that we do all the violations, not the authorities. All falsifications, fakes - everything is done by the opposition, not the authorities. Power has

nothing to do with it. Why Putin is always chosen at the same time is incomprehensible. Who really should win if this is such a massive fraud? Who should win? Probably not Putin. And for some reason he wins. This means that all violations, all falsifications are in his favor. This is their typical approach.

Since this is a rather psychologically complex paradigm, it is calculated on the fact that the layman, the average person, is difficult for him and Agatha Christie. And then such a twist, turn - go understand. And these are standard techniques - from the 20s. Yes, and since pre-revolutionary times.

They had a way that one of my acquaintances called "create an atmosphere of murder." Suddenly they start talking about some person, that an assassination attempt is being prepared on him, that something will happen to him. He killed or was killed, but there was something. Here is the idea: link the name and the murder, and then either accuse him of the murder, or kill him and accuse someone, his enemies, of killing him. This is a standard absolutely Bolshevik technique, which, by the way, was borrowed by Hitler. And he did it too.

RFI: You said, "don't threaten, because then you can be accused of murder." But on February 29, Putin said all this. He said that someone would be "banned", he said that the observers would falsify the elections themselves. But after all, if he said this and now they really kill someone, after all, everyone will immediately think of him, of Putin? Or if observers are accused of falsifying the elections themselves, everyone will say: "Putin ordered such an accusation 5 days before the elections," and again they will blame Putin himself? It turns out a strange discrepancy. Maybe he's not going to do any of this?

Vladimir Bukovsky: I'm sure it's going to. To understand this as Putin's order is understood by the minority. And the majority will take the story at face value: "they themselves falsified and filmed." What will happen? On this basis, they will try to prevent observers from going to polling stations, they will take away their equipment. That's what will happen. And they will justify this by the fact that "they themselves prepared falsifications in order to film and show."

confuse. Their business is to confuse, so that everything is ambiguous. I remember when Litvinenko was killed here in London, how many versions the KGB gave out! It is fantastic! Their department A, which deals with disinformation, worked, I think, 24 hours a day. And this and that, and this angle, and that angle, and now he consulted the police in the fight against organized crime. What kind of organized crime could there be if he was killed with polonium?

They don't care that these versions are unlikely, that they are funny somewhere. It is important for them to give them out as much as possible. So that it is not unambiguous: here is Litvinenko and here is the Kremlin. No, around a lot of options they came up with at once. This is their trick, and they are not in any way embarrassed by the fact that Putin said this - Putin is a smart person, he saw this in advance, he apparently already had operational data that such a thing was being prepared. That's what he said.

RFI: Yes, he says he already has proof. Vladimir Bukovsky:

Well, well, well. So he will do just that. And I'm warning so many of my acquaintances here: "Guys, avoid any hostility." We also have those who are specially set against you so that they go around, they say slander about you. And if you react to this, if you, for example, sue, etc., then they will kill him, and you are to blame. You are a natural enemy.

RFI: Between the two Russian elections (if you can call it elections) - the Duma and the presidential - Russian civil society seems to have woken up. There were massive, by Russian standards, marches, opposition rallies on Bolotnaya Square, on Sakharov Avenue. And in St. Petersburg there were more people at opposition rallies. And in provincial cities too. You say that people will believe in those simple versions that

The KGB offers the Russian people. Or maybe the society will wake up after all, will still think and will not be so gullible?

Vladimir Bukovsky: Let's approach differently, as the Kremlin does. They are now educated - they have their own sociologists, psychologists. Yes, for those who have woken up, all these hints of Putin are worth nothing, they will never believe him again. But let's see what part of society has woken up. Obviously not the biggest. There are, indeed, a significant number of people who woke up, understood everything about the Kremlin. You can't bring them down with any misinformation. But after all, the majority of people, especially those who hesitate - and there are always 30-35% of them who have not yet decided what to do - they are ordinary citizens, they have never played KGB detectives, they have never read anything about it. Well, maybe read Agatha

Christie, I hope. And so, in principle, for them this is a completely incredible, puzzling thing - so who did kill whom and why? And it's still not good. Even if you don't believe that it was the opposition who killed someone, and you suspect that it was the KGB, it's still not good. Murder is bad for everyone. This is a very standard technique for them, and it is a win-win.

2012

## Between the BBC and the FSB

(Regarding the BBC film "Putin, Russia and the West")

Please note that in my article I did not mention the name of Maria Ilyinichna Slonim and do not really understand why she considered herself entitled to get personal, and even in such a cheeky form. Apparently, she believes that our long-standing acquaintance gives her such a right. Strange logic. Yes, we have known each other for forty years, and quite close. That is why her attempt to present me as some kind of paranoid who sees the KGB under every bush looks so ugly ("sees a conspiracy in everything"). She knows perfectly well that I do not belong to this category of people. Even Professor Lunts at the Serbsky Institute did not give me such a

diagnosis. On the contrary, precisely because I have butted heads with this institution for the past half century, and I have butted heads quite successfully, the FSB-KGB causes nothing but contempt in me. Contempt and even boredom, because they are predictable to a yawn. And now, after the collapse of the USSR, they were disqualified to the level of the Zarskoye police department, so that even an ordinary residential building in their own Ryazan cannot be blown up without burning themselves. They killed Yandarbiev in Qatar - got caught. They killed Litvinenko in London - they got caught. For God's sake, any paranoia will be cured without a trace, if we remember at least a cheerful flock of Russian "illegal scouts" driven home, to their native stall, embarrassed by Ar

Moreover, Maria Ilyinichna knows perfectly well that by my nature I am by no means inclined to hasty conclusions or unfounded ("wild") accusations. Suffice it to say that in the 35 years of my life in the West I have published 8 books, hundreds of articles, but no one, anywhere, has ever sued me for libel. Well, if they had filed, they would have lost with a guarantee. Camp education teaches you to take responsibility for your words. After all, the rules there are simple: if you can't prove it, keep quiet, otherwise it's four on the side, yours are

gone. So if I write something, then, rest assured, I am ready to confirm it in an English court, and the libel laws here are the toughest in the world. Here I will be required to prove every word. For what

I, however, am not ready, so it is to be responsible for the words that I did NOT say. I should note that while reading the comments to my articles on the Russian Internet, I have long noticed a certain percentage of comments that seem to have nothing to do with my texts. Either the person did not read what I wrote at all, or he looked diagonally and immediately rushed to comment. This behavior was difficult for me to understand until someone explained to me that it is now considered fashionable in Russia to visit hundreds of blogs, forums, chats a day and leave comments everywhere, like a business card. Of course, with such hard work, there is no time to read.

So my last article caused a certain amount of comments like: "Oh, did the FSB really buy up all the BBC?" That is, these commentators did not even read the very first line of my article, which says in black and white: "They cleverly used the BBC film "Putin, Russia and the West." Note that it says "used", not "made a movie" or "bought the BBC". It seems to be simpler: the FSB (KGB) is always trying to use people in the dark, to deceive, to powder their brains, but their donkey ears again crawled out. Here is the meaning of what is said. What's incomprehensible here? However, if I can imagine a Stakhanovite multi-station blogger who has no time to read, then I can't imagine Maria Ilyinichna writing an answer to an old friend without reading what the friend wrote. But she also begins her opus with the words: "But it's even more stupid to accuse the BBC and the Brook Lapping television company of working for the FSB." It's not just stupid - I can't even dream of

having all those thousands of BBC employees working for the FSB. If this happened, I would respect these latter for the first time in my life. Say, Maria Ilyinichna does not understand the difference between "work for" and "be used"? He understands perfectly. She is, how to put it more elegantly, disingenuous. You know, a little slyness really adorns a lady. "The interview with Jonathan Powell was recorded a year ago. Powell admits only that there really was a spy stone. Not a single word does he hint at that Russian human rights activists were financed by British intelligence! It is not the fault of the BBC and even Jonathan Powell that the Russian authorities used the stone story for their own purposes.

"The BBC put the rock story into a press release because it's a SENSATION."

And again our lady is disingenuous. Where is the sensation? Some retired official of the former government "recognizes" something there. Yes, and an official with a bad reputation. Well, not a sensation for Britain. But this is definitely a sensation for Russia, where Putin's propaganda (and behind it the layman) will certainly say: "Yeah, so the FSB was right, there was a stone! And if the FSB is right about this, then it is probably right about the rest." Precisely to amplify the sensation in Russia, the BBC's Russian-language site goes on a hoax by reporting this "sensation" under the heading: "London admits to using 'spy stone'". The English-language website of the same BBC on the same day gives the news much more modestly: "Former Blair aide reveals UK did spy on Russia using fake rock" ("Former Blair aide confirms that Britain was spying in Russia using fake rock"). So who really "recognized" the spy stone - "London" (which traditionally means "the British government") or "the former assistant to Blair"? The government has not made any statements about this. How did a certain Powell suddenly become London? Well, a sensation followed: in three days (!) a propaganda video made by Mamontov

quite predictably revived a campaign of slander against human rights activists. There followed a statement by some FSB general that, they say, we always said this, and now London has confirmed it. And it's time, they say, to close down such spy organizations as Golos or Memorial. Followed by the expulsion of the "Voice" from the premises, a raid on the Moscow office of the "Memorial" police with dogs. Easily predictable "sensation" began.

All this, we note, in a suspiciously record time for the traditionally slovenly Russia. And knowing the Zaraysk level of the current Chekists, I dare to say: they waited, knew in advance, prepared. They did not know how to react so quickly even in the old days. Of course, "not the fault

of the BBC. that the Russian authorities used the stone story for their own purposes" in 2006. And now? Could at least not make an artificial sensation out of this dubious story?

“Our film is not about how Putin came to power. This is a topic for another film, and such a film has already been made. And not alone. Our film begins with the transfer of power from Yeltsin to Putin. And this is a fact. And the analysis of what brought Putin to power was not part of our

task.” Again cunning. The film, by the way, chronologically begins on August 9, 1999, with the appointment of Putin as prime minister, then jumps to the announcement of Yeltsin as his successor and Putin's famous phrase "wet in the toilet." It will not even be entirely clear to the Western viewer what kind of terrorists should be looked for in the toilet and why. That is, it is obvious that even the mention of explosions of houses is deliberately avoided. Otherwise, we would have to say who did it. And here, whatever you say, it's bad: after all, no one was ever caught except for two FSB officers in Ryazan. “And this is a fact,” as Maria Ilyinichna writes. “As for interviews

with Russian political figures, no one asked for and no one gave (the BBC never does this!) No guarantees that the film would not be directed against them or against anyone. The film was released, like all films made by Brooke Lapping and the BBC, without any approval from anyone. We did not give any promises or guarantees to the Russian side regarding the direction of the film. The only thing we told everyone, and I hope we did not deceive anyone, was that we tried to make the film as objective as possible.”

We agree, however, that excessive slyness no longer adorns a lady - there are other names for it in Russian. Never say never". Among those documents that I copied from the archives of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1992, there is a whole bundle about cooperation with the Western press, including television, and specifically with the BBC. The topics are varied, only the main condition does not change, "take note that under the terms of the agreement, the film can be shown on American television only after its approval by APN." There are so many of these materials that I eventually stopped copying them. Here is just a quick listing of what I was not too lazy to write out:

January 6, 1969. Negotiations between APN and The New York Times on preparations in 1969-1970. joint materials about the USSR.



July 30, 1970

producer J. Fleeming "In the country of the Soviets."

May 20, 1971. Joint TV program of APN and Granada (England) "Soviet Woman".

May 26, 1971. A joint television program between the APN and the BBC "Culture and Art of Georgia".

December 28, 1971. Talks between TASS and Reuters.

August 22, 1972. On the joint filming of APN and "Granada" TV movie "Education System in the USSR."

March 13, 1973. About the joint filming of the APN and the BBC film about

Novgorod. June 28, 1973. On the joint production of the APN and the BBC film "Kyiv: city, events,

people." July 10, 1973. On the joint production of APN and Thames television" four episodes about the role of the USSR in World War II.

October 24, 1973. About the joint filming of the APN and the BBC documentary about Shostakovich. May

27, 1974. On the filming of a BBC television program on European security under the control of the State Committee for Radio and Television. June 18,

1974. About the joint filming of the APN and the BBC TV movie "Lake Baikal". February 14,

1975. On the provision of production and creative services to the English television company BBC in the filming of a feature film about the Soviet director Aleksandrov. April

9, 1976. On the preparation of the APN together with the Weekend Television company for the television program The Soviet Union after the 25th

Congress of the CPSU. May 26, 1976. On the filming of APN together with the Yorkshire Television

company of the television film "Soviet Family" on July 10, 1979. On the provision of production and creative services to the American television company P-T-V Production Inc. in the filming of a serial documentary film about museums, architectural

and historical monuments of the USSR. April 3, 1980. On the provision of production and creative services to the American company Foreign Tra

a series of documentaries dedicated to the cultural program of the 1980 Olympic Games and Moscow. July 1,

1980. On the provision of production and creative services to the English television company "Granada" in the filming of a documentary television film about the history of Soviet cinema. (You will say: "So what? This is a completely innocent topic." And you will be mistaken. This is what the Soviet embassy considered: "... the creation of a series of films about the history of Soviet cinema can have a positive propaganda effect. Especially given the current situation in England.")

Particularly sweet, in my opinion, is this: "On the filming of the BBC television program on European security issues under the control of the State Committee for Radio and Television." So don't teach me what a free press is, please. (For history buffs, a few examples of such documents can be seen here.) "We did not give any promises or guarantees to

the Russian side regarding the direction of the film." The statement is strong, but it is not clear on what it is

based. After all, as it turns out, it was not Maria Ilyinichna who negotiated with the "Russian side" on these issues: "I participated in the preparation of the series"

Putin, Russia and the West "as a senior consultant, planned and conducted interviews, including with Jonathan Powell - and I can say that the truth is much simpler than it seems to sensationalists," one Angus Roxburgh, a British journalist and broadcaster, tells us. It turns out that he also wrote the book accompanying the film and, it seems, wrote a press release, although he does not talk about it himself. "It was basically my job as the show's chief consultant to convince the Russians to get involved. In the previous three years, I worked as an adviser to Putin's press secretary, Dmitry Peskov, and I entered the project feeling confident that I could attract any Russian up to and including the "master", as Peskov called him," he writes elsewhere. Not weak. Indeed, the truth turned out to be much simpler. Peskov's consultant for working with the Western press. That is, he taught Peskov

how to improve the image of the Putin regime, while this regime killed children in Beslan, killed independent journalists and

human rights activists, plundered billions of state money, planted Khodorkovsky. Well, nice person, isn't it? So who is this lover of Russian sensations? Let's translate from Wikipedia:

Since 1992, Roxborough has been the BBC's Moscow Correspondent, and since 1998, the BBC's European Correspondent. He wrote a book, *Preachers of Hate*, about the rise of the extreme right in Europe. For three years, starting in 2006, he worked for the Brussels-based PR company GPlus as an adviser to the Russian government. In 2009-2011, he participated in the work on the second BBC series about Russia "Putin, Russia and the West" and wrote the book "A strong hand: Vladimir Putin and the fight for Russia". In April 2011, he made a documentary radio program "Communist Space" on BBC Radio 4 on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of Yuri Gagarin's space flight. And what is this PR company GPlus?

Ketchum Inc. and its affiliate GPlus Europe are among the PR agencies used by the Russian government to advertise the alleged benefits of partnering with Russia. The Russian government is said to have spent millions on these operations. GPlus specializes in hiring former EU officials and prominent journalists. Gregor Kreuzhuber, who heads the company's operations for Gazprom, is a former European Commission spokesman for industry. Peter Witt is the former Deputy Ambassador of Germany to the EU. Angus Roxborough, another worker

GPlus, covered the war in Chechnya for the

BBC. Continue - or find yourself? So which of us is paranoid: me or Wikipedia? ..

But back to our crafty lady. Although I'm not Vladimir Ilyich, I would quite brotherly advise her to remember an old anecdote with three morals, the last of which was: "having got into the city ... but, sit down and don't chirp." And what is the desire to play the role of defender of the honor of the uniform of the BBC? The uniform is not the first freshness for a long time. Gone are the days when it was "the custom in Rus' to listen to the BBC at night." Like many other great institutions, the BBC has degraded, turned into a stronghold of the most unbridled leftism (only the communists can call it right). All England knows that for a number of

issues (not related to Russia in any way - for example, about European integration) The BBC is engaged in propaganda. There have been official investigations into the matter (eg by the Lord Wilson Commission) and the allegations against the BBC have been confirmed. Hundreds, if not thousands, of English people are now refusing on principle to pay the TV ownership tax, because the money goes to the BBC, and it is against their conscience to pay for their propaganda.

"We publish the sensation that we were fed, we don't think about the consequences and we don't answer for them" - this is a mammoth position in its purest form. There is such a thing as responsible journalism. And there is such a thing as irresponsible journalism. If, for example, the Kremlin slandered people to justify political repressions, and then some bastard in the West was found who agreed to confirm this slander (in whole or in part), then making a sensation out of this is just journalistic irresponsibility. Especially when it's a no brainer that the sensation will be used by the Chekists for repressions against innocent people.

History is full of examples when completely honest people were involuntarily drawn into Chekist provocations, starting from the "Trust" and up to the present day. The only worthy way out in such a situation is to publicly apologize and tell everything that you know on the merits of the case. You have to decide - either you were set up (and this frees you from all obligations of loyalty, confidentiality, etc.), or you are a conscious accomplice and will justify the evil done to the end. Everyone has moments in life when they have to choose: to sacrifice a

warm place on the BBC, on NTV, in the Union of Soviet Writers - or to sacrifice conscience and reputation. For people who were unwittingly drawn into the KGB provocation on the BBC, such a moment has come now.

Maria Ilyinichna is right about only one thing: the BBC does not care who wins and who loses in the elections in Russia. I willingly admit that Lady Phillimore does not give a damn. But does Masha Slonim give a damn?

2012

## About the BBC, the FSB and the spy stone

I have no doubt that this is an FSB operation. They cleverly used the BBC film "Putin, Russia and the West". This allowed

them to resurrect their old "spy stone" propaganda in the midst of mass actions in Moscow and on the eve of the presidential elections.

The explanations of the

filmmakers about the accident of what happened are not at all convincing. Firstly, no

one explains why this "insignificant", in their opinion, episode was included in the official press release of the BBC, although it is not yet shown in the shown part of the film. Obviously, the compilers of the press release were well aware of the sensationalism of this episode, understanding the inevitability of the revival of the FSB's slander of human rights activists and the scandal associated with this. That is, they perfectly understood what a gift they were giving the Kremlin at a critical moment, and either neglected this in a cynical pursuit of a sensation, or deliberately went for it from much worse considerations. After all, if it had been made public only in a few weeks, it would have been too late to unwind the scandal before the elections. And hardly anyone would have paid attention to him without a press release.

Incidentally, Jonathan Powell has a rather bad reputation in England, not much better than Mamontov's in Russia. Powell is remembered here mainly because his name was constantly mentioned in connection with the endless corruption scandals in the Blair government. During his time at Downing Street, Powell established himself as a liar and mass media manipulator, unscrupulous and promiscuous. That is, no one here would be surprised that he found a common language with a foreign government of "crooks and thieves", and his revelations would be perceived taking into account this possibility - if the BBC did not back up these revelations with its authority.

So the first question is who wrote the BBC press release  
si?

Secondly, how did the episode with Powell, NOT YET SHOWED IN ENGLAND, ended up with Mamontov in his updated film? That is, the producers of the BBC film gave Mamontov this clip? And if so, then they could not help but know what Mamontov would do, but most likely they wanted him to revive his slander campaign. And the very haste with which Mamontov made his second film is suspicious - in 3 days! So the second question is:

who gave Mamontov the clip with Powell and when? Has the copyright been discussed? And if Mamontov somehow stole it, Why isn't the BBC protesting?

Finally, very high-ranking Russian officials (including Ivanov, Gref, etc.) participate in the film, who simply do not give interviews. At a minimum, they would demand a guarantee that the film is not directed against them and their regime. At the very least, the film could not be released without their approval. We do not know these circumstances, but the film, no doubt, turned out to be pro-Putin. The first episode, which tells

about Putin's rise to power and the beginning of his reign, does not mention the apartment bombings in 1999 at all, does not mention Berezovsky at all, and in the narration of everything else follows in line with the official Kremlin version. There is no hint in the film that the war in Chechnya was anything more or less than just an anti-terrorist operation; and the film falsely claims that Putin quickly won this war.

About half of the film is devoted to Khodorkovsky, and although there is an element of sympathy for him, his whole story is told, again, in line with Putin's official version - as if Putin was at war with the oligarchs, "equidistant" them from the Kremlin, well, "the forest is cut - chips are flying. It has long been proven that this whole version is a complete lie, which a conscientious journalist should not even take seriously: Putin's oligarchy feels quite fine in the Kremlin to this day, and it is impossible to seriously talk about any "equidistance". The film, on the other hand, presents Putin's version of events as an undeniable truth, without reflecting a shadow of a doubt; including even conveying claims that

Khodorkovsky bribed members of the Duma, but does not quote anyone's

denials. Finally, the film conveys all this nonsense about how Putin was a staunch ally of the West in the fight against terrorism, and the evil Americans repaid him with black ingratitude, insisting on installing anti-missile systems in Eastern Europe.

No attempt is made to critically reflect on these events. It turns out a complete apology for Putin and his regime. He looks like a solid statesman who kept all his promises (both to Western partners and to Russian voters). The fact that world oil and gas prices have skyrocketed is only mentioned in passing, but it is strongly emphasized that Putin began to pay pensions and salaries on time.

In short, I think that if the Kremlin ordered this film to its propagandists, they would not be able to put it in the best light. Of course, we have not yet seen the 3 subsequent parts, but there is no doubt that the first part is nothing more than a "Party Political broadcast" for Putin and his United Russia. Hence more questions:

Third. Were any political promises or guarantees given to the Russian side regarding the direction/content of the film? Did the Russian side have the opportunity to watch this film before its release? Did the BBC press release agree with them? Fourth question. Is it legitimate to use the money of British TV

viewers (collected, as you know, forcibly) to propagate the policies of a foreign (and by no means friendly) state? I personally believe that all the circumstances of the production and release of this film should be the

subject of an urgent and thorough parliamentary investigation. 2012

## This mode is on the blood

The current Russian debate about the possibility of negotiating with the “crooks and thieves” regime, in my opinion, misses the very essence of the problem. We all understand that we are talking not just about crooks and thieves, but also murderers; however, only Aleksey Navalny and Andrey Nekrasov, it seems, have dared to say it out loud so far.

This regime is on the blood in the truest sense of the word. It began with crimes against humanity, with explosions

residential buildings, from the genocide in Chechnya.

All the time this regime has existed, it has been killing people: Starovoitov, Shchekochikhin, Yushenkov, Politkovskaya, Litvinenko, Estemirova, Markelov, Baburova, Chervochkin, Aushev, Magnitsky are just the most famous of his victims. Until these crimes are investigated, until the perpetrators are brought to justice, we will not be able to say that we have finished with the Kremlin gang. Why, so willingly (and

rightly) accusing the regime of corruption, lies, falsifications, provocations and even usurpation of power, do many still hesitate to talk about its most terrible crimes? Undoubtedly, making such accusations is a heavy

responsibility. Let's suppose that it is still possible to make peace with crooks and thieves: let them return the loot and go to all four sides. But when it comes to murders, it is impossible to return the stolen lives - and therefore, it is impossible to compromise with the murderers. When Gazprom, Lukoil and votes in elections were stolen from the people, the people can

forgive the thieves. There is no one to forgive the murderers. The living have no right to do so. This is by no means a question of abstract morality; it is also a question of practical

politics. It is no coincidence that the main slogans of public protest are now formulated in terms

of, so to speak, criminal law. The country rebelled not against someone's policy, not against some ideology, but against criminality in power. Such a revolution cannot



end with a "round table" - in fact, a deal between criminals and justice.

It can only end in judgment. Worst case - lynching. In

this sense, attempts to "establish a dialogue" with the authorities are not only harmful, but suicidal. Tens and hundreds of

thousands of people take to the streets to demand justice, and by no means a "round table" with the Kremlin godfathers. Any negotiations in such a situation will be perceived as a criminal conspiracy; the one who goes to such negotiations is like an accomplice of the mafia. Having lived a fairly long historical period under the mafia regime, the Russian people quite subtly understand the ethics of gang warfare. To apply this knowledge to our current confrontation with the Kremlin is both natural and justified for us. The dying Don Corleone was right when he instructed his young heir: war cannot be avoided, and the first one who offers you to enter into negotiations with the enemy is a traitor. And our people watched The Godfather and, more importantly, lived their lives in Russia. Society has little trust in politicians even now. Chatter about "dialogue with the authorities" will undermine this trust completely.

Such a tough attitude towards self-proclaimed negotiators is quite justified, including by our historical experience.

So, a quarter of a century ago, the democratic opposition spent decisive years on a "dialogue" with the dying Soviet government. As a result, the nomenklatura crooks and thieves managed to quietly retrain as "democrats", and in this new capacity remained in power. It seems that the dialogue was needed in order for the regime change to take place peacefully, without bloodshed. Only a few years passed, and it turned out that instead of a regime change, there was only a change of scenery: the same bandits, dressed in a different uniform, began to kill and torture people in Moscow, in Chechnya, in police stations throughout Russia. A "bloodless revolution" is good - rivers of blood, and freedom with

Democracy has not been, and is not.

Yes, and the Polish "round table" can hardly be considered positive historical experience.

Let's remember: the regime then bargained for itself, among other things, two-thirds of the seats in the Sejm and the presidency for a transitional period. And, of course, the Polish nomenklatura spent this transitional period to strengthen its position, to stay afloat (with money, with power, with the press) in the new Poland. The Round Table made it difficult and slowed down the country's recovery for a generation. As it turned out later from the archives, there was no real need for the opposition to make concessions at that time. Jaruzelski himself admitted then in his circle that if not for the "round table", his regime would not have lasted even a few months. It is also characteristic that in the end - even twenty years later - the Poles nevertheless had to put Jaruzelsky comrades in the dock. A classic example of quick and relapse-free deliverance

countries from a totalitarian infection - post-war West Germany.

Of course, her recovery became possible only thanks to the Nuremberg trials. Only by exposing and condemning all the crimes of the regime can the country move forward. It took Poland almost twenty years to be convinced of this and on their own experience. It took some Cambodia more than thirty years - the leaders of the Khmer Rouge also eventually had to be judged. Russia, not daring to arrange a trial of the Soviet regime in its time, paid the highest price for it. I would like to hope that this time we will not

repeat the same mistake. But there is no doubt that the Kremlin mafia will try to prevent such a trial at any cost. They are not the kind of people who will heroically shoot back

to the last bullet. But their last trump card - a real or imaginary threat of bloodshed - they

use in full. Most likely, it is precisely to drive us to the "round table" - which will mean, at a minimum, immunity for a number of Kremlin godfathers. But immunity is not just a civilized refusal to take revenge; it is also a refusal to investigate their crimes. Even if they throw a couple of the most hated boyars at the peaks of the archers - say, Churov and Putin (this latter, by the way, is dangerous for them to keep alive in any case - he knows too much and, if it comes to court, he may well betray accomplices); but many thousands of crooks and

thieves on the forehead is not written that they are crooks and thieves. Here we need an objective investigation and a fair trial; immunity would mean for them the eternal presumption of innocence.

There will be a change of leaders, some cosmetic reforms, but not a regime change. The "Lubyanka criminal group" will again dodge and remain in power, quietly stealing this revolution as well. That's why they are crooks and thieves.

In a word, if such a "round table" takes place, then only we will be round there - complete idiots who managed to miss the victory won at a high price.

And when new "seaside partisans" rise up all over the country, to administer in their own way the justice stolen from them, who will condemn them? They will not be to blame, but the self-proclaimed leaders of the revolution, who betrayed its just demands; shouting together with the people "we will not forget, we will not forgive!" and immediately ran to trade forgiveness in oblivion in exchange for ministerial portfolios.

We do not need to think about the "round table" now, but about our own duty to the country and history: to bring justice, and in civilized forms.

Fortunately, while high-browed Moscow politicians are still entertaining illusions, there are more responsible people in the country. In the regions, a movement has already begun to elect public tribunals to investigate and legally assess the crimes of the regime. Even without punitive powers, such tribunals will help to avoid lynching, on the one hand, and impunity, on the other. Of course, along with the regional ones, an all-Russian tribunal will be needed to investigate the most large-scale crimes of the regime. Undoubtedly, it is necessary to start with his original sin - the bombings of houses in 1999, which brought the regime to power. If there are not yet enough facts and evidence for an investigation, it will be a legitimate requirement to provide documents, witnesses and suspects for such investigations. And we need to start this work now. Tomorrow may already be too late. Of course, the regime will defend itself - expect an easy victory

after just a couple of rallies naive and irresponsible.

Already, the regime is in the position of Putin's famous rat, driven into a corner. Many years ago, looking into the eyes of a rat,

Putin saw his future - and if he did not fully understand the meaning of the prophecy then, he certainly understood it last December. The only question now is whether we will give the rat the opportunity to rush at us or strike first. And if you really hit, then you need to hit in the most vulnerable place. The sooner we kill this rat, the more painless it will be for the country. Let's

not deceive ourselves: a confrontation with the authorities is inevitable, we must prepare for it, and if we need the Polish experience now, then not a round table, but confronting martial law.

We must be prepared for the fact that the regime will try to intern opposition leaders and activists, in the center and in the field. Prepare yourself for this case, reserve apartments, telephones, Internet access, simple printing tools. We must also be prepared for the fact that the Internet and mobile communications will be completely disconnected for some time, and prepare alternative means of communication. It is also necessary to prepare for the fact that the opposition media will not be able to function, and to agree in advance on emergency media and organization. Confrontation

cannot be avoided - you need to think about how to avoid

bloodshed. Negotiations will not help here, just as negotiations with a cornered rat will not help. Suppose you bargain with them for a promise not to use force - who will this promise help, who will believe him? As long as there are serial killers in the Kremlin, the danger of bloodshed will not go away. It is necessary to save the country, to save innocent lives not with them, but from them. If the regime is still strong enough to fight off the revolution, then it will not make significant concessions, and uses negotiations to split and compromise the opposition. If the regime is weak enough to negotiate seriously, then we should not make concessions. Then it is already necessary to demand unconditional surrender. The revolution must not be allowed to become bloody; but it must not be allowed to become false either. As experience shows, a fake revolution also turns into a lot of bloodshed. Of course, it is impossible to foresee all

scenarios of events. We just need to remember that we are dealing with liars and criminals, they have no faith, a compromise with them is impossible. Like

the release of political prisoners, as well as fair elections, the investigation of the crimes of the regime cannot be the subject of bargaining. This is the indisputable, clearly expressed will of the people, and any concessions on these issues will quite rightly be perceived as a betrayal. In the meantime, the regime is not ready to capitulate, there is nothing to talk about with them at all. From my point of view, Ivan Andreevich Krylov gave a simple and logical answer to all these questions a long time ago:

“You are gray, and I, my friend,  
are gray, And I have long known your wolf  
nature; And therefore my  
custom: With wolves otherwise do not make  
peace, As having removed the skin from  
them off. 2013

## Is there a civil society in Russia?

I don't want to live in a dystopia (V.K. Bukovsky's conversation with political scientist V. Shtepa) They say that it is not easy to talk with old dissidents - the years of the underground have made many of them rather reserved people. Therefore, I was surprised by a very cordial meeting with the hospitable owner of the professorial house in the suburbs of Cambridge. We talked for an hour and a half - over strong tea with Karelian balm. The only thing that reminded me of England was the typically British, hot crackling fireplace. - Vladimir Konstantinovich, in Russia you are known as an intellectual and analyst who predicted the imminent collapse of the Soviet Union back in 1984, although there seemed to be no prerequisites for this then. Do you feel happy watching your prophecies come true?

- Not always, because usually my predictions are rather gloomy. But sometimes they are fun. In 1984, indeed, everyone remembered Orwell's book, and then I was asked the question: how do I see the USSR in the 21st century? And I replied that I consider this question ridiculous, because in 10 years this country simply will not exist. Then such an answer shocked many, and it is still remembered to me. (Laughs).

- And yet: what happened then, at the turn of the 80-90s? Why did the government, which brutally persecuted dissidents, suddenly intercept your ideas in the blink of an eye, and you yourself remained, as you were, unclaimed? -

And this was just the most logical way out for the authorities. These people have been in power for decades and generations and, of course, did not want to lose it. But when oil prices collapsed, and the world situation began to change, they had to urgently change their image. And despite the fact that we, dissidents, did not have any social positions and opportunities for influence there, we still had a certain intellectual potential, a language understandable to the outside world.

With this potential and language, the system under Gorbachev was in full swing and took advantage.

Yes, when the main ideologist of the Politburo, Yakovlev, suddenly spoke in the words of those whom he had poisoned for decades, there was something surreal about it.

- We would have observed the same surrealism if, after the Second World War, we had not guessed to hold the Nuremberg trials, and the Nazi party would simply have announced its "perestroika". But, unfortunately, we failed to achieve an analogue of Nuremberg - over communism. The opposition was too strong both among this "reorganized" nomenklatura and in the West, where leftist forces have long controlled public opinion and the lion's share of the press. They were scared to death that this process would reveal their long-term cooperation with the Kremlin, multimillion-dollar accounts and other scandalous documents.

— But in the early 1990s, did you manage to work in the Soviet archives? - Yes, but

only in 1991-1993, when the question was still being discussed - whether to arrange this process. In the archives of the Politburo, I managed to dig up some amazing documents - where the Russian money went, how all these Western communists reported to the Soviet leadership, what kind of "common European home" they planned to build together. I posted some of these documents on the Internet, but since 1993 they have been declared secret again in Russia! Apparently, Yeltsin was afraid that if this process was brought to its logical end, he himself, with his Central Committee past, would not be able to sit in power. So they decided to backtrack. And today even those documents that relate to the first years of Soviet power, the materials of the Comintern, are closed!

— It's amazing that we still have people who think that in the 1990s everything changed drastically. - People tend to be deceived -

and besides, they are constantly told about some kind of "ongoing reforms." But look - what has really changed by today? As the wild bureaucracy ruled Russia, it still rules, except that it changed the crusts on its party cards. Moreover, it has not decreased in the least, but on the contrary, it is growing more and more, more and more new ones appear.

"supervisory authorities". The "cult of personality" is being molded again - obviously caricatured, but no less fanatical than under Stalin. The mentality, as it was, has remained slavish-Soviet - these people least of all think about how to produce something new, for them the main thing is to take away

and divide. The Soviet economy collapsed due to a lack of petrodollars. Are we

going to repeat? And perhaps even more powerful! And sooner than some think. As soon as world oil prices fall, this bureaucracy will begin to squeeze the regions to the last, and at some point they will simply cease to obey it. But unlike the collapse of the USSR, this will no longer be a national, but an economic delimitation. The North, the Urals, Siberia and the Far East - the regions where all the raw materials are extracted, due to which this system exists - they will try to gain at least some independence. Not in the sense that they immediately want statehood with some strict borders. They will simply try to rebuild their own self-government, to find their place in the world market.

This applies especially to the Far East. After all, they have Japan, Korea, the richest Pacific markets nearby. And so far they are simply robbed to the skin, although due to transit alone they could live no worse than Hong Kong. I once gave such a hypothetical example - one evening the local governor will sit with the local commander of the military district, drinking brandy. And a conversation will start: "Ivan Ivanovich, does Moscow give you anything? - Why are you, on the contrary, it takes away everything, and even increases taxes. And you? "They don't even send boots. - So what. we need them, let me be the government and you the commander of the army!" What will Moscow do? Send troops? They don't have enough sun! The

current government simply does not understand that its venture with this directive "vertical" only strengthens separatist sentiments. A smart ruler in Russian conditions would lead the matter towards a real federation, would develop partnership, rather than command relations with the regions. This is something that no one has done in Russia yet, and therefore there is a constant, unknown in other countries, fear of "disintegration". But only the dead disintegrate.



- Today in Russia, unlike other countries, it is simply forbidden to create parties on a regional basis. For example, my acquaintances from Kaliningrad, people who are quite loyal, tried to register the Baltic Republican Party and received from Moscow not only a sharp refusal, but also threats. - It is impossible to "forbid" this movement, like the flow of a river -

it will break through in other ways. Only already more painfully, something will flood. If you don't want to talk in a civilized way, get Ulster or the Basque Country there. This is an objective law. Yes, and local princes - if they do not move, but rely on a good uncle from the center - this stream will simply sweep them away. I would not like to guess exactly how this disintegration will go - but it is already on the threshold. By the way, this does not mean at all that the Russian space will be fenced off forever - in a few generations these fragments may well reunite, but on a different basis, more healthy and natural, without this centralist ice rink. Cultural affinity will undoubtedly play a role. How, for example, today's English-speaking world - England, USA, Canada, Australia - lives in close contact and communication, and yet they went through fierce wars

for independence.

- The trouble, apparently, is that in today's Russia, the "Novgorod" consciousness is completely undeveloped - the will to organize its own, autonomous and self-governing space.

Where all problems are solved by the local civil society, and not delegated to some kind of resolving "center". Although this is how Veliky Novgorod existed in its time. — Yes, this example is very indicative.

That is why, by the way, I argue with those who see the causes of Russian troubles in some natural features of the Russian character. Novgorod, as a primordially Russian city, was at the same time completely independent and modern, freely communicating with the whole world. The cause of all troubles is not in Russian, but in some insatiable imperial consciousness, which began with the Moscow tsars. Therefore, the regular disintegration of their kingdom, starting from the era immediately after Ivan the Terrible, is not accidental. They never understood that a normal life needed partners, not slaves.

So in the 20th century, this empire fell apart twice. Isn't this a compelling trend? But if at the beginning of the century Lenin and Trotsky

fastened it with bayonets and ideology, and this galvanized corpse existed for another 73 years, then at the end of the century it became completely clear to everyone that distant narcissistic Moscow was not able to solve anyone's pressing problems. Modern Russia is a colossus on clay

legs.

- I wanted to ask you if you are thinking of returning, but, this question seems to be redundant.

- I love a specific case - but it is not there for me now. And I have not been given a visa since 1996. Apparently, I'm out of place with my ideas there. By the way, in 1991 I was given a visa only after Maggie Thatcher banged her fist on the ambassador's table. I am now more interested in European problems.

- In Russia, many are now worried about the insatiable expansion of the European Union. As far as it can be judged from your articles and speeches, do you also not welcome this process?

— I am not against “enlargement”, but against the European Union as such! It was originally a kind of convergence collusion between Soviet communists and European social democrats.

- But this policy of convergence, I remember, was also supported by dissidents, for example, Sakharov? - Andrey

Dmitrievich was the nicest person, but he did not understand anything in politics. (Laughs). In fact, the European Union as a system inherits all the parameters of the USSR, even structural ones, the difference between them is approximately the same as between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. What some wanted to establish immediately, others planned as a result of some evolution. But it is curious that these "new Mensheviks" sometimes demand even stricter standards than those of the "old Bolsheviks". - And strange - remember how all these "Europacifists" as

one advocated the bombing of Yugoslavia? “They are all socialists, and Milosevic just got a little out of their

understanding of socialism, so they decided to punish him. While turning a blind eye to civilian casualties and destruction. Here I was one of the few radical opponents of this war. After all, it was then that their frankly Orwellian “newspeak” - “humanitarian bombings” was revealed in all its glory! It was exactly

European propaganda invention. They just used the States as a mindless but strong club. The Americans themselves then bit their elbows when it turned out that the Albanians they helped turned out to be tough fundamentalists, and had long been listed as terrorist organizations.

- In one of your interviews, I read a very paradoxical statement in your mouth: "I would rather live in the former USSR than with the current political correctness." - Well, either I put

it too expressively, or the journalist colorfully exaggerated. Although the trends here are really very disturbing. We still think too much about the dead dragon and therefore do not notice new, growing dangers. Here, for example, is the recent agreement in Nice on the creation of Europol, a kind of pan-European police force. Under this agreement, any suspect can easily be deported to any of the EU countries, spitting on national legislation. And you have no right to complain about them, because these European policemen have diplomatic immunity. But there are two points that are especially touching. For the first time, "racism" and "xenophobia" have been included in the rank of criminal offenses on a pan-European scale. Can you give me their legal definition? It is a pure ideology, and a very vicious ideology at that. Any of your statements can be declared "hate speech" - and it immediately becomes cognizable! From now on, you can no longer criticize a black or an Arab for anything - because "racism" will be sewn to you. If you don't like your country being run by an uncle from Brussels, that's "xenophobia" for you. Yes, this is exactly written off from the ever-memorable Article 70 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR - "anti-Soviet agitation", under which anything could be adjusted. It was "anti-Soviet", it will be "anti-European" - that's the whole difference. Any criticism of the EU order - out of jail. That's what these "humanists" came to!

They openly build a new repressive system, and no longer hide it. Europol completely cancels the national judicial guarantee - and now England can rightfully be proud of it. Tony's friend, perhaps, would gladly hand over all the refugees here to his friend Volodya - but he cannot, since the courts here are real

independent. And without this, there is a direct path to the all-European Gulag.

Is the very idea of the European Community leading to this? - In no case! When the Common Market was taking shape in the middle of the 20th century, customs barriers were being relaxed, cultural communication was growing, everything was going great. However, the left, having come to power, replaced the idea of this free interaction with the construction of some kind of unified European state. And this is a big difference - either you are friends at home with your neighbors, or you are all relocated to a common communal apartment. After all, for the left, which themselves do not know how to produce anything, it is always important not the market itself, but control over it, constant distributions and redistributions. So they turned the European project upside down, completely distorted it.

By the way, Gorbachev's idea of a "common European home" arose precisely as a sign of this coup. It provided for the gradual unification of Europe under the strict control of left-wing governments. But the processes went faster and got out of control. A colossal role in this was played by the East Germans, who immediately realized that if they delayed the unification of Germany, the cage over them would again slam shut. And they would be united gradually, filtered, under the watchful eye of "international observers". But the living always grows through the asphalt. The Germans were able to quickly use the unique chance of 1990 - and organized an immediate, spontaneous unification. And after that, other schemes of socialist overseers over Eastern Europe fell down. The "smooth transition" to a new Europe controlled by them failed. And when Gorbachev and Shevardnadze tried to leave the troops in Germany, the Germans simply warned them: what do you mean, they will simply scatter here. (Laughs).

- But now, apparently, the Brussels bureaucracy is taking revenge? - Yes,

they have exactly the same, characteristic of socialists, artificial, leveling logic. They are constantly calculating some kind of "arithmetic mean" for the whole of Europe, just like a bad doctor submits an "average temperature" for a hospital report. Some are already cold corpses, others are feverish, and the "average" is 36.6. For example, some countries need to issue money, others, on the contrary,

Monetarism would be suitable - and what will a single bank do with all this? That's right, he will make it so that it is not good for either one or the other, but something "in between". And what pressure all these countries are experiencing! Those who refuse to enter their "euro zone" are immediately blackmailed with all sorts of economic "barriers". There is also a very direct parallel with the USSR - nowhere is the procedure for withdrawing from the European Union prescribed. The USSR constitution at least formally mentioned "the right to self-determination up to secession", but here there is not even that! That is, the claw is bogged down, and the whole bird is lost, with ends, forever. Now they seem to have realized it, otherwise it turns out to be completely undemocratic, they are coming up with something - but so far they have come up with a literal coincidence with Soviet laws - that is, if one member of the European Union wants to leave, all the rest should vote to let him

go! Why not camp orders? These European commissars (by the way, a very gloomy word, given our Bolshevik history), sitting in Brussels, are completely uncontrolled, like the Politburo, they appoint themselves and decide how we should live. Their administrative apparatus is as gigantic as in the USSR, it's just a single European nomenclature, unprecedentedly corrupt. They issue directives - what shape the cucumbers should be, how long the bananas should be, how many holes the cheese should have. This is some kind of madness of the European bureaucracy. I've already seen it. And I know how such an economy works, or rather, does not work. Plus, they encourage huge flows of migration from the

third world in every possible way. - Yes, already entire areas of European capitals literally resemble Africa or the Middle East. There would be nothing wrong with this multiculturalism - however, the demographic dynamics are now clearly not in favor of the Europeans, and no one dares to guess what will happen in a couple of generations. The main question here is not for the migrants themselves, but for the governments that are pursuing this strange policy. By the way, a similar one is being carried out in Russia as well - General Lebed wondered back in 1999 why the government was forcibly making Chechens Russian citizens, who themselves do not want this, and at the same time refuses to

citizenship to those who voluntarily ask for it - Pridnestrovians, Crimeans.

- Immigration in today's Europe is a forced phenomenon, it is really connected with the demographic crisis and the need to maintain economic infrastructure. But I am also surprised by this strangeness in the behavior of our governments, I once spoke about it when I was invited to speak in the British Parliament.

## **FROM V. BUKOVSKY'S SPEECH TO THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT, 2002**

We have a lot of workers, a lot of skilled labor in Russia, Poland, Bulgaria, Belarus, Ukraine - millions of people. But no, the European Commission does not want them to come to Europe. She wants them to be ethnically different people.

As a naturalized British citizen myself, an immigrant, I sympathize with these people seeking asylum from persecution. I sympathize with the ability of these people to live in a multi-ethnic environment, dealing with a wide variety of tastes and lifestyles of other people. I am a very tolerant person. But it is one thing to be tolerant of what is given to you, and quite another thing to deliberately create a huge problem. Intentionally create a problem that will later turn into a destructive one. We all know that the adaptation of newly arrived immigrants, and especially immigrants from the third world, is a very painful process. It will be painful for both immigrants and society. Why are the left doing it? And because it is very convenient. First, they get an electorate attached to them, people who are doomed to vote for them as parties that

constantly distribute and redistribute public funds and aid. Secondly, we will all experience guilt. This is so cute. Anyone who stutters about this problem will immediately turn into a pariah. And it is so convenient to apply repressive measures and silence any opponents. Thirdly, the ultimate goal of these people is the one and only great state in the whole world. Are the European commissioners deliberately building

Orwell's or Huxley's dystopia?

- Hardly - but only it inevitably turns out. They are intellectuals who do not know real life, beautiful souls

theorists who are always extremely surprised that out of their good intentions a monstrous system suddenly arises that grinds them down. And it would be fine only for themselves - noah voting for them peoples. Soviet intellectuals, for example, did not know the West at all and as a result built some kind of really "decaying", bandit capitalism from their party textbooks. Western Europeans did not know what socialism really was, they dreamed of it as of an earthly paradise - and now they will receive the second edition of the USSR. This whole new Tower of Babel, as it should be, will end in enmity, anger, ethnic conflicts. Well, for example, a Greek and a Finn are completely different languages, religions, ways of life - but in Brussels everything is mixed into one mess and artificially confused. I am afraid that this creates such an explosive mixture, in comparison with which the 20th century will seem like children's fairy tales.

- But in parallel with this centralization in Europe, according to many observers, the reverse process is unfolding - localization, the awakening of local cultures. And not only in Europe. Localization is a natural response of local cultures to artificial centralism. Moreover, these "localities" can even be entire countries that suddenly take over and start producing something unprecedented. For example, Chile is a narrow strip of land along the ocean. When the cursed Pinochet came to power there, he immediately called together the best Western economists and asked them for advice on how to pull the country out of the terrible crisis left by the socialists. And they told him the only thing - you just, please, do not interfere in the economy. And three years later, the low-industrial Chile suddenly began to export mini-refrigerators, filling up all American markets with them! Pinochet again called the economists and asked: what have you done? Those to him: it's not us, just finally freely earned local conditions. Previously, there were almost no vineyards - now Chilean wine is one of the best in the world. Now Chile is the most developed country in South America, and earlier, on the contrary, everyone fled from there. Corvalan did not return there in vain. (Laughs). And under the power of his comrades, there was only copper mining, and wild corruption around

her.



- In Russia, there is now a lot of talk about the "fight against corruption", only everyone reacts ironically to it. Well,

corruption in today's Russia is something that belongs to some other, beyond world. It's not corruption anymore, it's a system. Almost all of today's Russian capitalism is the flesh of the flesh of the former communist system, with its mutual responsibility and strict distribution of roles. Where do you think all these "oligarchs" come from? Fell off the moon? This is simply the result of the conversion of bureaucratic posts into property. This was done quite deliberately, but on the sly, long before Gaidar's privatization. I have a copy of the directive of the Central Committee of the CPSU of the late 80s, on the selection of young careerists, in short, "major boys", from the Komsomol and State Security structures, who were urgently taught financial disciplines and then handed them pieces of profitable property. As "confidants of the party"! And they signed up for it. Here is Khodorkovsky, for example, where did he come from? And he was simply one of those who took these courses in the Central Committee of the Komsomol, received his initial capital, privileges, and then turned around. They pressed him only when the guy was a little presumptuous and he began to have political "dizziness from success." That's what it was. No natural, popular capitalization, as in some Eastern European countries, has occurred in Russia. And the "upstarts" were crushed by the mafia, tied up at the top with the same party-KGB structure.

- And now they are trying to cross this "capitalism" with European, just as centralized and corrupt.

- Yes, the same "convergence" continues - their bureaucrats willingly travel to each other and "learn from experience." All of them are great at hiding behind good slogans, but they have the same goals - to distribute and redistribute what they did not produce, while establishing a new, tough ideological censorship. I don't want to live in this dystopia.

- I recently read an interesting statistic - 49% of the British do not want to recognize themselves as Europeans, if this means submission to the European Union. And I totally agree with

them! There is even an interesting party here, which I support, the British Independence Party

(UK Independence Party). The British value their historical identity very much and do not want to change it for dubious and intrusive "European standards". If you like, Britain today is a sovereign "Novgorod" against the backdrop of Brussels expansion.

- Lately in Russia I am surprised by some unprecedented public humility, sometimes it seems that everyone froze like a rabbit in front of a boa constrictor, and assured themselves that "everything is predetermined." No one seems to have the will for new historical creativity. Although this system may one day simply "freeze" – if only because of the same drop in oil prices – but no one thinks about alternative strategies.

"That surprises me too. Indeed, it seems that everyone lives for today, not thinking that everything can change instantly - although Russian history, it would seem, has taught this more than once. After all, in it all the most important things happen exactly when it seems that "nothing will happen." Right now, the "Committee-2008" has been created, as if these next four years have simply been crossed out. Garik Kasparov, of course, is a good guy, but you can cross out moves like that only in chess. (Laughs). But even if I am sometimes skeptical about them, I still prefer to support them on occasion, sign some appeals - otherwise there will be complete apathy. (There is a meow.) Oh, sorry, my cat came - I'll go and feed. - In my opinion, the current Russian liberals in

their centralist thinking are not much different from the authorities. Therefore, in the regions they are not particularly distinguished from each other. "Who has arrived? "Ah, some Moscow politicians again!" "I have noticed this for a long time. You know, back in

1962 I traveled almost all of Siberia with geologists, in 1970 I traveled along the Komi, along the Pechora River. In general, I traveled quite a lot around the country while I was not in prison. And I know from my own experience what a fierce antipathy towards Moscow is everywhere. In Soviet times, it was simply an ostentatious showcase of socialism - it was for this that everything was brought there from a starving country. As a friend of mine remarked exactly then: "Moscow is not the heart of our country, but its stomach." And in the 1990s, the situation did not improve, but worsened even more. Although a normal economy is not only not needed, but directly contraindicated, such a total

centralism, when everything is commanded from one point. Indeed, completely different opportunities have been created for Muscovites and residents of the regions, and as a result, they have different political thinking. It is a pity that the Moscow liberals do not feel this.

- Those who call themselves patriots sometimes have even more original political thinking - after they reconciled that Ukraine and Belarus are "foreign countries", three rocks in the Pacific Ocean turned into almost the main symbol of the empire. Well, it's a

state tradition. After all, the Russian state around Moscow was originally created as a cumbersome and artificial centralized structure. It seems that Klyuchevsky also noticed this - people have always fled from power, recruitment, extortion, church persecution, and the state pursued them - and so they reached the Pacific Ocean. That is why, throughout its history, this state never bothered to create normal local self-government, and as soon as zemstvos arose, the Bolsheviks immediately dispersed them. Local self-government is the source of civil society, and it was at the throat of the state, because it made this state think about people, and not just about itself. There have never been normal relations between the government and society in Russia. And therefore, as soon as a society arises, the state collapses.

- I also wanted to ask a question about your cultural preferences. Although you write mostly articles and essays, I think you have something Nabokovian about being equally fluent in Russian and English.

Yes, I love Nabokov, but it seems that, unlike him, I already speak English better than Russian. (Laughs.) Because I have completely forgotten the Russian keyboard layout. As for my cultural interests, I can say that they are no longer connected exclusively with Russian culture. It was in Russia that it seemed to us a certain absolute value, and from here such isolation looks very one-dimensional. I am interested in many European cultures. Although the Russian experience is certainly useful - sometimes it creates a certain special dimension of thought, which is unusual here.

We once expected a real cultural explosion after communism - but it, as you can probably also observe, is not

happened — because by and large, nothing has changed. Maybe I'm an older generation and I don't understand something, but I'm in no way affected by the now fashionable culture of "Generation X". This is the current ruling generation, who is about 40, who has made unscrupulousness their principle. I will not say that they have nothing behind their souls, but they are simply not interesting to me. But their children are amazing. They are much closer to us in spirit - they are interested not only and not so much in money as in creative self-expression, they study languages, history. In general, each generation rebels against the previous one. If continuous consumption is still in vogue, the next generation will certainly be more spiritual, if militarism, then "flower children" will again go. - I think that you yourself vividly represent the type of "global Russian" that is just emerging now. This is no longer just an "emigration" of

past eras, like moving from one country to another, but a mobile existence in the global diaspora, which is becoming increasingly popular among different peoples, but still unusual for a settled psychology. Global people really live, create, are interested in world problems, while sedentary people only

"survive".

- Indeed, I live globally - I myself live in England, my family is in Switzerland, I publish books in France, I give lectures in America and Germany. Today, in fact, Russians are increasingly turning into a diaspora - those who are tired of proving their natural rights to officials and overseers who have not changed at all. And this is the same Russian tradition of escaping from power, discovered by Klyuchevsky, only spilled out beyond the borders of Russia. Now in America and Germany, both in industrial centers and on student campuses, there is already a huge Russian diaspora, millions of people. Even here, in England, which is considered an "expensive country", in the mid-70s, when I arrived here, only 200 Russians lived, and now, according to unofficial estimates, up to 300,000 citizens from all the republics of the former USSR settled on our old island ! Three Russian newspapers are published in London, there is a radio station, and Orthodox parishes all over the country. (By the way, it doesn't occur to anyone here to ban them, as they do with Catholics in Russia.) Moreover, these people do not at all consider themselves "torn off from their homeland", rather even

on the contrary, they have the psychology of leaders. They think globally, but in terms of culture they completely remain Russian and freely realize their talents and abilities, without fear that some official or bandit will suddenly come and close everything, take it away, imprison it, etc.

And as for settled people, what should, for example, an ordinary young man in Russia do? Open your own business, so that you can humiliate yourself in front of officials all your life? Go to crime or the police, which is now the same thing? Wait until they call for this useless war in Chechnya or mow it down for years? In today's Russia, a person has to make incredible efforts just to be himself - that's the saddest thing.  
2004

## **The killing of a citizen by foreign agents is an act of aggression**

(Interview with the West-East newspaper) - It flashed in the stream of messages that the members of the Litvinenko family also showed symptoms of radiation sickness. Is not it? Did they intend to kill the whole family? Or did they get it from him? - They had "residual radiation": they touched it and through sweat they got a little bit. But it's not dangerous. —

How do they feel? - Well, how can they feel in such a situation, in such a tragedy. Completely killed. - Tell me, please, according to Russian doctors, Lugovoy and Kovtun also "got infected." Do you think this is true? Or clumsy tricks when there is nothing to cover? — It is very possible that the tricks, I do not know. You can't trust them there. Nobody.

- Will British justice be able to come to any conclusions? Are they not allowed to investigate?

- But they are already saying that the thread leads to Russia, the killer came from there. Who exactly he is, they will not be allowed to establish. But for Britain and for other countries this is enough. It doesn't matter who the specific killer is or he can't be found. In any case, this was done by order of the state, and the authorities of the state are responsible for what happened. Whether politicians want to do something about it or not, but in principle it is an act of aggression. The murder of a citizen of Great Britain, on its territory, by agents of a foreign power, is an act of aggression. In the 19th century, the British navy would have already been heading towards St. Petersburg, in the 20th century they would have been interrupted diplomatic relations.

What will happen at the beginning of the XXI century, I do not know. So far, there is no big political scandal, everyone is waiting for the final report of Scotland Yard. After it is presented, politicians will decide what do.

Why do you think such an "exotic" method of murder was chosen? "This is not so much a

murder as a public execution. A demonstration designed to intimidate people, here, they say, we have long arms, do not hope, you will not run anywhere and you will not hide anywhere.

- Litvinenko's father, Walter, not without reason called the current Russian regime more dangerous than Brezhnev's. Is that so, according to you? - Walter is a

straightforward person by nature, he speaks very directly. He calls the current regime in Russia fascist, very dangerous for the country's citizens and neighbors. I agree with him.

- The West was gradually losing ground. First, according to an international conspiracy, they gave the Chechen Republic to an uncontrolled torment, a mafia-criminal defeat of the genocide <sup>And</sup> Creation zone, then the opposition in Russia itself followed, including a number of political assassinations and demonstration trials; and, finally, acts of aggression began already abroad. Is there a red line that will force the West to reconsider its forgiveness towards Russian aggressive forces?

- Here is an act of aggression committed on the soil of Great Britain, legally it is that very trait. Under the NATO treaty, an attack on one country means an attack on all NATO member countries. This is an act of war. And if England calls, then NATO will have to solidarize. For example, they could expel Russia from all international organizations, which I hope - and all NATO countries should support such a decision.

- Apparently, some circles have drawn conclusions?  
The Israeli intelligence services and the FBI got involved.

"They are helping the investigation, but that doesn't mean that the political leaders of these two countries are ready to do something. So far, this is purely inter-agency cooperation between police officers.  
forces.

- Western politicians, journalists, public figures often justify such a strange tolerance for the villainy of the Kremlin: Russia, they say, is humiliated by the collapse of the USSR, it has a lot to forgive.

The British Empire also collapsed at one time. Do the British feel humiliated?  
— No, on the contrary, they

deliberately dissolved the British Empire. They made such a decision and systematically, systematically granted independence to the former colonies. This went on for many years, in the 1940s and early 1950s. No one has any complex about this. Well, maybe at that time it hurt someone, but now no one remembers it. The collapse of the USSR also cannot be the basis for any resentment of either the Russian population or the political class. The Soviet Union collapsed for internal reasons, not as a result of some kind of sabotage, pressure from outside. On the contrary, the West supported Gorbachev in every possible way until the last moment. President Bush Sr. came to Kyiv in September 1991 and tried to persuade the Ukrainians not to secede from the USSR. European countries in no way contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Therefore, now the Russian authorities have absolutely no reason to blame someone for the collapse of the USSR. It was the decision of three presidents, Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, and thank God!

I think so too, thank God. They just summarized the prevailing realities, formalized them.

- Certainly! And by the way, nobody got hurt. But if they had not done this, there could well have been a civil war between the republics. There were 15 countries - so what? And great!

- It seems to me, on the contrary, Russia should have breathed freely. - Yes, it

was at first. Russia breathed more freely, it was said that we did not lose anything on this. Therefore, now to say that this is the greatest tragedy of the 20th century, as Putin says, is an outrage. The biggest tragedy of the 20th century was that the Soviet Union was organized. And the fact that it fell apart is a blessing. And resentment has no basis. They are there all the time offended by something, they have inferiority complexes, these lieutenant colonels who sit in the Kremlin. This is their own fantasy. "However, it seems to me that the group that has just arrived has no ideas or principles at all.

She is driven by unrestrained profit and stops at nothing if she sees a tidbit.



“But at the same time, they are, in general, pursuing a policy of restoration. They are trying to restore the Soviet-type regime in Russia; return the breakaway republics to the sphere of influence, be it Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova. They put pressure on the Baltic countries for completely invented reasons. That is, they have this complex, and they are trying, as far as possible, to recreate the Soviet Union. But it is easier to restore the Roman Empire than the Soviet one, and this will not happen, but they can break a lot of wood while they pursue such a policy, thoughtless and insane. - And it becomes

simply dangerous for honest people in Russia. “A lot of people are running. There are already 350,000 immigrants from Russia in London alone. There has never been such immigration from Russia to England. When I arrived 30 years ago, there were 100 Russians in all of England. They were random people: married, married, invited to work in some rare specialties - and defectors. “But it’s mostly the rich who

are running now?” - Everyone is running.

Both the rich and the poor. Especially young people, because they see no future for themselves in Russia. And every capable young man wants to go where he has at least some future. Let it be difficult, if not immediately, but the future. — Does England accept immigrants from Russia?

- It is very difficult to understand who is here legally, who is illegal; They come on a tourist visa and do not leave. Now, however, immigration laws in England have become tougher: there is too much immigration, especially from the countries of the "third world" - Pakistan, India, Nigeria, Uganda - and this is very difficult for the British treasury, they cannot accept so many people. But Russian people are experienced.

- Anya, does it seem to you that the international human rights movement has also weakened its

attention to Russia? - It was like that for a while. In 1993, almost all organizations associated with the defense of Soviet dissidents closed down, the sources of funding for our activities dried up, and we all dispersed, because the world decided that all problems had been solved, there was democracy in the East, and there was nothing more to be done. And no matter how much we tried to convince that the period is very difficult, fra

they didn't want to hear it. But now Amnesty International has already recognized Mikhail Trepashkin and Igor Sutyagin as prisoners of conscience, and Human Rights Watch, just on the issue of Russia, Chechnya, and also Central Asia, gives very detailed information and leads a very honest line. No, they didn't relax.

- And, in conclusion, a question of a more philosophical, or something, meaning. By the end of the 20th century, at the cost of incredible sacrifices (for the entire 20th century, 86 million people died in wars, revolutions, genocides and totalitarian massacres), in the confrontation with totalitarian regimes, the world seemed to have come to some universal values, generically called Western civilization. Now the center of gravity of world contradictions, apparently, is shifting to the East, with a new alignment of forces and new challenges. Nevertheless, aggressive forces are again growing in Russia, and the West itself has somehow changed. How do you see the development of the situation in such conditions?

- Indeed, the situation is sad. In the late 1980s, dozens of countries in Latin America, Asia and Africa turned from dictatorships to democracy. She was imperfect, fragile, but at least the trend was visible. - And they were guided by America

and the West. - Yes. And now there is a reverse turn: already in Latin America there have been turns towards dictatorships, the same thing in Africa. The wave of democracy did not reach the victory line - and everything rolled back. And in the West, the institutions of democracy have sharply weakened. I'm talking about England. We just have a one-party system, the second party has collapsed. The people hate the Labor government, and the Conservative Party has collapsed, and there is no one to elect. This is the degradation of democracy. Apparently, democracy will have to go through some reforms, maybe an expansion of the base, but the current democracy does not work here

either. Therefore, the countries of Eastern Europe and the former USSR were not lucky: they tried to join this family at a time when the degradation of democracy had already begun here. Had they come 10-15 years earlier, they would have received a very healthy example of who to follow and who to be friends with. And now - the climate in the world is rotten, unhealthy, and it is very difficult for those who are trying to get on their feet.

- Probably, in such periods, the importance of a personal system of moral values increases, and people like you; like the savagely murdered citizen of Britain, Alexander Litvinenko, and like many others, whom we know and whom we do not know, become, if not beacons, then at least candles in a foggy darkness.

Thank you! 2006

## The Khodorkovsky case awakened civil society

(Interview on radio "Echo of Moscow")

Russian society has long been looking for a core around which to unite in order to oppose the current political regime. And it found it. The organizing reason that launched the process of crystallization of society

was the second case against Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev. A case that came into being only because of the personal enmity of our so-called "national leader" towards the former head of Yukos. And the fact that this motive is quite enough to put an innocent person in jail very well characterizes the Russian political system, which operates on the principle: we ordered, we will do it. Many people say that this process answered a lot of questions. He showed the true face of the country, time, situation, features of our political system. What conclusions did you draw from this process? - The first thing I noticed was the

impudence with which this case is molded. Still, we thought that after the end of Soviet power, after ten years of relative opportunities and freedom, the authorities became more accurate. They began to take into account public opinion, understood something about PR. The

Soviet government did not understand anything about PR. It turned out not. It turned out that no one cares. That this is how this political vertical worked, this is how it works now: they ordered it - they did it. Doesn't matter. They called white black - it doesn't matter. In the West, certain public sentiments - it does not matter

don't give a damn.

The fact that they don't give a damn about anything - about the people here and there, about the inevitable costs of this whole thing - that surprised me. I still thought that they are much more integrated into the modern world than the Soviet government, and they are more dependent on understanding both in the West and their own public. It turned out not. They don't care.

— And how does the process characterize the Russian political system?

- How can you characterize it? The political system is obvious. It was already evident from the second Chechen war, from the explosions of houses, from the history of NTV. That is, she did not add anything new in this sense. Although I must say that in the West this story made a depressing impression on business circles. For example, NTV made an impression on the press, on politicians. But not so in the business community. They are still a little special, business people. They are incredibly optimistic. They always believe that the neighbor is bad, but I will be fine and there are prospects. And then they suddenly realized that there was nothing: no insurance, no guarantee. Butt in the face - and all your

business. This caused, I am sure (although I did not look at the numbers, but it should have caused), an outflow of capital, an outflow of investments from Russia. This made a depressing impression on the business community. I just know from talking to a lot of these people. For them it was a shock. For me it wasn't.

- All our politics, they say, is just two people - Medvedev and Putin. What role do you think each of them plays in this process? And which of them really decides the situation at the moment? - We have now found out thanks

to Asanzh that the West perceives this couple as Batman and Robin. In general, their role is approximately the same. Well, who can deceive this gambit. We understand that Medvedev has no political base of his own. And in politics, a person who does not have his own political base cannot make decisions. He is not independent. That's why he was chosen there, appointed. He was appointed brazenly enough that there was no power behind him. Right? Accordingly, his role in decision-making is minimal. It's clear. He is a performer. He is an actor playing the role of president for a fixed term. That's all.

Therefore, I do not believe that there would have been any personal influence on the outcome of the Khodorkovsky case. It was clear that this was a continuation begun by Putin. Continuation of the same business. with the same motives. Stay with personal hostility and hatred.

To Medvedev himself, if you look like that, what is Yukos to him? What is Khodorkovsky to him? He never knew them and had no dealings with them. This is Putin's personal enmity. He was touched by the initial decision to finish off those who do not fall under him, let's say so. And this is a continuation of his work. I think that this two-headed eagle is still one-headed. His second head is so wadded.

- Are there options to reverse this hostility of Putin and persuade him to decide to leave Khodorkovsky alone?

- This is more a question for psychiatrists, I guess. This is purely psychiatric. He is a vindictive, petty, very vicious person. Why did he get so personal? For this you need a specialist in psychopathology. I don't know. I can't tell you. I'm afraid that this type of people - my experience tells me - does not let go of the victim. No, he must finish. That is why the prospects in themselves, if the matter is left as it is,

to chance, are rather sad both for Khodorkovsky and Lebedev, and for very many businessmen who find themselves in a similar situation. That is why we are all so concerned about this matter. Because otherwise the outcome will be rather sad. Still, we hope that these efforts will at least mitigate and

unclench those claws. Otherwise, the outcome is predictable.

"And yet there is a certain amount of optimism in this situation. If only because the Russian public, seemingly already downtrodden, follows this process with indifference. Didn't you get the impression that civil society began to raise its head in the wake of the Khodorkovsky case? "You see, in our current situation,

society needs an organizing reason. In this case, the Khodorkovsky case gave rise to such a crystallization. I do not want to say anything bad about the case itself and

the people involved in it. But it could have been something else, or something else. Society was looking for a nucleus around which to crystallize, where it is possible to deploy some kind of confrontation. It's like the 31st on Triumphal Square. Do you understand? Convenient moment of crystallization. Another thing is that for me, as a person who remembers the trials and

persecution of 50 years ago, it was a pleasant surprise

how much more opportunities there are

now. You and I are sitting in a warm room, and not standing at the door of the court and freezing in the cold.

But it was so. And our friends came to our ships to freeze. And there were no warm rooms around. Did not have. Television happened, the press came. But it was all quite small in volume, small in scale. And today the trial against

Khodorkovsky is an event. World event. And there are as many Russian correspondents here as foreign ones. That is, despite all the prohibitions, censorship, at least the online publication gives honest reports. And the rest at least talk about the event. Let's say that censorship does not allow them to say what they think, but they talk about the event. Do you understand?

That is, we can already act as a society. Tools allow us to dictate our will. We are much stronger today than we were decades ago. And the reaction of society is quite adequate. There is a certain amount of optimism in this in everything. Still, there are many more possibilities. - And the last

question: what will happen to Russia, how will the situation in the world change if Khodorkovsky and Lebedev are nevertheless convicted?

Khodorkovsky had a pretty good last word. I unwittingly proved to be an expert on the latter words. And could appreciate the restraint and thoughtful approach he took in his last word. He

quite accurately describes the consequences of what it will be for Russia. It's for the country. He concentrates less on his own business in this word. And more on the consequences for the country.

And he's right. For business activity, this is a destructive process. For trust in the world, for business relations with the West, this is all a blow, no doubt.

2010

## Why should Gorbachev be arrested?

(Comment by VK Bukovsky after applying to the Westminster World Court in England with a demand to arrest Mikhail Gorbachev, who arrived in London to celebrate his 80th birthday) Of course, it's not about a

man named Mikhail Gorbachev. By and large, I don't care if he personally ends his days on the gallows, in prison, or dies in his bed. After all, he did not kill people from bloodthirstiness - he just had such a job.

Undoubtedly, there were general secretaries in the history of the CPSU and worse than him. But I have no desire to figure out who was a good general secretary and who was bad. Let the communists themselves judge this. My job is to establish one simple truth, which the world so stubbornly refuses to acknowledge: the communist regime was criminal. As one consequence of this, every General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, good or bad, was a murderer. In this sense, the example of Stalin, of course, proves a lot; but only the example of Gorbachev proves everything. Indeed, in the film "The Nuremberg Trials", which I quote, the central figure of the drama is not a Nazi monster, but the liberal Minister of Justice, the idol of the German intelligentsia and the author of Germany's most democratic constitution. A life sentence for just such a person was needed by the German society in order to realize the voluntary or involuntary complicity of everyone and everyone

in the crimes of the regime. The charges I bring against Gorbachev in an English court are self-evident: the Tbilisi massacre on April 9, 1989, the Baku massacre on January 20, 1989, and the Vilnius massacre on January 13, 1991.

Let's leave everything else aside for now: Afghanistan, Chernobyl, Alma-Ata, Karabakh, Dushanbe, Riga. Let's leave, for the time being, the fact that under most of the Politburo documents on the support of international terrorism in the 80s. the signature of the secretary of the Central Committee Gorbachev is, of course, among all others. Let's start,



let's deal with three indisputable crimes, where Gorbachev's guilt has been proven and even well-known.

My accusations are not

unfounded. Even now, at the very initial stage, I submitted 150 pages of evidence to the court: the results of investigations of these events by parliamentary commissions and public organizations (Human Rights Watch, Memorial, Shield); secret documents from the Gorbachev archive, photos, videos. These days, I'm approached by many living witnesses who are ready to testify against Gorbachev; including former Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis. If there is an impartial trial, we will prove Gorbachev's guilt. But it is precisely an impartial trial that the modern world would

never want to allow. It is no coincidence that the Russian intelligentsia criticizes me so unanimously.

As if there was no all this melodrama of their relationship with Gorbachev, whom they first kissed the hands of as a kind reformer tsar, and then so picturesquely, beautifully "disappointed" in him - and precisely because of Tbilisi! It is because of Vilnius! They tore their clothes and proclaimed eloquent curses. Recall: a half-million demonstration took to the streets of Moscow in March 1991, protesting against the massacre in Vilnius. And now none of them claims that Gorbachev is innocent - they prefer to talk about the need for a broad view of his role in history and the relativity of everything that exists. What is the role in history when it comes to criminal offenses? But to be honest, I'm not surprised. My critics are not worried about Gorbachev either. Perhaps, even subconsciously, they actively do not want exactly what I want: Nuremberg

clarity on the crimes of

communism. After all, according to the Nuremberg account, not only Gorbachev had a snout in fluff. And the West is no better. After all, it all started when Gorbachev came to London for an indecently luxurious celebration of his birthday: a gala concert at the Albert Hall,

tickets costing up to

a hundred thousand pounds, a crowd of Hollywood stars, the press sings of the hero.

And this is just at the time when his old colleagues - the Arab dictators, who are no better and no worse than him - are being overthrown and even bombed by the whole world. Not at all embarrassed by double standards, the entire Western beau monde, political and otherwise, hurried to dance around the Soviet Mubarak. They say that the British government even insisted that the Queen attend the festival, but, to the credit of Her Majesty, she was never

seen there. No sooner had this concert begun than my lawyers demanded a warrant from the Westminster Court

for the arrest of the hero of the day. But alas! - English justice is not what it used to be. Judge Wickham's decision is frankly based on telephone law: I called the British Foreign Office, and the Foreign Office said that Gorbachev was here on a "special mission" from the Russian government and would meet with the Prime Minister; therefore, he enjoys diplomatic immunity. By the way (if no one lied to anyone), this information is important. Nothing was

previously announced about Gorbachev's meeting with the prime minister; about his "diplomatic mission" too (after all, now, it seems, he is listed in the opposition). What are these secret Anglo-Russian negotiations behind our backs? And if the Ministry of Foreign Affairs misled the court,

then this is generally a scandal. Here, it would seem, a sensation for the press. But the press does not investigate any. Gorby is the most sacred cow of the Western establishment.

The authorities, judiciary and others, are clearly trying to win time for Gorbachev to leave. 2011

## Prayed to the Mother of God, answered the Madonna

(Interview with Radio Liberty) The campaign continues around the world in support of the members of the Pussy Riot group, who are awaiting the announcement of the verdict in the case of holding the punk prayer "Mother of God, drive Putin away!" in the Moscow Cathedral of Christ the Savior. Today, British rock singer Anne Lennox spoke out condemning the trial of the girls, thus joining Madonna, Sting, Bjork and other stars of international show business. In an interview with PC, the Russian

human rights activist and Soviet-era dissident Vladimir Bukovsky.

How long do you think the Pussy Riot story will go on? - It all depends on

how much wisdom the Russian authorities have. If they were smart people, they would have given a suspended sentence and limited themselves to time spent. But they are stupid people, otherwise they would not start such a stupid judicial story. I can say in advance that they will not justify them. I have not yet seen anyone acquitted in a Russian court in such cases. Yes, and in general for any business. The term may be insignificant, conditional, because the pressure is great. The noise they created in the world is completely disproportionate. This is a story that should not have attracted any attention at all. Well, they gave a fine - and it's over. — Do you understand

why the world pays such attention to this process? - Basically, show business people reacted,

because they understand the situation very well, they themselves have been in a similar situation. Performance is now a fairly accepted art form and they easily identify with the affected girls. We live in a virtual world. They prayed to the Mother of God, and the Madonna answered.

- In support of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, neither Madonna nor Sting, nor any other bright characters of show business performed.

- Political figures, big businessmen, writers could speak for Khodorkovsky. And here - a typical problem of show business, and they act quite logically. — Is there any chance that this is international pressure

correct the position of the Russian authorities in the case of Pussy Riot?

“After all, they are very illiterate people, especially in PR, this has always been the weak point of the Kremlin. They did not understand PR at all, and they arranged such things that caused the most negative reaction, without thinking at all, without trying to minimize it. And now they don't know what's going on. Some of them said: who is Madonna? Some whore. She can be what

whatever, I'm not her fan, but behind this are tens and hundreds of millions of people who hear what these stars say and follow, in general, rather blindly to their assessments. That is, the harm that they have caused themselves now by this unfortunate process is enormous, it is completely disproportionate to what happened. - A lot of years ago, your personal

fate turned out to be connected with an attempt at international influence on the Kremlin's policy. Can you draw any parallels? The parallels are very superficial, of course. In my case, for example, Tom

Stoppard and Iris Murdoch stood up, they were slightly different people. Even Nabokov said something, I think. But the mechanism is the same - the mechanism of public discontent, pressure, which makes politicians move, and politicians, after all, depend on public opinion. And this changes the atmosphere in the world, it toughens the position of other countries in relation to the Soviet Union, and now to Russia. All the guards listened to the BBC and Svoboda at that time, and they knew me very well. I had not yet had time to arrive at the colony, and they already knew that I was

coming. Accordingly, they treated me very carefully, tried to be correct, realizing that everything would immediately become known. And in this case it's the same. It will not be difficult for them to sit, everyone will recognize them.

But there are more differences than similarities. For example, we campaigned against punitive psychiatry. It was quite a serious matter. And here, rather, at the level of a joke, a joke. And the fact that the authorities took it so seriously shows how much they merged with this very

corrupt church, as far as it is one and the same now - the Kremlin and the church. For some reason I remembered The Three Musketeers, the words of Athos addressed to my lady: "Since when, madam, has it become possible to offend you?" That's about the same thing that you can say to the church. How can you insult her? She prayed for the health of Stalin, for the health of Khrushchev, Brezhnev, knowing full well that it was impossible to pray for Tsar Herod, the Mother of God did not order. This is a church where a priest could not become a priest without KGB approval. And even more so as a bishop. They are now making the same mistakes again. The peculiarity of the current Kremlin regime is that it steps on the same rake that the Kremlin stepped on under Andropov, under Brezhnev, under Gorbachev. It's amazing. It would seem that such a rich experience, they lost the whole country as a result, it would seem, sit down and analyze, understand what's the matter, where you made a mistake. Nothing like this! Who they were, they remained the same - to drag and not let go, that's all they can do. 2012

## What is the opposition in Russia?

The opposition cannot be reconciled...

(V.K. Bukovsky on the Ekho Moskv radio. Hosted by A. Venediktov)

A. Venediktov: Vladimir Konstantinovich Bukovsky is in touch with us from London. Vladimir Konstantinovich, good evening.

B. Bukovsky: Good evening.

A. Venediktov: You can hear it well. Vladimir Konstantinovich, you have already told, and very much, to our colleagues about how you received a Russian passport. I would even say, in the faces. You are probably fed up with it. And please clarify to our listeners the story of your citizenship. For you, obtaining a Russian passport meant obtaining citizenship or not?

B. Bukovsky: No. Of course not. The fact is that I actually never lost my citizenship, even the Soviet one. It so happened that the Politburo, having kicked me out, decided not to change this status. They had their own considerations, purely technical. But, of course, I did not live on this passport. He's long outdated. And in 1992, by Yeltsin's decree, on the proposal of the Citizenship Commission under the President, I was restored, as it were, Russian citizenship. And since then I have had a passport. This passport expired a long time ago. I did not go to Russia on it, and they did not let me in with an English passport. And that's how the thing went down. Well now, in

connection with all these advances and so on, arose the need to resolve this issue, shall we say.

A. Venediktov: So you got a sickle-hammered, two-headed, right?

B. Bukovsky: Two-headed, yes.

A. Venediktov: Tell me, please, it's also not very clear, our listeners are asking us about the history since 1993, the history of the Constitution. You even wanted, as our listeners remind us, here is Andrey, our listener, to renounce Russian citizenship in 1993. This is true?

B. Bukovsky: Yes, indeed, I was very angry with this Constitution. It was mediocrely written, very badly, and there were a lot of ambiguities and unnecessary things, and so on.

And I even thought about doing it. But it turned out that at that time there was no procedure for renunciation of citizenship. It hasn't been developed yet. And it was impossible to do so.

A. Venediktov: So it's an accident that you didn't come out?

B. Bukovsky: Yes.

A. Venediktov: In this regard, you, in general, did not refuse to apply for the post of presidential candidate. For now, anyway. And you, if anything, will be the guarantor of the very Constitution, which almost led you to renounce citizenship. How does it compare?

B. Bukovsky: Well, what to do.

A. Venediktov: Guarantee this, which you strongly dislike.

B. Bukovsky: Of course, if I have such an opportunity, if everything happens as planned, I will, of course, try to explain, to prove to voters that it is in their interests to change this Constitution - it is really stupidly written. There are a lot of ambiguities and a lot of unnecessary things. And in general, it was written for one person, which is not done at all. The constitution is not written for one person. The constitution is written in order to ensure continuity and stability in transitional moments. And it was written for one person.

A. Venediktov: Well, it turned out that we already have a second president, the second person under this Constitution, without changing it, exists. Maybe there will be a third? Or maybe a fourth?

B. Bukovsky: Well, I don't know. I think it needs to be changed. This is in the interests of the country. Well, now talk about it for a long, long time, too technical.

A. Venediktov: Yes, I understand. Vladimir Konstantinovich, I would like to build our broadcast as questions from listeners. I have a lot of questions on the Internet, and now they write to me by SMS. Andrey from Moscow writes: "Vladimir Konstantinovich, why do you need all this? This people does not need you, but Hitler and Stalin, but rather both together, "writes Andrey, I note, from Moscow. Why do you need all this?

B. Bukovsky: I thought I explained everything in great detail.

A. Venediktov: Apparently, it is not clear. I'll have to explain again.

B. Bukovsky: Andrey is not the only one who asks this. And I explained, in my opinion, quite intelligibly. I am doing this in order to help the opposition re-establish itself. It seems to have come to an end with us, the opposition has disappeared. Give them a chance to rebuild. There are a lot of people who are in opposition. Judging by my correspondence on the Internet and on the Internet in general. So many. But they are completely unorganized. They cannot create themselves by social force. And it's very embarrassing. It is impossible to leave life without strong opposition. Do you understand? In any case, even if everything was safe. It's not possible anyway, it's bad.

A. Venediktov: Well, Vladimir Konstantinovich, from the opposition, after all, from Mr. Zyuganov, who is an opponent of the current government, and Mr. Zhirinovskiy to Kasyanov and Gerashchenko, you and Limonov are full of oppositionists.

B. Bukovsky: Everything is true. Now, of course, we are talking about the democratic opposition.

A. Venediktov: And there are a lot of people there. Leaders, I mean.

B. Bukovsky: I'm not sure about that. Most of them are not opposition at all. They only occupy a niche of the opposition and play into it. This is not opposition. Serious, principled, as it is customary to say in Russia for some reason, "irreconcilable" opposition, in general, was not there.

A. Venediktov: What is intransigence? What should be irreconcilable?

B. Bukovsky: Intransigence is not my term. In general, opposition cannot be reconciled. It must, by definition, be opposed to existing governance, governance arrangements, and so on. Well, the intransigence is that what is happening today has happened and has been developing for about 10 years, this is exactly the opposite of what people went to the White House for in 1991 in August. Do you understand? That is, the foundation of our statehood was laid in August 1991.

A. Venediktov: But Vladimir Konstantinovich, many people, I can't say, I didn't conduct sociological research, but I know people who were around the White House in August 1991, were with



Yeltsin, and now they are with Putin. And now they support what Putin is doing. Moreover, many of the people who were standing there were inside, in any case, the House, they are also part of Putin's government. And they consider it normal for them. They believe that this is a natural process.

B. Bukovsky: I'm not talking about people now. I'm talking about principles. You see, these are the principles, the foundations of statehood, which were laid then. That's what it's all about. People change. People can and change their minds. Please. It happens every day. And the principles on which this statehood was based in 1991, these principles are now completely dismantled, abandoned, betrayed, call it what you want. And the country marches away from them, it marches into the past. There is some attempt being made to recreate, well, some semblance of the Soviet Union. The current president told us that the biggest tragedy of the 20th century was the collapse of the Soviet Union.

A. Venediktov: A political catastrophe, yes.

B. Bukovsky: A political catastrophe, yes. Here. And, accordingly, its super-task is to overcome this catastrophe and return to the same starting positions that were before the collapse of the Soviet Union.

A. Venediktov: Well, maybe this is not bad for most people? For most of your voters, I would say so.

B. Bukovsky: I don't think so.

A. Venediktov: Why?

B. Bukovsky: People forget a lot. I remember how we lived under communist rule and how everyone hated this regime, and they really hated it. And now suddenly some nostalgia. Here, according to some polls, I saw that almost 60% consider Brezhnev's time to be the happiest. This is already the beginning of the mythology. This is mythmaking. This is the unwillingness to honestly look into the past and understand what happened and why it happened. There were no people at that time who would have liked this regime. There were none. Including, in my opinion, even members of the Politburo.

A. Venediktov: And now there are a lot of people, including young people, and students with whom I meet, and such elite universities as the Higher School of Economics, they say: "No, no,

everything is fine, look - people began to live better, "having, first of all, material things. Better! Second, "People have more freedom. People have more choice." You see, many people feel differently.

B. Bukovsky: No, well, there is more freedom, I don't argue with that either. And all the time I try to prove to especially pessimistic people who say that now it has become worse than under communism, I say - excuse me, this is not true. Now the country is open, but it was closed. Previously, only those who were approved by a special commission of the party committee could go abroad, but now you are welcome - buy a ticket and leave. And so on. But the point is not that the current Kremlin regime did it. This is what the 21st century has done. Do not forget that in the 21st century the means of communication are such that you cannot close the country. It can't be done. This is the first achievement. Richer is also a very interesting statement. Who got richer and who got poorer. This is the first. And secondly.

A. Venediktov: But compared to the Soviet Union, something richer, probably, after all, Vladimir Konstantinovich.

B. Bukovsky: It's just an accident of the global situation - insane oil and gas prices.

A. Venediktov: So what? But people live in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and it's good for them - they don't want to change their emirs. For what?

B. Bukovsky: Excuse me, this is not possible. And to say that the regime is good because world prices are high, no, this is just some kind of schizophrenia, you will forgive me.

A. Venediktov: Yes, for God's sake.

B. Bukovsky: The regime has nothing to do with it. They did not set these prices. It fell on their heads, like happiness, an asterisk fell from the sky. And nothing more. They didn't lift a finger to do it or use this golden rain somehow wisely. Nothing like this. On the contrary, they do nothing about it. They are sitting on these petrodollars, on this pipe, and they are not making any structural changes to the economy. We need to boost the economy somehow. There is no economy, besides the pipe and the defense industry.

A. Venediktov: Well, how? What about nanotechnology?

B. Bukovsky: Will it still be? It's just getting started. And what  
As for the rest, the country does not work, in general, practically.

A. Venediktov: Well, how? I think that every person who is listening to  
you now. "How? I am working!" Here I see who sends you questions. Look -  
a neurophysiologist

from St. Petersburg Alexander - he probably works. Alekseev's doctor is  
probably working. And you tell them - "the country does not work." Konstantin  
from business, Alexey from science.

B. Bukovsky: That's right - he works, but the country does not work.  
Ambassador is not a country.

A. Venediktov: I understand. Here is a question from Mikhail: "Vladimir,  
remain in the people's memory as a hero who challenged the system, and  
not as a jester who amuses KGB non-humans." And very many, so I looked  
at the blogs of various newspapers and magazines and stations where you  
gave interviews, they cannot understand - understanding, you yourself say  
that you cannot win the elections, even if you are registered - is this clowning?

B. Bukovsky: This is not clowning. It's much more interesting. This is a  
very interesting move, which gives the opposition a chance to recreate and  
reformat itself. Do you understand? It's still an opportunity to create it. If  
people have such a desire, if there is such a need, then I give them such a  
chance. It's not that they will choose me, they won't choose me, I don't even  
want to think about it. Vaughn, the Electoral Commission has already stated categorically.

A. Venediktov: Yes, we will discuss this now, yes.

B. Bukovsky: Yes, that he will never register me. Not in this case. But  
people can show their initiative, their activity. Campaign, build structures.  
This is all that will remain. Even if they don't let me get elected. It will stay in  
the country. And this is a plus for  
the country.

A. Venediktov: Well, then let's go back and take a step back, to the  
statement of the Central Election Commission. Indeed, one of the leaders of  
the Central Election Commission, Elena Dubrovina, said that there are two  
possible obstacles to registering you as a candidate. This means that obstacle  
number 1 is that the law on presidential elections says that a presidential  
candidate has been living in Russia for at least 10 years, and she

emphasizes, I want to tell you, that not "living", but "living". Here. What can you say?

B. Bukovsky: You see, lawyers tell me that this article is very vague, complicated, that it requires interpretation, and, of course, no one except the Constitutional Court can offer such an interpretation.

Maybe.

A. Venediktov: Well, our Constitutional Court will interpret it's two years.

B. Bukovsky: Well, if it's two years, then of course we won't make it to the elections. But again, everything is in the hands of society. I tell you - if society needs it and they are ready to fight for it, all obstacles can be overcome.

A. Venediktov: But nevertheless, this "resident" here - what's muddy here? A person must live in the territory for 10 years.

B. Bukovsky: Well, the law says, for example, that he must reside on the territory of the Russian Federation.

A. Venediktov: Yes.

B. Bukovsky: And the Russian Federation emerged in 1991. That there are all the elections that have been so far, they are not legal.

A. Venediktov: Well, yes.

B. Bukovsky: None of the candidates, not only elected, but also running, could not live in the territory of the Russian Federation for 10 years at the time of registration, because it did not exist.

A. Venediktov: Well, suppose this is interpreted as the legal successor of the Soviet Union. But you haven't been here for 16 years, have you?

B. Bukovsky: So what? Well, the article is written very badly. I tell you - the Constitution is bad. It was written with the left foot and for some political reasons.

A. Venediktov: But it works, Vladimir Konstantinovich.

B. Bukovsky: Well, it works. The law requires interpretation.

A. Venediktov: Good.

B. Bukovsky: Look, Lebed.

A. Venediktov: General Lebed, yes, Alexander Lebed.

B. Bukovsky: Yes, he was elected after having spent one year in Russia by that time.

A. Venediktov: Well, yes, he was in Moldova.

B. Bukovsky: Yes. Yeltsin was elected in 1996, five years after the creation of the Russian Federation.

A. Venediktov: Isn't the law new? Is the law old? This one rule of law. Maybe she's new?

B. Bukovsky: Well, the Constitution of 1993.

A. Venediktov: Ah, yes, indeed.

B. Bukovsky: In 1996, all the registered candidates, except for Zyuganov, were probably illegal.

A. Venediktov: Interesting.

B. Bukovsky: Putin was elected in our country in 2000 - he had lived on the territory of the Russian Federation for 9 years by that time.

A. Venediktov: Yeah, your interpretation is clear. The second interpretation is related. that is, not an interpretation, but the second norm of the law is associated with dual citizenship. You have British citizenship and Russian citizenship. Or - Russian citizenship and British citizenship. The law explicitly forbids a person who has a second citizenship from running for president.

B. Bukovsky: Well, yes. Well, first of all, this rule has been challenged. This relatively recent law, adopted almost last year.

A. Venediktov: Yes.

B. Bukovsky: It was not protested by me even before my nomination. This was done by Volodya Kara-Murza in connection with the fact that he was going to be elected to the Duma, and he was told that it was now impossible, that it was forbidden, and so on. And he appealed to the Constitutional Court with a complaint, protesting against such restrictive legislation that restricts the rights of a citizen of the Russian Federation. A citizen of the Russian Federation, it is said that he has the right to be elected. And here, for some unknown reason, the right to do so is denied. This case was accepted for consideration by the Constitutional Court. Since, I understand when they will consider it, what decision they will make, I cannot tell you, but the fact is that this has already been protested and is in the Constitutional Court.

A. Venediktov: Here is Vasya from Moscow, a loader, he worries: "Is it true that Berezovsky pays for your election campaign?"

B. Bukovsky: No, not true. Nobody pays for it yet. Still no money. And I'm not going to ask Berezovsky for any

money.

A. Venediktov: Why?

B. Bukovsky: You know, we don't particularly like each other. At least we live in the same state, but you never know who lives with whom in the same state. We rarely see each other. I last saw him at Litvinenko's funeral. It was December last year.

A. Venediktov: By the way, tell me, Vladimir Konstantinovich, you wrote a letter to The Times on July 11, 2006. On July 11, 2006, you wrote it together with Oleg Gordievsky.

B. Bukovsky: Yes.

A. Venediktov: And you literally wrote the following phrases regarding Putin: about what you wrote about the law allowing him, Putin, I quote from the translation, "to use special services as death squads to eliminate extremists abroad, including in our country", meaning Great Britain.

B. Bukovsky: Yes.

A. Venediktov: Then you wrote that "as Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov stated, a black list of people to be eliminated has already been drawn up." This was before the events connected with Litvinenko. You were at Litvinenko's funeral and I just saw you on the screen. Tell me, please, do you link all this into one?

B. Bukovsky: Of course. Undoubtedly.

A. Venediktov: And what are your grounds?... You know, there is indeed a discussion in society, and a lot of quite sane people say - come on, why did the state need to kill this Litvinenko? It's just complete nonsense. And even if they were killed, in accordance with the law, it would not be the same to inherit all of Europe.

B. Bukovsky: Well, to inherit, of course, is their unprofessionalism. And it was not part of their plans, their intentions to inherit.

A. Venediktov: Why is that? Here is from your point of view.

B. Bukovsky: And why - explain to me, why was it necessary to kill all those whom the Soviet state killed for 70 years? For what?

A. Venediktov: Well, the state is different after all. You yourself speak.

B. Bukovsky: Well, how can I tell you. The state may be different in general. And security officers, they don't change. They are exactly as they were. Their mentality is frozen for centuries. This is their vindictiveness - they do not forgive those who ran away from their corporation, went over to the other side. It's like the mafia - the mafia does not forgive the one who left them or went over to the opposite or enemies. This is the mafia psychology of the Chekists. This is the first. Secondly, he knew a lot of things that the current leaders of the country are unlikely to like. He knew very well about the connections and influence of the KGB, the FSB, with the organized criminal world. This he knew very well. That was his profession - fighting organized crime. And here he was a unique expert. He knew everything perfectly. Up to illegal or semi-legal bank accounts of all these FSB generals.

A. Venediktov: But Evstafiy from Moscow literally tells you the following: "Bukovsky, you are a corpse. You will be killed in the same way as a girl open to everyone, Litvinenko, and then they will say that the Kremlin is killing political opponents. And those who asked you to become president will kill you." Here is an opinion.

B. Bukovsky: It's amazing how easily people fall for the KGB byza. This is a typical KGB byza. They kill themselves, and then come up with these cover operations, active measures. They begin to invent legends that, no, it was Berezovsky who killed Litvinenko, but there is something else. Well, complete nonsense. Absolute bullshit.

A. Venediktov: But nevertheless, the question of your safety, because it is worth it. By the way, there was a question, I already lost it. There, Mikhail writes again, what you see, now they have already begun to put people in psychiatric hospitals, as in the days of Soviet power.

B. Bukovsky: It's true, yes.

A. Venediktov: Yes. Are you in general, going to Russia, Mikhail asks you, are you not afraid that not in London, but in Moscow, comrades will get it?

B. Bukovsky: Well, first of all, I will tell you this: I have never served in the special services, I have never been involved in any business, and I have no personal enemies. So if they kill me, then it can only be the FSB, only the current Kremlin authorities. And it's so

it is obvious, so obvious to everyone - in Russia, and here, but here I have been living for 30 years, and they know me very well here. So this is the first. And this alone is enough for me as a guarantee.

A. Venediktov: Yes.

B. Bukovsky: Secondly, you understand, I am already 64 years old. Of these, I have been with this government for almost 50 years. And she used to be no more vegetarian than she is today. They could have killed me a long time ago, and tried a couple of times. And if you are in prison, it is very easy to kill you. Here. So this is not a new idea for me.

A. Venediktov: But does she visit you?

B. Bukovsky: I live with this idea all my life. I know it can happen. And it doesn't stop me. Never stopped, will not stop now.

A. Venediktov: Vladimir Konstantinovich, this is the price. I understand the price of risk, indeed, when you have a chance of becoming president. But the price of risk in order to rally the opposition, which is generally incomprehensible of whom, don't you think that this is too high a price?

B. Bukovsky: And what about the cost of risk in those Brezhnev-Khrushchev-Andropov years? Then there was no talk of becoming the president of the country. Such a dream could not. And we risked our lives in order to achieve greater freedom for Russian society. And it did not seem to us too high a price.

A. Venediktov: Look, Konstantin from Chelyabinsk, who works in business, writes: "Don't you think that it's too late for yourself to do PR, but it's too early for a democratic president in Russia?"

B. Bukovsky: Well, let society decide whether it's early or not. I'm not going to rape society. I'm not imposing, I'm offering an option. I offer an alternative. If it is needed, let people show it. Let them be as active as possible. Anyway, without this activity, we will not achieve anything. But if it is really needed and people are ready to go to great lengths to implement this alternative, then we will overcome all obstacles.

A. Venediktov: Vladimir Konstantinovich, you will come to Moscow and you will meet and, probably, you are already talking on the phone, or maybe people who consider themselves to be part of the democratic opposition come to you. You said in your interviews that you are from



of the leaders, you know only two - Yavlinsky and Kasparov. V. Bukovsky: No, I know more.

A. Venediktov: No, well, one of those people who.

B. Bukovsky: I know a lot of people. It's not that they are now necessarily leaders. The concept of "leader" has also become very vague. But I know Nemtsov very well, for example.

A. Venediktov: Well, yes, we agreed.

B. Bukovsky: I agree. I met with almost all those figures who were, say, in the 90s in the first government of Yeltsin. I know Khakamada, for example.

A. Venediktov: Well, look, your committee for your nomination included such well-known people of the first democratic will as Yury Alekseevich Ryzhov, for example, and such young people as Volodya Kara-Murza. Well, relatively young. Nevertheless, when you talk about rallying and uniting the democratic opposition, it's all the same like leaders - you may not like the word, but in meaning, I think it is accurate - these are Kasparov and Yavlinsky.

And immediately we have questions, questions came to me. People cannot imagine that Grigory Alekseevich Yavlinsky would move for the sake of Vladimir Konstantinovich Bukovsky.

B. Bukovsky: Well, I think that we are civilized people.

A. Venediktov: I understand that. Nevertheless.

B. Bukovsky: Our actions are not dictated by personal ambitions. Anyway, mine are definitely not dictated by this. And if it becomes obvious that one or the other of us has a better chance and can do it better, for example, I don't see a big problem for myself in losing to someone who can do it better.

A. Venediktov: Or who will be registered.

B. Bukovsky: Well, they will register it, by the way, this is a moot point. Here, the society can also achieve that the restriction on registration be lifted. This is a matter of political struggle. But in principle, who has the best chance of doing this, we will probably decide between ourselves.

A. Venediktov: Tell me, please, Elena from St. Petersburg sent me a text message - you are talking about an alternative, and

so the real question of a normal voter is: "Where can I read Bukovsky's program?"

B. Bukovsky: We are writing and developing the program now, we are all sitting. I will try to make, as it were, two options - one is shorter and simpler for a general, as it were, principle. And the other is more detailed - for those who are more interested in technical issues. It's just a matter of time. Still, you need to prepare, develop. I can explain the fundamental issues of the platform when you want. Right now. But these are fundamental.

A. Venediktov: But let's try. Here I want to ask you a question. Since lately we have seen an aggravation, at least verbally, between Russia and, say, the United States of America, the European Union and at the same time.

B. Bukovsky: Great Britain, Poland, Estonia, Georgia, Ukraine.

A. Venediktov: Well, yes, Europe. So I wanted to separate the former republics of the Soviet Union and the European community, including Great Britain and the USA, and rapprochement with our, relatively speaking, Central Asian republics, plus China - the arms trade, of course, plus India, plus Pakistan, plus the Arab countries. Do you see this path differently as a possible presidential candidate?

B. Bukovsky: Absolutely.

A. Venediktov: How and why?

B. Bukovsky: This is deliberately whipping up tension in the world. Quite deliberately. Because, mind you, the sources of this current tension are the behavior of the Russian government, the Russian authorities. They provoke him. They behave aggressively. They begin to engage in blackmail oil and gas. And so on. It comes from them. They do it for their own reasons. Well, apparently the regime they create cannot live without an external enemy.

A. Venediktov: But you must admit that the reasons - let's say missile defense in Poland and the Czech Republic.

B. Bukovsky: Yes. And what? And what is missile defense to you?

A. Venediktov: I don't care, but our citizens are outraged.

B. Bukovsky: Well, do any of them really understand the technical side of this anti-missile system?

A. Venediktov: Well, along the border of the base, radars, missiles.

B. Bukovsky: So what? Radar, by the way, the closer it is, the worse it works. Radar is better. and even more so interceptor missiles - they need distance in order to have time to intercept a missile. I assure you, any technically literate person will immediately tell you that what is being done or planned to be done in Poland and the Czech Republic has nothing to do with Russian defense. And in general, Russia's behavior in this matter is not dictated by any military considerations - considerations of security, defense - but by pure politics. It is the unwillingness to admit that Eastern Europe is no longer their satellites and that they do not have the right to dispose of what these now sovereign states decide to do on their territory. But no, we will not allow anything to be done there without our consent! That's what. This is imperial policy. Unwillingness to admit that these are already uncontrolled countries.

A. Venediktov: All right. And the fact that, say, Russia is building its relations, has now begun to build its relations, say, with the former republics of the Soviet Union as with distant countries, at least in terms of gas prices, is that normal? That in Georgia the same price as in Hungary?

B. Bukovsky: Well, you understand that these are all games. It has to do with politics. You don't just tell me that the ban on selling Georgian wine and Borjomi is a purely commercial economic issue. No, of course not. Or a ban on selling Latvian sprats. It's all politics. This is all a desire to put pressure on these countries that behave too independently, have left our orbit, from our sphere of influence. They cannot calm down and understand that the Soviet Union has collapsed. And it collapsed for quite natural reasons, and not as these KGB colonels think, that this is all subversive activity of the CIA, Zionists, Masons, I don't know what else they think there. It's hard to understand them. I have a different mindset. They cannot understand in any way that it was inevitable that the Soviet Union collapsed under the weight of its own stupidity, the stupidity of the system. Well, how could Amalvi know in 1969 that this system was doomed? And by the way, we all thought so when he published his book, will the Soviet Union last until 1984? How could we know this? Because we thought calmly, analyzed and saw it.

Instead of living in illusions, myths. Well, take an analysis - well, this system could not survive. Could not! Here she collapsed. Well, calm down. Don't restore it.

A. Venediktov: Do you see this system, the current Russian system, as more stable?

B. Bukovsky: Well, not yet, it was a little more stable when there was more self-government, when there was an elected local government. The more this is taken away, the more centralization of the so-called. power vertical, the more the country becomes unstable. And they also cannot understand this in any way there, in the Kremlin.

A. Venediktov: Well, I think that we won't make fools of them either. If they strengthen the so-called. the vertical of power, which means, apparently, they are afraid of the collapse of the country.

B. Bukovsky: So by doing this they only accelerate the decay countries.

A. Venediktov: Why, Vladimir Konstantinovich?

B. Bukovsky: Well, because you need to learn how to be partners, not dictators. This is something that in Russia has never really been able to. You need to be a partner, you need to give people more degrees of freedom and be a partner with them. And we only have a master-slave relationship. That's just the way it is.

A. Venediktov: You know, here our listener writes: "Your friendship with Gordievsky will not give you any chance, because Gordievsky is a traitor."

B. Bukovsky: Well, for him he is a traitor, but for me he is a courageous man who risked his life every second for 9 years in order not to allow the communist regime to enslave the whole world. From my point of view, he is a man of great courage.

A. Venediktov: You know, I am reminded of your work in the archives and publications on your website, and I am reminded to ask you a question - after all, to what extent all the documents that you published on the website from the archives are now the presidential archive, and then it was the archive of the Politburo and the Central Committee, how authentic are they?

B. Bukovsky: They are all authentic. I don't draw documents. Believe me. And there is not the slightest sense in this - to draw documents.

A. Venediktov: No, but you published everything, what did you have?

B. Bukovsky: Everything I had at that time, yes.

A. Venediktov: This phrase is incomprehensible. Clarify. And at this moment?

B. Bukovsky: Here. But I'm telling you - but since then, three years ago, without going to Russia, I got the opportunity to increase my collection with a huge amount of material from the Gorbachev period.

A. Venediktov: You should have published a book.

B. Bukovsky: A book? Which one?

A. Venediktov: And here are the documents of the Gorbachev period.

B. Bukovsky: No. I don't even have any contracts.

A. Venediktov: No?

B. Bukovsky: There are several books that my assistant is writing on these materials. For example, about the first war in Iraq. Or about Mitterrand. Or about German reunification. He writes this, these are his documents, but he did it together with me, acquired these documents, and, as it were, according to my tattoo. I prepared this for him, explained to him how to do it. And he acquired these documents. The collection is huge. It's about a hundred thousand pages. And now we are sitting with him and dealing with these materials. But since the materials are his, he writes.

A. Venediktov: Ah, I understand.

B. Bukovsky: I can help him find publishers. I can write a preface, finally, if required. But he writes.

A. Venediktov: Vladimir Konstantinovich, then I have a what is the question - what is Gorbachev for you now?

B. Bukovsky: Gorbachev? And it has always been the same for me.

A. Venediktov: And what?

B. Bukovsky: As people called it - "non-alcoholic chatter". Here it is, as it was, and is. This is the person who tried to save the system and failed to do so, lost control. He tried to honestly save her. Those who consider him an American agent are again myth-makers. He never was. He deceived the whole world and his own country, saying that he would introduce democracy. He never wanted to introduce any democracy. And the market never wanted to. He always spoke of "socialist market" and "market socialism". Well, such a pull push. Here. He just. he, as the youngest and most energetic, was made general secretary at the time of the developing structural crisis

Soviet system in the hope that he will find a way out. And he was looking for them. Very often, and for the most part, inventing all sorts of disinformation, deception - such a huge operational-Chekist undertaking, its entire restructuring was. And he deceived the West - the West believed him.

A. Venediktov: And the West is generally naive.

B. Bukovsky: Well, you know, naive, yes. But on the other hand, the Soviet system, without having lived in it, is almost impossible to understand. I've been living here for 30 years, trying to explain to people for 30 years. Think it's easy? They don't even have an adequate idea of what it was, how it worked. It's impossible to explain it to them.

A. Venediktov: And what is the difference between Gorbachev and Yeltsin, Vladimir Konstantinovich?

B. Bukovsky: Yeltsin was the only one, in my opinion, of the major communist functionaries who repented of being such in his communist past, and honestly tried to overcome it. As for Gorbachev, not only did he never repent of his communist past, he still remains a communist by conviction. Well, rather, say, a Menshevik than a Bolshevik. But still, he never got over those things. He never understood what the system was and why it was doomed.

A. Venediktov: Very interesting Kamil from Kazan just wrote to me: "If possible, say hello to the naive, but very good man Bukovsky."

B. Bukovsky: And why did he get the idea that I'm naive?

A. Venediktov: Well, he is listening to you now, apparently, and he has such an understanding.

B. Bukovsky: Well, I answer him - naive people will not live 12 years in the Gulag.

A. Venediktov: They answered. I think that Camille may not know What is the Gulag, by the way.

B. Bukovsky: Well, let him read books.

A. Venediktov: Yes. And then another question: "Bukovsky, you are Robin Good?" Such a good question, given where you are.

B. Bukovsky: No, Robin Hood is known for a completely different thing - the fact that he robbed the rich and distributed it to the poor. He was like the first

spontaneous socialist in England. I'm not going to do this.

A. Venediktov: Here is Diana, a student from Saratov, writing: "How are you going to prove to voters that a person who could live without a homeland for so many years should become president?" This question, you know, will be asked to you repeatedly.

B. Bukovsky: You know, this question shows, in general, a very poor understanding of what a modern state is. Well, Adamkus is currently the President of Lithuania.

A. Venediktov: Yes.

B. Bukovsky: He lived most of his life in America. And this does not interfere with either the Lithuanians or Adamkus. By the way, he is a very good president, and the Lithuanians are happy with him. And what? You somehow cannot understand in any way - what does "lived without a homeland" mean? First, what choice did I have? Excuse me, they took me out of there in handcuffs. And no one asked me whether I want it or not. And I could not return to those times - the border was locked. So it's my fault that I lived 30 years in the West? For the last 11 years they have not let me into Russia - they did not give me a visa. Is this my fault?

A. Venediktov: Alexander, a student, students came from Moscow: "What act should an unknown person commit in order to sink into people's souls six months before the presidential election and surpass the high rating of the current government?" Student.

B. Bukovsky: You know, there are so many stretches in this proposal that I need about 10 times more time to answer them. As for the high rating of the current government, I have all the doubts - it could have been very high in 2000, in 2001, but I have no doubt that it is fake today. So how high is he? and how do you determine this now, when there are no more or less independent public opinion polling systems left? How do you determine this when the media is controlled and openly pro-Kremlin propaganda? How can you now determine what people are really thinking when they are already afraid to say it? There were political prisoners in the country. We have already mentioned psychiatric repressions again.

A. Venediktov: Yes.

B. Bukovsky: So people have reason to be afraid to say what they think. Is it true?

A. Venediktov: Well, probably.

B. Bukovsky: And how do you now determine whether they like the current system or not? In Russia in Soviet times, there was a very simple test - you need a person to drink a bottle of vodka, and then he would say exactly what he thinks about the Soviet government. But today I don't know.

A. Venediktov: Well, there is vodka.

B. Bukovsky: There is vodka. But do they say now after drink a bottle of vodka, I don't know.

A. Venediktov: I understand. By the way, I want to remind Alexander, a student, that, in fact, when I read his question now on the air, I suddenly remembered that Vladimir Vladimirovich, six months before the elections, was also somehow unknown to anyone.

B. Bukovsky: Well, yes, but in principle.

A. Venediktov: We went through this.

B. Bukovsky: Yes, we have been through this. This is not the question. In my opinion, people need to look at these things more broadly - what I say suits them or does not suit them. We must act according to our convictions. For example, I have been living here for 30 years - I have never voted for the lesser evil or for some other reason. I only voted when I believed the person.

A. Venediktov: Vladimir Konstantinovich, please tell me, there are many such questions here, they, of course, have different tonality, but the question that I would formulate as follows: you said that you were advised or you were asked to run for president, or somehow still, there are all sorts of terminological stories, - but how did this idea come to your mind after all - why - A - did you decide? And second, after all - what was the procedure for making your decision?

B. Bukovsky: Well, why I decided, I have stated very precisely in my answer. It is on the Internet, it is on my website. Now, by the way, there is my official website. All these documents are there. And there I stated very precisely why and with what thoughts and with what plans and with what hopes I agree to this. And the procedure was very simple - a number of Democrats, journalists, and academics, familiar and less familiar to me, approached me with such a proposal. I thought about it for quite a long time, discussed it. Of course, in the end they



they officially wrote me their nomination, a statement, and I answered. Everything was very simple - everything was at the level of discussion.

A. Venediktov: Yes, Valery, apparently, is not the oldest person, here he sent a very interesting one, remembering "It's hard to be a god", he writes: "Uncle Vova". maybe this is your nephew - do you have a nephew named Valery? No?

B. Bukovsky: Valery - no.

A. Venediktov: No. So it's just a listener. "Uncle Vova, you now remind Rumat a little, who is just going to Arkanar and who now its inhabitants, Uncle Vova, are calling. Good luck to you". Such a funny story, really. Yes. But, nevertheless, they ask you to name your site. Annel from Moscow writes to you. Website address, I mean.

B. Bukovsky: Oh, yes. But I need to see this - I have in computer.

A. Venediktov: Oh, good. But I will find it. Not to waste time, yes. "I don't live in vain - I heard Bukovsky. Finally," writes Ausmanov. So. But look, Galina writes.

B. Bukovsky: Well, you see, but they say that no one knows!

A. Venediktov: No, no, no, it's different here. Another question, look, Galina approaches philosophically: "We don't need utopian philosophers who dream of building a city of the Sun, apparently you, but people who worked hard for the good of the motherland and people, and not for their own pockets."

B. Bukovsky: Well, firstly, I am not a utopian and I am not going to build the city of the Sun. It was she who confused me with comrades Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Brezhnev, Khrushchev and Andropov. And Gorbachev. Here. They wanted a city of the sun called communism. And all my life I was against the city of the Sun and against building it. I always remember the words of one Russian politician and thinker that the task of a good government is not to create heaven on Earth, but to prevent hell from arising. And this is very true. Secondly, what does it mean to work for the good of the motherland? I gave my youth to this motherland, having spent 12 years there. Is this work for the good of the motherland or not? Tell.

A. Venediktov: Well, how? In the Gulag they worked for the good of the motherland.

B. Bukovsky: No, to work, I mean.

A. Venediktov: No, no, I said that on purpose.

B. Bukovsky: Namely, by the fact that a person deliberately went to prison in order to expand the degrees of freedom for his compatriots. Is this work for the good of the motherland? A.

Venediktov: Of course. Vladimir Konstantinovich, thank you very much. I remind you that Vladimir Bukovsky from London was on the air of Ekho Moskv. 2007

## Don't be stupid again

(On-line conference by VK Bukovsky)

Question: A week ago, the Presidium of the RNDS approved in principle the draft coalition agreement proposed by the Solidarity movement. At the same time, the leader of the organization, Mikhail Kasyanov, emphasized: "The need for the desire to unite to grow into real actions." At the same time, Vladimir Bukovsky, a member of the federal political council of Solidarity, opposed the creation of a political party on the basis of this movement. So far, the name of the coalition being created remains unknown. Possible candidates for the presidential elections are also not named. The head of the Moscow Helsinki Group, Lyudmila Alekseyeva, welcomes the decision of the democratic forces to unite and nominate a single candidate in the presidential elections, but agrees that he will have very little chance of winning. How do you feel about the prospect of creating a democratic coalition to participate in parliamentary and presidential elections?

Vladimir Bukovsky: You know, my position has always been that creating any opposition organization with the permission of the authorities is absurd, this is a contradiction in terms. And today, the legislation invented by the Putin regime completely excludes the normal participation of opposition forces in political activities. In particular, no coalition has the right to participate in elections, no party is considered as such and has no right to participate in elections if it is not registered by the Ministry of Justice, and so on. We've all been through this before, it's happened before. Three years ago, it was understood that all electoral games are meaningless, there are no elections in the country. And, of course, until society forces the authorities to comply with their own laws and introduce fairly serious democratic changes, this game will not happen. You can just agree with this.

I do not really understand my colleagues why they decide to step on the same rake again, all this was already discussed three years ago and was obvious. What do they achieve? Raise some hope among the population? But since it is impossible to actually implement them, I do not

very sure it should be done. Personally, I am not involved in this. And I repeat, Solidarity as a movement does not create a party, some participants, our colleagues, create it, they decided to conduct an experiment again. Well, that's their own business. But the movement as such is not going to evolve into a party - this is categorically important for me, it is fundamentally important, otherwise I will not be a member of this movement.

Question: Hello. Before asking a question, I want to remind you that recently, speaking in Yaroslavl, Dmitry Medvedev said that, in general, our political system does not require profound changes, it is quite good, our democracy. In general, we see that he is not able to remove Luzhkov, but at the same time he makes decisions that, in general, are absolutely contrary to both democracy and the liberal line. I will have a question for dear Vladimir Bukovsky. Information has recently been received that a number of parties in the Duma minority - this is A Just Russia, the Liberal Democratic Party, in my opinion, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and a number of liberal parties - want to unite in a group that aims to support in the country, as they called it, the course towards the modernization of reforms, conducted by Medvedev. Here's my question: do you think that it is generally possible to somehow negotiate with Dmitry Medvedev and the current government and what this movement will achieve, how do you assess this process, and the current

government in the Kremlin? Vladimir Bukovsky: I have already said many times that it is impossible and unnecessary to cooperate with this government, their goals do not coincide with ours at all. Their goals are to create verticals, to introduce greater centralization, to clamp down on any initiative from below. When we talk about the actions or intentions to act of people like Zhirinovskiy, the communists, A Just Russia, we understand that their task is to create such a choir, an ancient choir that accompanies the tragedy, their task is to sing along. And, of course, they do not seriously think about any kind of modernization, especially since modernization involves a very broad participation of the population, society in this process, and by no means some kind of games. As for Medvedev, I think there is no need to explain that he is a puppet, he is not an independent person, he does not have his own political base, and he was appointed, he was not elected. And the politician who doesn't have

independent political base, can not pursue independent policies. That is, these are all empty shells, these are games of good and bad police, and so on, in order to blow off steam in the country, the image of such a more liberal president is offered, which everyone is invited to rely on and turn to. Why play these games? We have all seen the Kremlin games for decades, we know them very well. Question: Hello. Interestingly, live Aleksashenko

refused to participate in this list. So the list is questionable. Although he said: tomorrow we need to listen to a press conference and so on. I wanted to ask Mr. Bukovsky: what, Nemtsov and Kasyanov are not dummies? I tried to enter the organization led by Kasyanov, there was no smell of democracy there, and in general no work was ever done even within the organization. Glamour-tuzhur, today hee-hee, ha-ha Nemtsov, and that's it. Vladimir Bukovsky: You know, first of all I would like to clarify. It turns out in our current context that

I am against consolidation and unification. Of course it isn't. We have all contributed to attempts at consolidation and unification. This is not invented today, it has been done for many years, at least since the emergence of the Putin regime. But the question is in what form and for what purposes. When they tell me that it is necessary to consolidate, to unite in order to create a party, it seems to me stupid, this is a stage already passed, and I see no point in stepping on this rake a second time. Why talk, declare the creation of a party as the goal, when it is clear that, according to the law, only a registered party is a party, and no one will register them.

And secondly, why unite for the elections? This is again stepping on the same rake. We have already seen that there are no elections in the country. And therefore, uniting in order to go to the polls is pointless, it will only discourage people, since no one believes in these elections. And the fact that we need to unite, consolidate, we have been talking about this for years and are trying to do it. And what does not work out too widely does not depend on us - it is primarily limited by the general activity of the population, and it is not high. It will certainly grow as the crisis deepens and so on, and the protest movement in the country will grow. So,

it is necessary to develop the movement, and to expand it, to expand its base. And to declare new structures in Moscow a party, a superparty, a coalition is nonsense, it is some kind of bureaucratic nomenklatura game that does nothing.

Question: Hello. Vladimir Konstantinovich, Yabloko has some kind of paper, a permit or a license. Now, if our entire coalition joins Yabloko, can they drive the hydra into the lake again? Even if they are not driven away, at least protest moods, the movement must also be carried on. God bless you, I think so. Is it possible to unite on

the basis of existing legal parties "Right Cause" or the party "Yabloko"?

Vladimir Bukovsky: The fact is that both of these parties have undergone very significant changes since the last elections, they are now controlled - that's the problem. The most energetic ones were removed from there. There is an order in the party that prohibits the creation of any coalitions or joining any other movements besides Yabloko. This in itself shows what the current Yabloko organization is aiming at. Alas, there was a degeneration after the last elections, when all parties were on the verge of bankruptcy,

deliberately created by the authorities.

Question: Gentlemen, good evening. It is not very clear to me why now they are very cool pushing on whether this party will be or this association will be called something else. In my opinion, we are in a pre-perestroika mood. I would now like to list at least three circumstances that contribute to the fact that we, democrats, must unite. The first is the ruling group, which has always had internal contradictions, and these contradictions come to the surface. They were very vividly described by Andrey Piontkovsky in his last article, where he wrote about Luzhkov. And we Democrats need to take advantage of that. Second: a smooth, more or less prosperous course of life is ending for us, I think that difficult times will come next year. And when the people begin to see that things have become worse, their own activity will also appear, and then this people should be offered their leaders. Thirdly, precisely because of these inevitable difficulties, in fact, it can be seen even now, all sorts of Black Hundred and openly fascist movements will be aroused, something must be resisted to them. In general, our mode

Putin's, with its more or less favorable set of circumstances, is ending its existence, and we need to be united in order to be ready for difficulties later.

Vladimir Bukovsky: Very likely. And in general, I largely agree. The only thing he does not understand, who asked the question, is to aim at creating a party - to tie himself up. So, you need to register, registration will depend on the Kremlin and you will most likely not be given it if you do not promise to be good. This, on the contrary, discourages people, and going to the polls when there are no elections in the country is also wrong. That's the problem. But the fact that we need to unite, create broad movements, that we need to think about protest groups, get in touch with them and consolidate, no one has been arguing with this for many years, they are trying to do it. Yes, it looks like next year will be turbulent, it looks like all the economic problems that have accumulated over the past few years, including the unresolved past crisis and the second peak of this crisis that we are waiting for, all this together will create unbearable conditions for living in country. Plus a bad harvest, fires. We know what this means - it means that there will be no food, there will be little of it, it will have to be purchased. All these things, taken together, indicate that the situation will worsen, and therefore the protest movement will grow. But the form of the party at the moment is unrealistic and unnecessary. It is necessary to expand the movement, which does not require registration, and indeed no interaction with the authorities.

Question: Hello. Probably everyone understands that a person does not immediately come to beliefs, to the need for some kind of action. It takes time, it takes space, and it takes the right environment. But a person has nowhere to go, there is no party, there is no structure. And no matter what Limonov says, that this is the 19th century - parties, Russia itself is now in the 19th century. Therefore, I have a question for Bukovsky: is it not possible or does no one feel the need to create an illegal party, an appropriate structure, some kind of paper documentation?

Vladimir Bukovsky: I don't understand why it is necessary to be tied to the party framework. Here is our experience of 30 years of work within the Soviet Union, starting from the 60s, we not only never had a party, we had no organization. We did not have

leaders, structures, everything was based on understanding, on mutual trust and proactive distribution of roles. And we made a serious contribution to the end of the Soviet regime, I won't say that we defeated it - it's not true, we failed to do this, but we made our contribution. And we had no organizational form. Here is an example for you. And by the way, it was very convenient, given the harsh conditions of repression, when the organization itself was already an article. And here is the result. It turns out that organizations, organizational forms, and even more so parties that need to be registered are not needed for effective political work.

Question: Good evening. I have two questions for Vladimir Bukovsky. When Lenin created the party in London, he did not ask the tsarist government for any permission, and had no intention of asking. However, Russian deputies from the Social Democracy participated in all Duma elections and had their own faction there. I have a question: why in Tsarist Russia, which had an absolute monarchy and which in Europe was considered a non-democratic state, it was possible to create real opposition parties, and in Putin's Russia, which Europe considers minimally democratic, not only no political life is possible, but even impossible creation of a real opposition party.

Vladimir Bukovsky: It seems to me that the answer is contained in the question itself. The tsarist regime after 1905 was no longer an absolute monarchy, but a constitutional monarchy to a large extent. And they did not have any serious restrictions on participation in political life, there were conditions for elections to the Duma and so on, but in general they no longer exist. And the possibility of the legal existence of parties and organizations has already been recognized. And we are dealing with a post-totalitarian regime that is trying to restore Soviet conditions. And, of course, the first thing they do is return to the suppression of political activity, freedom of the press and, in general, freedom of expression of the will of any kind of people. And so they first of all closed all the possibilities of legal resistance or are trying to close it. So the answer is in his question. Why Lenin could, but we can't? You know, give me Nicholas II, I would deal with him very quickly.



Question: In your opinion, are the resources of the Russian liberal opposition exhausted if it remains within the existing structures? Vladimir Bukovsky:

No, of course not. The fact is that we are talking all the time about the process of worsening life in the country, on the one hand, and the growth of opposition protest movements. This is what the activities of the opposition movement should be designed for - to expand these protest moods and to try to consolidate and coordinate them.

Approximately, I always give this example of how the Polish KOS-KOR organizations behaved, as a result of whose activities the Polish Solidarity eventually arose. This is our model, which we must try to implement today. 2010

## Generation Facebook on Bolotnaya area

(Interview for Radio Liberty. Hosted by D. Galperovich) One of the most famous Soviet dissidents, Vladimir Bukovsky, told Radio Liberty about the principles and methods used by the KGB when working with dissidents. Which of these methods will the current "dissenters" - participants in the growing protest movement in Russia - have to face? Vladimir Konstantinovich is one of those who knew the methods and style of the Chekists

better than anyone in the USSR, having experienced them for themselves. Once outside of Russia, he closely watched how the KGB officers, who seemed to have lost influence in 1991, gradually regained it. It was with them, who now almost completely occupied the highest echelons of Russian power, that irreconcilable "stylistic differences" arose among the people who went out to Bolotnaya Square and Sakharov Avenue in December.

— Young people who came to Bolotnaya Square — 20-25-year-old Facebookers, managers, businessmen, artists, in my opinion, have no idea what the KGB is, because the KGB no longer exists under them. Nevertheless, it is with people from the KGB that they will have to deal in this confrontation. Practically in all key positions in Russia now there are people associated with this organization. What should today's protest youth know about the characteristics of their opponents in this protest? What should they consider first? What should they think about when they are going to protest and, apparently, they are seriously going to fight this clan? - First of all, let's note that the intelligence officers have become very disqualified over these twenty years. In our time,

the Central Committee of the CPSU stood over them, and without the decision of the Central Committee, they did not even carry out searches. This control forced them to be stricter, clearer, the Central Committee

easily punished them if they did something wrong or arbitrarily. They were more disciplined, they were much

more professional. Nevertheless, despite the fact that they were, in general, in the prime of their lives, we beat them as we wanted, we beat them on their own field, in their own game. That is, even then it was not the Stalinist NKVD. Since

then they have fallen. Sometimes I look and am amazed - this is the level of some Zarsk police department, this is no longer the KGB. Well, when they cannot blow up houses in their own city without getting caught, this is the limit already, Comrade Stalin would have shot them all. When they kill Yandarbiev somewhere in the Middle East and get caught right there, this is some kind of fantasy. To do all this under a surveillance camera, immediately report by phone, go to some embassy dacha. In our time, this was unimaginable. They were an order of magnitude higher in qualification.

But there is a terrible side to this - they are now much easier to kill. Previously, in order to commit a murder, they had to make a plan, they conducted surveillance, they kind of "took the installation." They drew up a plan, reported to the Central Committee, the Central Committee had to approve the plan. I mean, it was a long one. Therefore, they did not like to do such things: long, a lot of bureaucracy. It was easier for them then to imprison than to kill. And today, on the contrary, today it is easier to kill than to plant. Imprisonment is immediately publicity, lawyers, no, but the press. They don't need

it. That's what's dangerous. The first person who explained this to me was Sasha Litvinenko, who said that they were now negotiating the murder in the KGB canteen. "Here," he says, "I'm sitting, eating soup. Someone from the neighboring department comes up and says, Sasha, do you have any criminals in touch? And he worked in the organized crime department. "Eat". - "Listen, take this German away for me, I'm so tired of him." - "What German?" - "But I have this one here." Sasha says: "That is, how to remove it?" - "Why? You are also 30 pieces squirming there. " That's how they handle these things today. This must be kept in mind. If we compare our time and today, this is perhaps one of the most important distinguishing features. At the same time, since they do not have strict control, they do a lot of stupid things. In the USSR, all the same, the "wise Central Committee" sort of stopped them, worked through all this collectively. They hated the Central Committee for its control

happy when they got rid of party control, and now they go into a tailspin all the time, nothing works out for them. — Can they try to kill the people who are in this

Will the protests be considered really dangerous?

“In our time it was difficult. And now. I started by explaining the difference between the Soviet KGB and the current KGB (I'll call it by its old name). But in fact, it would be necessary to say about some fundamental things that have remained. The first thing to remember for people dealing with KGB officers is that they cannot be negotiated with. All Western politicians are pierced by this, except for Reagan. They have no understanding that, in fact, this is a separate subspecies of Homo sapiens. These are people with whom it is impossible to negotiate, because they do not want to negotiate with you. Their task is to recruit you, and they do it, they recruit you. You can be his enemy or agent, and there is nothing in between. You can consider that you have shown civility, made some compromises - for them this is only a sign of weakness - which means that you need to push further. Therefore, you need to cut it on your nose: the sooner you "send" them, the more secure you will be.

I can tell you a story. There, however, not quite censored there are expressions, but I will soften them.

In the camp we had an old teacher from Transcarpathia, very intelligent, knew five languages, such a polite, such a wonderful little man. Suddenly, the "godfather" (in the camp jargon - detective. - D.G.) began to imprison him. Calls - and in the punishment cell. Calls - and in the punishment cell. And we had such an unspoken inter-ethnic camp council, from different ethnic groups they allegedly gathered to drink tea, but in general they discussed camp affairs. Armenians, Ukrainians, Jews, Russians, Lithuanians were sitting there. Since it is necessary to solve common problems in the camp together, they agreed on who would represent them, and we got together and discussed the camp problems behind the scenes, what to do. And then a question arose with this poor Ukrainian teacher: what to do, why he is imprisoned, he doesn't do anything improper, he doesn't touch anyone, and he can't touch anyone. I (it would be better if I kept silent) say: you know, in my experience this means only one thing: the "godfather" recruits him, and our intelligent

the teacher cannot send it to three letters. And "kuma" must be sent in three letters, he does not understand another language. It's like a computer running C++: if you try to type something else, it won't understand. The same "godfather": he has his own "machine" language. Well, the initiative is punishable. They tell

me: since you have calculated so, explain to him, he will just come out of the punishment cell. I made tea, the old man went out, went behind the barracks, sat down, and I taught him for more than three hours how to say "go on." Moreover, the Russian swearing is completely in the Stanislavsky system, you can't just say it there, you have to sort of see it. And his lips did not develop, he could not pronounce this word, in any way. He knows five languages, but he cannot pronounce this word. For three hours I suffered with him, taught him. Taught, he understood everything. "Godfather" called him, he went for fifteen days, went out, and they didn't

touch him anymore. Here's a story for you. It is very indicative, because with the KGB it is impossible otherwise, otherwise they do not understand, their head is arranged differently, they are taught differently. And you cause yourself great trouble by not sending them three letters at once.

"Now these people with their own "machine language" are faced with a mass protest on Bolotnaya. There has not been such an organized mass protest since the late 1980s. How will the current special services operate? - They gained experience in countering mass

movements during perestroika, because then politicians decided to unleash mass movements and even create them, encourage them. And the KGB was supposed to regulate and control all this. And they generally did. Another thing is that they lost control very quickly. It's not their fault. No one can control the mass movements. This is a common police error. They think they can control the masses. Pop Gapon, Zubatovism - these are the best examples for you. And they ended up causing the revolution of 1905. And it's absolutely everywhere. The internal logic is very simple: their agents, who are trying to control all this, at some point face a dilemma. The situation is aggravated, politicized, radicalized. To stand in the way of this radicalization - they will be thrown out, to go along with it - means not to have influence. And at some point

such a process - and the process is always dynamic - they lose control of these mass movements.

But some experience of manipulation has been accumulated, it cannot be said that in the 80s they sat around doing nothing. They gained experience, how to manipulate, how to control mass movements. The techniques, it must be said, are quite standard, they were not even invented by the KGB: the introduction of agents, the creation of fake movements - all sorts of "fronts" - this is all very old. I have no doubts that they will use this, we must be prepared for this. Already now, some personalities, I will not name names, flashing there, are very suspicious to me. I look, and something is not right here - it is not clear where the man took.

- But there is Nemtsov, there is Yavlinsky, there are a variety of people who have been heard for years. What is your feeling, can these people, in the context of what has begun, have some kind of future?

- Some of them, of course, have a future. For example, I am sure that Nemtsov. He has a unique combination: on the one hand, management experience (after all, he was in the government, he was a governor, which, as a rule, no one in the opposition has); on the other hand, Nemtsov already has accumulated oppositional experience and authority. So he will definitely be in demand. As for the rest. Most of these people are not perceived by the population at all. The same friend of mine, Garik Kasparov, is too intelligent for them, too far from the people, from their point of view. Limonov is a very specific figure. For some part of the youth, he is a leader and will be a leader, that's for sure. But this is a very small part of the public, the wider public does not perceive it. Yavlinsky is generally a worked figure. After all, he has been spinning in all this politics since 1990, he has already tried everything, and made compromises, and got out of all sorts of difficult situations, and it all accumulates, and this ballast cannot be thrown off anywhere. Therefore, I do not think that Yavlinsky could strongly claim leadership.

I think that in general we don't know the real leaders yet. Usually leaders appear at the moment of maximum tension, when it is necessary, speaking symbolically, to go to the barricades. Then people who are capable, intelligent, but busy with their own business, give up and go to the barricades, because there is nowhere to go, they have to. That's when they appear

leaders - in a period of confrontation. Real leaders cannot emerge in times of peace, and neither can serious opposition, by the way. As long as there is no confrontation, there can be no opposition. So far, let's say, it's a declassed public that doesn't know where to join, and that's why it goes to all sorts of rallies. The rest are doing business. But when there is a crisis, yes, then that's it, then you can't do business.

— That is, in your opinion, is not yet a crisis at all? - I think that the first serious crisis will be in the spring, in March-April. Now there is a certain buildup, such a build-up, an increase. By spring, these sentiments will intensify. Presidential elections are generally perceived by society as a more serious thing than Duma elections. What is Duma, what can she do, even if she is perfect? And presidential elections in Russia are taken seriously, it's like being invited to the kingdom. Accordingly - emotions, moods, emotional stress. One does not need to be clairvoyant to predict that the presidential elections will be as rigged as the Duma, if not more, and, of course, they will be caught again in this fraud: it cannot be otherwise, the country is too big. We can expect a sharp increase in confrontation, spasmodic. Now everything was also abrupt, mind you: say, on August 31, up to a thousand people went to Triumfalnaya, and at least 40 thousand people on Bolotnaya, and observers say that more, up to 60 thousand.

This is certainly a leap, and a very serious one at that. You can analyze, think about why it happened. This is a different conversation. But it cannot be denied that this was a leap, a radicalization of society. And it is very easy to imagine that a similar leap will happen by spring, it is quite predictable. That's when there will be a crisis. That's when the barricades will begin, roughly speaking. And then you suddenly find a lot of people from some medium business who will drop their account books and go, because otherwise there is no future.

## Elephant in the KGB shop

A. My phone rang. Who is speaking? Elephant. More precisely - Mikhail Dmitrievich Prokhorov. But then, oddly enough, deviations from the well-known plot of Chukovsky

began. He didn't ask for chocolate. He outlined his views on the situation in Russia, answered all my questions clearly and honestly. To the direct question of what exactly he wants from me, he answered: nothing. Do whatever you see

fit. And I was just sitting there and thinking that the attitude of the Russian democratic opposition towards the upcoming "presidential elections" is somehow

schizophrenic. On the one hand, we all know perfectly well that the elections are a performance, a farce, and the actors for the role of candidates are selected by the Kremlin. We have already seen many such elections. To choose from the proposed candidates, firstly, is humiliating, and secondly, there is no one. In this situation, there is a simple and logical

However, we do not want to do this now, and it is not surprising - the boycott will not give quick practical results. Last

December showed that of the many different aspects of election fraud, people are most outraged by one: stolen votes. December raised hopes for a peaceful Orange Revolution this year. If so, you still need to go to vote, and then catch the thieves by the hand. Having gone through this simple logical circle, we inevitably

return to where we started: so who to vote for if the candidates are only "permitted"? And then the schizophrenia begins. We are told: be sure to come to the polls, vote in

whatever you like, and then we'll see. All this is called a solid word "strategy". Wait, where's the strategy here? To vote in all sorts of ways - for this you do not need strategies, this voter would

have figured it out even without strategists.



The second part - "we'll see there" - also does not impress with the originality of the strategic plan. By calling for this, the opposition

gets all the shortcomings of both "worst" options. On the one hand, we are still participating in the Kremlin's farce. On the other hand, without supporting a single candidate, we cut off our path to the orange revolution. We still sit down at the table with cheaters, but we don't even try to beat them.

Of course, we were driven into this trap quite deliberately. For the orange revolution, after all, some kind of Yushchenko is needed. Even if, like Yushchenko, it will be a random figure. Even if, like Yushchenko, he is a defector from the enemy camp. But without it, there will be no orange revolution. And whatever one may say, there are only four candidates for the role of Yushchenko, and not chosen by us. We can let things take their course, and in the end support the one to whom Churov draws second place. Or still try to seize the initiative, win over one of the Kremlin's candidates to his side. It hardly makes sense to seriously discuss the candidacies of Zyuganov and Zhirinovskiy. This is a sure way to guarantee Putin victory even if

fair count of votes.

Paradoxically, the best friend of the Russian desman Mironov — already better.

Precisely because he himself is zero. His only one can be considered as a "transitional technical" president who will not really do anything, but will not bring much harm either, and in two years will give way to an honestly elected president. But here, too, there are two problems. Firstly, you can't lose two years - the Chekist-mafia regime must be

dismantled, and here everything will be decided by speed. During these two years, they will calmly recover from defeat, dodge, prepare and take revenge. And secondly, I still can't imagine the best friend of a Russian desman at the head of a million-strong crowd fearlessly going to fight Putin's riot police. There remains the basketball player Prokhorov, who has never been involved in politics and decided to fight his way to these elections, obviously

only out of resentment that he was so ugly thrown in the story with the "Right business."

He is known to the country mainly because of his weakness for the weaker sex. Is the hero of Courchevel suitable for the role of the Russian Yushchenko? Is he capable of decisively dismantling the Putin regime? I think yes. Whether he is ready for this role is another question. He is inexperienced, he

accidentally found himself in the very center of the confrontation between the people and the authorities. He is the elephant in the china shop. And when I directly asked him what he would do

in an "orange" situation, this question was the only one that threw him into confusion. "I am against revolutions in general," he said. We are all against revolutions, but what if Putin stubbornly

want to leave? What if this revolution is forced upon us? "Well, then, of

course, you have to. He obviously had never thought about it before. For some reason, we have developed a stupid tradition of choosing candidates the way brides are chosen - so that he must be handsome, smart, hardworking, morally impeccable. Neighbors to envy. But in politics, there are still other criteria. Politics is very often built on

not the most pleasant tactical alliances - simply because without them it is sometimes impossible to achieve anything at all. Yes, he took his place in the Putin system. Probably paid kickbacks. For the time being, he did not quarrel with the Chekists. But still he himself is not a Chekist. I have never heard of him

having blood on him. About the fact that he helped to plant someone, too. His program is more than decent - suffice it to mention that the first item there is the disclosure of all the archives of the Soviet era. Moreover, he told me that he was quite ready to arrange an objective investigation and fair trial of all Putin's murders and other crimes against the person. And he is ready to force Putin's oligarchs to return the loot, and he is ready to return his billions to the country first - he has already spoken about this publicly. So if we need a defector - and we need one - then why not try?

He supports all the demands of Bolotnaya and Sakharov Avenue. He did not fully accept only the "technical president" scheme: according to his calculation, two years is not enough for the transition period, four are needed. I found his explanations why this is so convincing: after all, he would need to simultaneously release hundreds of thousands of wrongfully convicted (that is, at least begin a broad reform of the judicial system - without this you will not review all cases); reform the electoral system (which would also require new laws) and solve the legal puzzle of dissolving the enemy Duma. In what order do you want to do all this? Two years will not be enough for this, which were entered into the scheme in the heat of the moment, not counting, and to which only Mironov now agrees.

Note that Prokhorov does not ask for six years - a full presidential term. He asks for four. Not the maximum, but the minimum. The incantation that

Prokhorov is a project of the Kremlin does not convince me. What is the

project? Make him president? Obviously not. For him to take second place? No, that's what Zyuganov was invented for. For him to draw votes? Who exactly? Whatever one may say, but in reality such an "oligarchic" candidate can only win votes from Putin. Therefore, the alleged "project" is limited

to the fact that Prokhorov was allowed to participate in the elections.

He will not make a difference, but his participation will help create at least some illusion of democracy - there was, they say, a "liberal" candidate. If so, then by refusing to vote for Prokhorov, we do not interfere with the "project" in any way: the fewer votes he has, the better for the project. It turns out that one liberal was admitted to the elections, and he took the last place. And vice versa, by making him the main opposition candidate, providing him with strong support, we disrupt the "project" clean.

Prokhorov himself has already demonstrated in the story with the Right deed" that it is not suitable for the role of a

"project". The "project" would not now balk at four years instead of two. The Project wouldn't call me. The project would be ready for

question of the Orange Revolution. The "project" would easily accept all our conditions, and then, at the decisive moment, would betray. So if the Kremlin considers it its own project, then it sees it differently. Who should we play along with, the Kremlin or Prokhorov?

Of course, it was no coincidence that he was admitted to the "elections", and on We would not talk about his candidacy in democratic elections.

The Kremlin's calculation is simple: Mironov is an empty place, Zhirinovsky is a buffoon, Zyuganov is a communist, and Prokhorov is an oligarch. Choose, dear Russians. But who is the "oligarch"? After all,

this is a person with money

and in power, and not a person with money who is striving for power. And if he has now broken with the Kremlin, then what is wrong with the fact that at least one oppositionist has good money that he is ready to spend on a common cause?

I have known big businessmen in my lifetime, both in the West and in the East, and in general I love them no more than the rest of Russia.

But if we choose between a communist and a businessman, then the businessman is closer to me. I dare to think that most people from Bolotnaya do the same. And since our "strategy" is to vote for everyone, we will not violate the unity of the opposition ranks in any way by deciding to vote for the elephant in the KGB shop. Agree, of all the existing options, it is preferable for us to see him in second place. The Kremlin's calculation is based on class envy. On the fact that this meaningless label of "oligarch"

will cause a purely instinctive rejection, it will become

that flag from Vysotsky's song, for which the wolves cannot go. The expectation that a rich person will be rejected with hatred without thinking. Calculation, simply put, on cattle.

I don't think this calculation is correct. The

people who will take to the square in March are not the ones who first count the money in someone else's pocket. They will be worried about something completely different: how to defeat the enemy. And if Prokhorov is ready to help in this, they will accept this help.

Yes, we have been besieged, they are trying to drive us into a trap, to squeeze us with this seemingly indisputable axiom: impoverished Russia will never vote for an oligarch.

And there seems to be no way out. In such a situation, my instinctive response is to break dogma. Rush for the flags. 2012

## December Lessons

December 2011, with its turbulent events, once again confirmed what I had long suspected: in addition to other ailments that have been described many times, Russia suffers from Alzheimer's disease, and almost all segments of the population, including the ruling elite, suffer from it. It really is some kind of "Groundhog Day" across the country.

Indeed, what is new in the events of December 11? Never mind. Kremlin directors once again showed us another horror story, a kind of caricature of the Russian people, designed to scare us and, accordingly, make them more acceptable to us - as our only "defenders" from the "wild" people.

It would seem that it is time to get used to such performances. I'm not talking about the bad memory of the "Memory" society, which played the same role at the dawn of perestroika, or about the glorious son of a lawyer, but just recently, some eleven years ago, the same farce (only much more bloody) was played for us by gentlemen of the Chekists with explosions of houses and the Chechen war. But no, again the layman got scared, again he dreams of a "strong hand", completely forgetting that this hand will first of all be on our throat.

But after all, the Kremlin dreamers have not learned anything either, forgetting in the same way that literally all such manipulations in the past turned against them when the elements inevitably got out of control. Why, the whole cunning "perestroika", this gigantic operative security measure, ended exactly like this - the biggest "geopolitical catastrophe" for them. And the "small victorious war" in the Caucasus will not end in victory in any way - on the contrary, it has already covered the entire North Caucasus. And in Chechnya itself, it doesn't look like Kadyrov was their dream. So no, again for the old, again this manic KGB belief in their own cunning. And here is another event of December - the

verdict in the Khodorkovsky-Lebedev case. It would seem that it is not Newton's binomial at all, and one did not have to break one's head to foresee the outcome of this comedy. So no, even such a sport arose, like a bet - who how many percent

probabilities gives for an acquittal. I simply fell into despondency from this, especially after reading in the liberal press a controversy about the conscience of a certain Danilkin. And that is to say, the question is academically important - does the Soviet cop have a conscience? Only Gogol, Saltykov-Shchedrin, or, at worst, Dostoevsky can do such research. But for us, mere mortals, it is better to follow

folk wisdom, which says that such people "where there was a conscience, there x. increased". However, even after the verdict, when the question of Danilkin's conscience seems to have resolved itself, the liberal intelligentsia continues to hope. To the Supreme Court. To Mr Medvedev. On the Kremlin stars. They are not the first time. They hoped for Molotov, and for Khrushchev, and for Brezhnev. And how much they hoped for Gorbachev, and now we ourselves are ashamed to remember. Such is the function of the liberal intelligentsia - to hope.

So after all, the authorities are not smarter, they have not learned anything over the past 50 years. How many times, I remember, after the next trial, the Chekists hissed in my face: "That's it, you won't go out again. You will rot here." But now, 40 years later, there is neither the USSR nor the CPSU, and the KGB has shamefully changed its name, the Chekists have rotted away long ago, but I live and live for myself. To give credit to Andropov, he at least learned that political repression harms their regime more than us, and began to send us abroad. However, his heirs forgot this lesson. Alzheimer, what can you do.

And finally, the last chord of the outgoing year is the mass arrests on December 31st. By themselves, arrests on the 31st also seem to be nothing new. However, this time the society is especially indignant: still, after all, they "agreed", "agreed", "allowed". Here is the last lesson of December for you - it is as useless to negotiate with the Chekist authorities as it is to talk with a camp godfather. Its task is to separate you, split you, divide you into "good" and "bad", and if it succeeds, they will put both of them in prison. In the end, he doesn't need either of them. When will we finally learn this simple truth? When will

we stop taking seats in all sorts of "councils", "chambers"? Shall we cease to feel sacred awe before the next impostor personifying power? Well, we have no president, no government, no parliament, no elections, no courts,

no free press, and no need to pretend they exist. But again there is a large concentration camp, there is a godfather with whom a decent person cannot cooperate in any form. And this must be remembered. This power must be surrounded by a cordon sanitaire of non-participation, non-recognition. It's time for us to remember the camp wisdom worked out by many generations of prisoners: don't be afraid, don't hope, don't ask.

And let Alzheimer's be with them, but not with us. We do remember that December is replaced by January.

2012



## The collapse of the system can happen soon enough

(V.K. Bukovsky's conversation with IMR analyst O. Khvostunova)

Olga Khvostunova (O.Kh.): The law adopted in Russia banning the adoption of Russian children by American citizens caused a wave of criticism. How do you rate this initiative? Vladimir Bukovsky (V.B.): This decision

came as a complete surprise to me. First of all, because the law itself is completely meaningless. That is, this is supposedly an "asymmetric response" to the Magnitsky Law, but in fact it has nothing to do with the Magnitsky Law. It's just that the government decided that it was necessary to at least somehow punish the Americans, and made this schizophrenic decision. The English have a good proverb: "To spite my face I will cut off my nose." Something like this Russian legislators did, but worse from

it became only them.

O.Kh.: But they motivate this by the fact that the Magnitsky Law directed against Russia and designed to humiliate her.

VB: This is exactly what I don't understand: after all, the Magnitsky Law is not directed against Russia. It is directed against corrupt officials, with whom the Russian leadership, led by the president, promised to fight. So they should rejoice in the Magnitsky Law. It would be worse if the West refused to disclose the names of these officials and freeze the accounts and they continued to hide the stolen money abroad. The Russian Duma should write a letter of thanks to the US Congress for passing this law. Instead, they come up with some kind of "asymmetric response." With the same success, they could ban the import of cacti into Russia. The logic is about the same. I get the feeling that a significant part of the political establishment in Russia are mentally ill people. O.Kh: And how expected were other tougher laws - on increasing fines at rallies, on slander, on high treason?

VB: Repressions, tightening the screws, tightening the legislation - all this was expected. During mass protests, deliberate provocations were rigged to initiate laws to more tightly regulate such demonstrations. If you take the law on liability for high treason, it is very illiterate. I think that the Strasbourg court will challenge any decision on this law, because the definition of "high treason" in it is so broad that a simple conversation with a foreigner can be qualified as treason. I don't understand why people don't study in history class. In the Soviet system, one could be imprisoned for communicating with a foreigner - did this help the CPSU to stay in power? OK: Many experts say that such laws bring Russia's political system closer to the Soviet model. Is it possible to recreate the Soviet Union today?

VB: It is impossible to recreate the same rigid system as in the Soviet Union today. Get a pale copy. Russia is an open country, people can freely leave and come, there is open access to information. All this can no longer be banned, which means that it is impossible to introduce a regime of spy mania and total control. Russia cannot return to the Soviet past. So why bother? Well, if you introduce a few more such laws, you will cripple several hundred more lives. And there's no point. OK: Maybe these legislators are not thinking about the country, but about their own security and their own capital?

VB: They really don't care about the country, but they won't be able to protect themselves with these laws either. It is naive to think that such rude police methods can protect oneself. The CPSU was unable to defend itself, and its measures were much more stringent.

O.Kh.: Nevertheless, the Soviet Union managed to hold out over 70 years.

VB: It's true, but in Russia after the Soviet experience everything will happen faster. People still remember the USSR, and they do not need to explain the situation again. There is no longer any trust in the authorities.

O.Kh.: How many years do you think it will take to  
Has the existing political system in Russia broken down?

VB: The current leadership of the country can change at any time, even this year. The political establishment and business elite are very dissatisfied with the authorities and may want to change leaders in order to update the image of the country. The current system does not benefit them because it hinders investment and business opportunities. But changing the leadership does not mean changing the system, there will not be much point in this. There must be a collapse of the system, and this may happen soon enough, in particular, due to the fall in oil and gas prices. In addition, today everyone is talking about shale gas, which is abundant in Europe. And Gazprom may soon lose its status as the flagship of the Russian economy. Russia's near-monopoly position as a gas exporter to Europe that took shape at the beginning of this century will come to an end. Now it is difficult to name specific dates, because a lot depends on the global situation. O.Kh.: But

could you indicate the approximate horizon? VB: Oil and gas analysts say that by 2020 Russia will be completely inadequate as a supplier for Europe. Naturally, the people who sit in the Kremlin know this. And they understand that something needs to be done. Therefore, conflicts and a struggle for power can begin within the regime. I think that we are talking about three to five years, during which the system will crumble radically and non-stop.

OK: There is an opinion that the tightening of the system is connected with the personality of Putin himself. Therefore, the coming to power of a compromise figure like Dmitry Medvedev will let off steam and delay the collapse of the system. What are your ratings?

VB: I think the opposite is true. Suffice it to recall that Gorbachev's "perestroika" only hastened the collapse of the Soviet system. When, back in the 1960s and 1970s, we were calculating when the Soviet Union would collapse, everyone agreed that this would happen at the end of the 20th century, and this happened 10 years earlier. Gorbachev began to repair this system, and suddenly it turned out that little had been done for the economy, but a lot for the loss of political control. Control was lost and the economy failed. I think if the current government starts to carry out liberal reforms, then the same thing will happen - the collapse of the system will accelerate.

O.Kh.: That is, Putin calculated everything correctly: he is tightening control to prevent the collapse of the system?

VB: Yes, but another thing is that this is a short-sighted approach. Thus, he will win no more than two or three

years. OK: What role can the opposition movement play in this process? For many, including the authorities, the protest wave of last winter was unexpected. Is something similar possible today?

VB: What happened a year ago was really a surprise. It was clear that discontent in society was accumulating, but it was impossible to predict exactly when this discontent would break out. However, as soon as the first sociological assessments of this movement appeared, it became clear that we were dealing with an intelligentsia movement that would not enter into a violent conflict with the authorities. Therefore, the authorities had a back-up variant of hard blocking - what we are seeing now with the tightening of legislation. The protest movement is positive, but, unfortunately, it cannot change the government. O.Kh.: And what can he do? VB: There will be a second wave. The intelligentsia does

not want to fight the police. It will be replaced by a simpler, "shpanist" audience, which is very numerous in Russia. It is a pleasure for them to fight with the police. So a crowd of thousands will trample with sharpenings on the unfortunate riot police. OK: When can we expect this second wave? VB: I think,

by spring. It's winter now, and it's not in favor of the people. During the crisis of the Polish "Solidarity" there was such a proverb: "Winter is for the government, spring is for the people." Now the authorities are chasing them, trying to imprison those whom they consider to be leaders of the opposition, and are tightening repressions. And by spring, the public will come to life again and go to express their disagreement. But it will be a different audience, which is not so easy to cope with.

O.Kh.: How, in your opinion, can the Coordinating Council of the opposition

help? VB: I think that the Coordinating Council is a big mistake of the opposition. This is an absolutely pointless waste of time and effort. An organization of 45 people is not able to work and make decisions. Even if each member of the CC is given five minutes to

performance, it will take about four hours. No one ever creates organizations where decisions must be made, more than 10-15 people. Moreover, the Constitutional Court has taken the path of broad representation of various political movements, and this will lead to even greater disagreements. In addition, the authorities will try to split it. Inside the CC, two forces are clearly visible - liberal and conservative. By making concessions to one and increasing the pressure on the other, they can be turned against each other. With such a motley organization as the current Constitutional Court, it will not be difficult for the authorities to do this. O.Kh.: Nevertheless, many positively evaluate the Constitutional Court in terms of the experience of civil participation in fair

elections. The fact that about 100 thousand people took part in the elections already speaks of

many things.

VB: These 100,000 people participated in the elections, hoping that some sense would come out of them. But then they will be disappointed. So they chose the COP, but he can't decide anything. Defeat is inherent in the very idea of the project. You don't need to do this. O.Kh.: What should be done? VB: It is necessary to

expand peripheral, horizontal

ties, to develop regional movements. There is no need to focus only on Moscow or St. Petersburg - our regions are now more active than ever. And they can make a serious contribution to the protest movement. Russia is a huge country, and if unrest arises in the regions, the central government will not be able to do anything about it. She simply does not have the means to suppress such unrest. Transferring the same riot police from Moscow to the Far East and back is pointless and costly. OK: But revolutions usually take place in the capital. Do you think that unrest in the regions can lead to a change in federal power? V.B.: Remember the late 1980s and early 1990s:

miners went on strike en masse across the country. Against this background, the emergence of the Interregional Deputy Group and its political work turned out to be a serious factor. Without unrest in the regions, the attitude towards it would have been completely different: just think, again a hundred intellectuals gathered in Moscow. The revolution, of course, will take place in the capital, but on

Against the background of unrest in the provinces, any speech in Moscow makes the situation hopeless for the authorities.

2013

## Does Russia have a future?

I have a pessimistic attitude towards the development of events in Russia

(V.K. Bukovsky's conversation with political scientist G. Mesh) - In one of your interviews, you said that you would never return to Russia. Novodvorskaya, for example, declares that she will never leave Russia. To what extent have your public interests become private? - I have a pessimistic attitude towards the development of events in Russia, which, by the way, I wrote about back in 1993 - this understanding is gradually becoming common - those who did not agree with me even a year ago, now agree after the latest events and constitutional changes. For me, the light of a wedge in Russia has never converged. Now, for example, I am much more interested in another structure, emerging here in Europe, rather dangerous, which is called the European Union. I consider it my duty to resist it, since I live here and this directly affects my civil rights. - Will your activity have

a beneficial effect on Russia? - Russia has now entered into such a ballistic trajectory, which is quite difficult to influence. It did not start today, but back in the 1990s, when invaluable, unique opportunities were missed. Russia is a huge inertial mass, and if it has already gone in some direction, then there is simply no equal mass to stop it. All our efforts rather come down to reducing the harm from what is happening. I continue to help my colleagues who deal with Russia, but nothing more, I just don't see how and in what way we can have a significant impact. All we can do is somehow sober up Western politicians, make them treat their new "friend" Moscow a little more soberly, communicate with him more carefully so as not to get dirty.

"One must live in this loneliness without rest, in this prison without leisure, called Russia, in order to realize all the freedom available to anyone else in the countries of Europe, regardless of the forms

controls adopted by them. It is always useful to know that there is a society where happiness is impossible, because, according to the law of his nature, a person cannot be happy if he is not free.

These words of the Marquis de Custine, to which you refer, were said more than a century and a half ago. Is it possible to talk about the Russian archetype and stop blaming the communist-KGB government, considering it just a fragment on the long Russian path, which is always incredibly difficult?

- I never believed in any laws that determine history, why, for example, Bolshevism arose in Russia, etc. The Russian character has its pluses and minuses. Having lived half my life here and half my life there, I can quite compare them and say that our troubles are from our character, and not from communism. Communism did not improve our character, it rather sharpened those negative traits that have always been in the Russian people. The situation, government, system, strengthen or weaken the natural qualities of the people, as well as the upbringing and conditions in which a person grew up, can strengthen or weaken his natural negative qualities, therefore it is quite difficult to separate, isolate one from the other.

- Why is it so hard for a Russian person in life? How to make his marriage with the state successful? Is there finally peace in his own soul? You have

touched on a key issue. In Russia, the relationship between the individual and the state has never fit into a civilized framework, into some kind of developed system. As Klyuchevsky writes, the Russian Empire was created due to the fact that the people fled from autocracy, from recruitment, from exactions, from serfdom, and the state chased after them, chased them, as long as geography allowed, until they reached the Pacific coast, to the borders of China, etc. e. And this is a great tragedy. We have not developed a statehood. In our country, the state has always been built from the roof down, and the foundation up. As a result, we have a unique, completely insane situation when this huge country, which has 11 time zones, is controlled from one point, by one person, from one office, which is absolutely impossible even to imagine cybernetically. All this is a consequence of

the fact that society has not put up barriers to the state. The relationship of society with power and the individual with



the state did not receive development at all. This is a very important circumstance. I will not say that everything is connected with the Russian character, not necessarily, geography has also said a word here. And it dominates, hangs over Russia for several

centuries. - Geography - yes. But this geography was created by Russia itself, when, at one time, it seized other people's territories. -

Some captured, and some, as Klyuchevsky says, captured purely by chance, chasing their own subjects. When I was in political camps, in the 60s and 70s, I noticed that the majority were not those who tried to fight the authorities, but those who tried to run away from it. - Run where? - Where the power does not reach. Previously, they fled

to Siberia and

other places, so the Cossacks arose. If the situation in which a person finds himself is unacceptable for him, then in England, say, society begins to fight with such a government and with such a situation, and in Russia - to flee. This is a typical Russian reaction to oppression by the authorities.

- Before me is your book "And the wind returns." Let's take a little tour. When you were in the Soviet Union, you wrote: "Yes, and in general there is no difference between criminals and warders. Just a uniform, and change them - and you can't tell them apart. The jargon is the same, manners, concepts, psychology - everything is the same. This is one criminal world, everything is connected by an inextricable

chain. The President, the FSB, the prosecutor's office, law enforcement agencies - in wh To what extent does this apply to the people of today's Russia?

- To a large extent. In the Soviet Union, there were two official, dominant, ideologies: one was communist, the other existed latently. It was a thieves', thieves' ideology, and a very tenacious one at that. It outlived Peter the Great and Catherine II and Lenin and Trotsky and Stalin and continued to flourish in my time. When the official Marxist ideology collapsed, the second one, which had been underground, came to the surface, it has won for the moment. And you suddenly see amazing things when the authorities, the prime minister, the president speak in thug jargon. This is no coincidence. I noticed that today's Russian language is a surprisingly ugly hybrid of foreign words and thieves' jargon. Because the

I know both, then I see how badly they are used, people very often do not even know the meaning of these words. It's not about the fact that they belong to the thieves' world, no, they just accepted this ideology, they are like new converts.

"Is it really them, these cowardly bosses, who handcuff us? We just haven't learned to live without them yet. We don't understand that no handcuffs have existed for a long time." This

was said by you almost thirty years ago. Now in Russia they are again afraid to speak. Is it really the Russian archetype when one inspires fear and the other is afraid? - I

would not say that this is a Russian archetype, this is the absence of civilized relations between the individual and the state. Because of this, only two types of behavior remained, stable and, as it were, acceptable - possession and submission. Remember Lermontov: "Farewell, unwashed Russia, a country of slaves, a country of masters."

- At first, America was principled and intolerant of Russia's policy in Chechnya, but after September 11, wanting to enlist support in the fight against terrorism, it retreated from its positions, in fact, betrayed Chechnya, which relied on American support, at least moral. Do you think that this prompted Chechnya to seek help from the Islamists? - We need to make some adjustments here. During

the first Chechen war, the West also did nothing, and public rejection and condemnation exists today. What is striking is the amazing indifference of the authorities in the West, namely the authorities. I follow the press, the press is quite critical of the Russian president.

- In America, the media practically do not show anything, they do not talk about Chechnya, they do not criticize. Topic dropped by the Bush administration. Dot. Now, in the presidential elections, he is being stabbed in the side by unprincipled relations with Russia, Chechnya in particular. But again, for propaganda purposes, nothing more. Europe, as far as I can judge, does not forget about

Chechnya. Society, not government. In Europe, governments behave as ugly as the American administration. Hence, I think, such a reality. It is already difficult for the American society to perceive that the Chechens are fighting for something legally and their struggle is not a manifestation of extremism and terrorism. And for the government, this

Unfortunately, it is a manifestation of a well-known pattern in politics, which is called real politic, as it were, the politics of reality. Among the manifestations of such a policy were the Munich agreements known to us, the policy of appeasing Hitler.

“But it's a loss. Everyone lost. The Chechens have restored public opinion against themselves, America does not hold Russia back, but gives it carte blanche, as it were, which serves to further rampant terrorism, which Russia, directly or indirectly, supports. One can understand that the Chechens have nowhere else to look for help, and now they seem to have grown together with the Islamist extremists. But they have different

goals, and that's the point. - I'm not sure that they have merged with Islamist extremists, as far as I can understand, such fusion has not happened. There is no longer a single leadership in the Chechen resistance, since no one could withstand the pressure of the Russian troops. The unified leadership has collapsed, and individual field commanders, out of hopelessness, can seek support from anyone. In particular, Maskhadov's leadership has no connections with the Islamists. I know this from Zakayev and other people I meet.

They all condemn terrorism and warned more than a year ago that the process could become unmanageable. And so he became. No one can predict what will happen next. What do

you think can be done and how? - It would be realistic to achieve Western mediation, and through mediation, at least, a ceasefire, that is, an end to bloodshed. The solution of the problem itself by political means may take longer and go through negotiations, even ten years, this is not so important. It is important to stop this terrible massacre, this is a crime that is being committed there on both sides, from which no one benefits. This would be real. But to solve the problem the further, the more difficult.

“We did not play politics, we did not write programs for the “liberation of the people”, we did not create unions of “sword and plowshare”. Our only weapon was publicity. Not propaganda, but publicity, so that no one could later say - “I did not know.” The rest is up to everyone's conscience. It was not a political struggle, but the struggle of the living against the dead, the natural against the artificial.

How can Russia stand the test of glasnost? — The Internet is crushed. I am in America, and they do dirty tricks to me here too, because I publish what they do not want to see and hear. Free television - it does not exist at all, what is allowed from Moscow - pieces of undercooked regime propaganda that raises low passions, misinforms, is not at all addressed to the human mind. Newspapers, if they print something, in Moscow they were simply removed from the places of affordable sale, and Muscovites do not have time to travel to other, remote and little-known places. Not by washing, but by rolling - people were alienated from information. Putin is afraid of publicity. Russia in the information dungeon, the Kremlin turned off the light.

“We lost the biggest battles with these weapons, and we lost them foolishly. A lot was lost precisely during the Yeltsin period, when far from everything was lost. Now this is much more difficult to do. Russia did not stand the test of glasnost. Until now, the Russians have not realized what was born under communism, they have not realized their guilt in this, there has been no remorse, no self-esteem. And today the Russian people sit and grumble, blaming anyone but themselves for their troubles, from world imperialism to the intrigues of Zionism or the CIA. Most of them did not understand that the collapse of the Soviet system was inevitable and that it was not about us dissidents, not about Gorbachev betraying someone, we knew back in the 1970s that all this was inevitable. Even after the fait accompli, Russian society is unable to realize this.

“A citizen has his rights from birth. The state within the citizens - and only it - determines what the state will be like externally. To recognize the sovereignty of these internal states in man would mean the end of the socialist system, and to recognize the sovereignty of individual nations would mean the end of the empire.

Do you think the empire will fall apart now, for the second time?

- I analyzed this back in 1993 and came to the conclusion that the country would rather enter another phase of disintegration, fragmentation of Russia itself. -

Russia is now divided into regions and national formations. Here Tatarstan, for example, is located in the center of the territory and, at the same time, an independent national entity, as well as an economic one, and, as far as I know, their internal economy

works well. Is this not an example of the fact that Russia can disintegrate on national and religious grounds?

- In my analysis, I speak, first of all, about the political and economic component. He considered the inevitable separation of the Far East, and ultimately Siberia. The longer a country remains tightly centralized, the greater the danger that it will disintegrate. - Maybe it's for the best - it will help the country

enter the  
a new stage in its development, which is disintegration?

- There is an inevitability in this, there are pluses in this, but there are also huge minuses in this. Don't forget, we don't know how this will happen - peacefully or not, how these pieces of Russia will live, whether they will be democratic republics or they will be ruled by their dictators; will they fight among themselves or not; what fragment of this country will take over the functions of supporting the national infrastructure, and, by the way, there are thirty Chernobyls there.

- Maybe that's why they disintegrate, because such opportunities will appear and they will be able to self-govern, they will become mature enough? - Even in a situation

of the inevitable, talking about this, I do not feel joy, because the problem is very painful. "In the past, the lawlessness

of the authorities cost the lives and freedoms of millions of Soviet citizens. it is easier to sacrifice one day of peace than to endure the consequences of arbitrariness not stopped in time for years.

In Russia today there is a very narrow circle of your associates in the human rights movement. They have changed their face in many ways, like the whole country as a whole. What, in your opinion, is their role in Russia? - This

role, in connection with known changes, is growing, and the demand for it is growing. Whether they will be able to meet this demand, I do not know. Despite the quantitative growth of human rights activists in Russia, and in the most terrible Brezhnev totalitarian time, there were about three thousand of us all over the country, but now, probably, only three thousand organizations - they are completely different in quality and are mainly engaged in some kind of bureaucratic work, for many it is became a source of income

way of life. Judging by the way they behave, I do not have the feeling that they are able to satisfy this newly emerging demand in the country. In addition, there is no civil society in Russia, so you can't bet on public organizations.

“For the first time, we were personally convinced of the power of publicity, we saw the fear and confusion of the authorities. For the first time in our dead society, too, the germ of public opinion arose. Before our eyes, a movement in defense of the rights of the citizen began. And we had to hurry not to let it stall.”

Judging by your path, you never forgot about tactics, knew how to clear rubble, persuade people consciously or unconsciously to serve your goals. What advice would you give to those who continue to fight now, to the new generation of human rights defenders?

“It's hard for me to advise them, I don't live there and I don't see and know everything by far. Much was missed in previous years when it was possible to act legally. They did not achieve judicial and legal reform, and this is one of the most important undertakings, if it were brought to fruition, now at least one side of the state system would provide legal guarantees. It is impossible to fight against arbitrariness and tyranny in a country where there are no independent, normally functioning courts within the legal framework.

“Western Europe is flooded with left-wing ideas, even opposing forces are already finding themselves in the movement of the left — Islamists, anti-globalists, liberals. Do you think liberalism will be able to establish the dictatorship of the bureaucracy, and after it to shape it into some kind of totalitarian society to balance all these heterogeneous forces? “That's

exactly what they do with us. This is the European Union - the attempts of the left bureaucracy to establish some kind of dictatorship, some kind of resultant, using all these currents taken together. This is happening before our eyes. I hope they fail. I hope I don't have to die under another dictatorship, that would be very sad. But they have a chance. All these are utopias. They are all very good tacticians, these utopians, but insanely bad strategists, everyone since Marx and Lenin have been very bad strategists. Their strategy has been replaced by ideology. The same is true for the left.

They do not understand how doomed this model is. They are building the European Union to a greater extent on the model and likeness of the Soviet Union, completely unaware that a bomb is planted inside this model that will finish it off. I have no doubts that the European Union will end in crisis and collapse. The only question is when and how. And they believe that they are building for the millennium, like the Third Reich.

- How do these people in general, immigrants, many of whom work in Western Europe, Arabs and others, how do they feel about such buildings, do they feel support in these bureaucratic structures? "There are not so many who feel

support in them. As a rule, these are new immigrants who have just arrived, on whose poverty and difficulties the left, as a rule, speculates. And those, even immigrants, who have already lived here for some time and realized that all this is not necessary, are no longer happy about this in any way, it is among them that the fear about the emergence of such structures is most of all. All those who lived under the socialist system, whether it be Vietnam or China, look with horror at the new socialist experiment in Europe, react to it much more violently than the original, native population, because their experience allows them to predict what will happen next. And for the local population, this is still an unknown value. We seem to have the advantage that we have already lived in this future. - Two and a half years ago you spoke in the British Parliament with exhortations about new trends in Europe and the European Union. How did the English elite perceive

you? - This speech had a great resonance and even now it still diverges in the form of samizdat. Those who are inclined to take a negative attitude towards such trends have adopted my orientation and

use it quite openly. I first introduced the term for the European Union not EU, but ESSR, and now this is a very common joke. However, I met people who were clearly negative. The reaction is different. There is also confusion among our leftists. The traditional left of the old school is also against the EU, and the so-called new

left for.

- In an attempt to build a superstructure over Europe, is there any influence and help from Russia?

Not now, but it was. This is evidenced by archival documents that I got acquainted with in Moscow, about negotiations with Western leaders, especially with the left, with the socialists - Mitterrand, Brandt, Gonzalez and many others. As you remember, Gorbachev once put forward the thesis of a common European home. After all, socialists and communists have the same ultimate goals, but the tactics are different. The socialists' tactics are more humane, evolutionary, with a "human face", while the communists' tactics are revolutionary. And when the communists "burn out", they quickly repaint themselves as social democrats, and then deal with their opponents in their own camp, just as the Bolsheviks did with the Mensheviks in their time. And from the dialogues it can be judged that this time they understood each other very well - they exchanged the idea that this European house should be built in such a way that all the architecture matches. It was the idea of convergence between East and West. The socialists rejoiced that the communists finally returned to the camp of the social democrats. It is not surprising that this European Union is so reminiscent of the Soviet Union, it was built with the expectation that these two buildings coincided. The designers put it that way.

"No, I didn't want to leave. Jews go to Israel, Germans go to Germany. It is their right, like the right of every person, to go wherever he likes. But where can we Russians run? After all, another Russia No".

How could you answer this question yourself today? It so happened that I didn't have to run anywhere. If the Soviet authorities hadn't expelled me, I would have lived there. This is a pure accident, an accident on my part, from the point of view of the Soviet government, this was not an accident.

I think things will start to get better in Russia when people stop running. In the meantime, people are running, I understand them, but do not blame them. You can't say to a nineteen-year-old man - no, you sit here, better go to the barricades and fight, then the country will become better. "That's not right, it's cruel. He has his own tasks in life, his talents, abilities that he wants to use, he does not want to die with this country at all. But, unfortunately, this turning point has not happened yet, and I see no possibility for a turning point in the country itself.



“People, I love you, be vigilant!” “Julius Fucik said this not only against fascism, not for communism, but against totalitarianism!!! “Life in a democracy

does not relieve us of this need. After all, democracy is not some kind of given, which, once received, can be put on the shelf. Democracy lives only when every member of society fights for it, every day. And when this does not happen and apathy sets in, democracy begins to disappear. Fucik, I think, did not reason so narrowly, although he was a communist, but he had a broader nature.

- Do you think the conflict in the Middle East will ever end, if so, how? Or should we not think for ourselves, but should we carefully read the Bible? — I am not an

expert on the Middle East, but I often visit Israel and see what is happening there. I have a feeling that a mutually acceptable solution simply does not exist, as in mathematics there are problems without a solution - which all parties would voluntarily accept. Therefore, I am much more tolerant of the actions that the Israeli authorities are carrying out, whether it is building a wall or fighting terrorist groups. Unlike most European intellectuals, who see elements of oppression in this, etc., I understand that this is elementary self-defense, that people living in Israel cannot do anything else. If we are looking for a solution in the Bible, then we need to think about millennia, but in our age, I do not see any solution. - Some people think that if there were no Jews, there would be no

problems in the Middle East, wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, even "September 11" would never have happened, no one would have threatened anyone, humanity would have felt much better, but because of Jews America has to fight. - This is a very naive presentation. Benjamin Netanyahu

said that the Arabs hate Israel because we are close to the West, not the West because it is close to Israel. And this is very true. Anti-Western sentiments are strong in the Middle East, and Israel in this case is seen as an outpost of the West, as a close, most loyal ally, and therefore is hated. Fundamental

Islamism is anti-Western, Israel, in this sense, is only a small symbolic particle. After all, they are blowing us up here in the West.

- What is the point, really?

"Without the Jews, it would not have been calmer. The Arabs have their own problems, the problem of fundamentalism, which is connected with their own failed state experiment. They did not develop statehood, did not develop a civil society, and therefore - failure, there is no social development. Unlike Christianity, Islam did not survive secularization, when the religious authorities realized that their realm was spiritual and their kingdom was in heaven, not on earth. The Pope of Rome at one time accepted this and the Catholic Council confirmed that the church does not pretend to earthly rule, and starting from this, a civil society began to take shape in our country, and before that there were also religious wars and the Inquisition in the Christian world. This is precisely what has not yet happened in the Arab countries.

- Speaking about the "policy of detente", about how "friendly relations" with the Soviet Union were built on the bones of human rights activists, you wrote: "Violence ruthlessly takes revenge on those who support it. And those who think that the border of freedom and non-freedom coincides with the state border of the USSR are cruelly

mistaken." The Bush administration largely closes its eyes to what is going on in Russia, believing that as a result of this "friendship" they will get help in the fight against international terrorism. In the field of American "blindness" is Chechnya, Iran, support for traditional KGB-totalitarian values both in their own country and in the rest of the world. Breaking away from current benefits, is there more strategic benefit or harm in this "blindness"? - Of course,

harm. I generally do not believe in momentary benefits that do not take into account all the consequences in 10-15 years. This is the blindness of current politicians, their momentary nature. Churchill once said: the difference between a politician and a statesman is that the politician thinks about the next election, and the statesman about the next generation.

- Sometimes they talk about a certain community of Russians and Americans, both in some features of the national character, and in the general future. Do you think history will ever put them on the same boat?

- I lived and worked in America, traveled with lectures, I know the country well. We have no similarity of national character. Russians tend to seek the truth, the truth. Americans are much more pragmatic, they do not believe that there is an objective truth. They say truth is instrumental, relative.

Will Americans and Russians be in the same boat? I think no. For this, Martians are needed, so if Martians appear, then we can unite in the fight against them, but I don't foresee that. Islamic terrorism will not unite us either, since Russia is secretly helping the Islamists themselves.

— I admire your book and speeches. I believe, no matter where you are, no matter what you do, you will always be useful - so that people are free, so that everyone is their own master, so that a person, a person, will always be held in high esteem. Thanks for this!

2004

## Russia will fall into seven parts

(Conversation of VK Bukovsky with journalists A. Soldatov, I. Borogan)  
Vladimir

Konstantinovich Bukovsky. Two stints in a psychiatric hospital, a prison, an exchange for the leader of the Chilean communists, Corvalan - for those who caught the Gorbachev era at the age of teenagers, Vladimir Bukovsky, the most famous dissident of the Soviet Union, is a character from a history textbook.

However, lately it seems that history is repeating itself: today Bukovsky is a participant in all political scandals associated with fugitives to England from Russian authorities. He is the guarantor in the case of Berezovsky and Zakayev. Since 1996, he was no longer

allowed into Russia. Therefore, the political prisoner is forced to receive former compatriots at his place - in the professorial house in Cambridge. - Do you think it is possible to return the

Soviet Union now? - Until the end, Putin will not return the Soviet Union. This is impossible. I'm not talking about such a simple consideration that nothing can be returned at all.

It's the same as trying to restore the Austro-Hungarian monarchy or the Soviet empire. He will, of course, do a lot of things. But times are not the same, not those people, a whole generation of people was born who grew up not knowing what it is. They are not very afraid. They

laugh mostly.

In addition, it is impossible to return the Soviet regime without closing the country, but how to do this? What, return the exit visa regime? It will be very inconvenient. First of all, howl the whole business. And then it's technically impossible. What, will he guard the border with Ukraine in the same way as the border with Poland was guarded? Hardly, the border is long. And there are practically no borders.

Recall that the equipment is different now - there is satellite television, the Internet. Then, do not forget, in order to introduce the institution of terror, you need to have a certain critical mass of fanatics. And now there are no fanatics, this GB is corrupt from top to bottom.

Well, for example, they will come to me now with a search, I will tell them: "Guys, here's five thousand dollars for you, will you leave here?" They will say, "Give me ten, let's go." That's right? In a country that is completely corrupt, it is impossible to introduce terror. Well, well, now Stalin will appear. How much can he do? Nothing, probably banks will be robbed.

- And the Latin American version, when there seems to be terror, but while certain people agree with the authorities? - Well, you already have it. You already got it. - It so happens that political immigration is now gathering in the UK. Why here in Paris and not in Washington?

- Accident. Mostly by chance. It happened. - Is it somehow connected with the position of the British authorities? -

No way. Blair is very fond of his friend Vova. He would be ready to hand over everyone tomorrow. But we have a judicial guarantee. Our court is independent, unlike many other countries.

- Do you know Berezovsky's statement that he will not allow Putin to be re-elected? -

Nonsense all this. Berezovsky talks a lot. And not to the point. To him no need to engage in politics, he is completely unsuitable for this.

- But do you admit the option that Putin will not be re-elected for a second term?

I don't think there is such a chance. And there are no elections, FAPSI decides all this. Even if you find some candidate who can lead people, what's the point. All the same, he will get his twenty percent, and Putin will get sixty. - How do you feel about what is happening in Russia?

- All this is disgusting, of course. But I've stopped thinking about it. Because everyone really missed before. The decisive years were 1990-1991. Then no one did anything. Then it was necessary to completely dismantle the system, as we told Yeltsin, to hold a trial of the communists, to completely dismantle the KGB. And he imprisoned Bakatin, who was dismembered by the committee. Border guards separately, intelligence separately.

I told Bakatin that this is a rather pointless undertaking, it's like the teeth of a dragon. So they grew up, and now they are united. This was not a reform. Didn't get them. Well, they came to life and went forward like moles. And since 1996 they have already come to the surface. At least, they stopped letting me into Russia since 1996.

- That is, how are they not allowed? So, the visa was stopped. Old comrades said, probably. Here Sasha (Litvinenko. - Approx. Authors) told me that when he studied at the KGB school, they sorted out two cases: on foreign intelligence - Penkovsky, and on internal affairs - mine. This is what they have left. - This is probably

the position of officials who constantly trying to guess the desires of the authorities.

- Officials in all countries are like that.
- This is probably the main problem.

"That is not your main problem. The main problem is that you have not formed a society. This was the omission of 90–91. When a confrontation with the authorities was needed, and the society was frightened. The regime collapsed on its own. Unfortunately, the putsch lasted only three days. For three days, the company did not have time to consolidate. So what can you do in three days? Many in the provinces have not even heard of it.

And it was necessary to demarcate, wall to wall. Then there would be new structures, new leaders. But what you have now is not new leaders, these are some kind of lobbyists, there are no parties. It was necessary to go through a healthy confrontation. -

People, in my opinion, were not ready for this.

- They were very ready. I remember it very well. I arrived for the first time in April 1991. The country was incandescent. And in Moscow, the intelligentsia spoke conversations. I was brought to the Supreme Council, and there they are discussing who should speak when. In general, a complete mess. And we proposed to call a general strike. But there would be blood. "There

was no need to be afraid of blood then. She wouldn't exist. A missed the moment of history.

"But we didn't have a well-organized opposition, needed for such things.

- Then it was enough to call Yeltsin to strike, and that's it. At that time he was the leader. But he got scared. If he had not been afraid, new leaders would have appeared on the ground. After all, normal people do not go into politics, they are engaged in business.

And here, when there is a crisis, then these people would go forward. And completely new structures would be created. This would be the basis on which a new system could be built. But this did not happen, everything came to a standstill. So they trudged into the future with the old

nomenclature. When will there be such a historic opportunity again? - Well, who knows. In the history of the people this happens once in a century. All this was prepared by 73 years of Soviet power, it's not just that the people bucked up. Our people are very calm. And now smarter people either go about their business or leave. Now, after all, such an outflow is underway, and the best - young, energetic people. I

travel with lectures to American universities. At every American university, and there are at least a hundred of them, there is a group of Russians. Where there are forty people, where there are two hundred. There are thirty thousand Russians in the Denver area, because there is a lot

of military industry there. The country is running. - What's next? - What will happen next with Russia is clear to me. I wrote this back in 1993. It will continue to fall apart. And not on a national

basis, but on an economic basis. - That is, as Brzezinski wrote - into three or four parts? — Brzezinski wrote that because I told him so. This process has a historical reason. Russian statehood did not really take shape. In my opinion, Klyuchevsky writes correctly that the Russian Empire was formed as a result of the fact that the people fled from power, and the power

fled after the people. The people fled from serfdom, from recruitment, for religious reasons, and the authorities were chasing after them. So they ran to the natural borders - China, Türkiye. After all, who are the Cossacks - runaway peasants. So the foundation didn't work. statehood.

Power had no limits. For example, England is a small country, you can't run far here. Here they reached the natural boundaries, society began to fight, and the Magna Carta (Great Charter) appeared: they limited the power of the absolute monarch. And the

Russian reaction was to run. As a result, Russia was built as a state from the roof, not from the foundation. You never had local government.

Here, for example, America. If tomorrow some rabid general seizes power in the White House, half the country will not notice it. Because the vital problems of the country are not solved in the White House.

Everything is decided in each state, they, in general, do not really need Washington. When there is no local government, the country is doomed. A country in 12 time zones cannot live with a government that decides everything in the Kremlin. You need to build a bridge, but you have to wait for

permission from Moscow. Before the revolution, they tried to solve this problem, they created a Zemstvo, but then the Bolsheviks came. As a result, Russia practically collapsed by 1918. Fell apart. Lenin and Trotsky glued these pieces together, somewhere

on bayonets, somewhere on ideology, on terror. And this embalmed corpse lived for 73 years. It has never been a living state. It always struck me when I was young how dead it all was. As soon as central authority weakened, everything returned to the 1918 scenario. So it inevitably happens in history - where it was interrupted, it returned to that. And everything started to fall apart. And since reforms are not taking place,

there will be further fragmentation. There will be pieces. Well, why, for example, the Far East needs Moscow? And then one evening the local governor will sit with the local commander of the military district and drink what they drink there. And the conversation - "Ivan Ivanovich, does Moscow give you anything? No, you just have to pay taxes. And you? And boots are not sent. So we are fooling around, let me be the government, you are the commander of the army. What will Russia do? Send troops? Solar is not enough. Everything will fall apart when the center weakens

And then came the KGB and its representative Putin. And what did they do? Those three years were good in terms of oil prices, did he use this money for something reasonable? Had



rebuild the economy. He did the opposite. The country needs federalization, the more you give local government to develop, the better it will be for the country. And this one said about the vertical. Well done. We puzzled over what pieces

the country would break up into, he created seven regions, and now we know what pieces it will break up into. He does not understand anything, this little man, one and a half meters with a cap, except for his KGB work. - You are not now engaged in Russia, as you said. What are you

are you doing?

- I am engaged, for example, in Europe. And here the processes are also unpleasant. We are building a new ideological dictatorship here. It is still very soft, but in structure it is absolutely the Soviet Union. Just as undemocratic. Only there was a Politburo of 15 people, and here there are 25 commissars sitting in Brussels. That's the whole difference. The ideology is Menshevik, Social Democratic. But there is little joy in this. Very soon a repressive apparatus will be introduced to us. According to the latest data, Europol is being created, which has the right to extradite without court hearings. — You mean Europol, which is now part of

Interpol, or a new structure?

— No, this is a new structure. Look at the treaty in Nice, and they left the same formula in the European constitution. Europol will have the right to extradite on 32 counts. This is a very broad list - usually extradition laws cover four or five items. Of these, two are especially interesting because they are not a crime in any of the countries - one article is "racism" and the other is "xenophobia". - What does it mean? - It is very clear to me. All those who object to further integration will be imprisoned for xenophobia. And those who will object to mass immigration from third world countries will be

racists. Here is Article 170 and Article 190. Now I know who is going where. This is a special process. And here in England, many are dissatisfied with this process. This already concerns me directly, because I live here. So the Soviet Union came directly to me.

I don't have to go there. This is what I am trying to do. Although there are many dissatisfied, all this is poorly organized, as a rule, fragmented. I constantly travel to different countries and understand that the unification will take another ten years.

— But the Great Britain occupies a special position here - always together with the USA?

- This became a stumbling block, you remember that happened at the beginning of the Iraqi war. Complete split in Europe. "But then Europe lost, didn't it?" "Yes, but these people don't calm down. - What kind of

people are these? - The initiative for this belongs to the Socialist International. That is, some association of socialist and social democratic parties in Europe. It has been developed since the 80s.

Do you mean the idea of a united Europe opposing US domination? Yes, this is the idea of

creating another Soviet Union. Initially, the idea was that this (the European Union) would merge with the Soviet Union. The so-called "convergence" idea. There was such a great dream in the West that at some point the Bolsheviks would return to the fold of social democracy, grow wiser, soften, create socialism with a human face. And in the West, by that time, the socialists will come to power, and convergence will occur. And the division of the world will

disappear, there will be no wars, poverty, and happiness will come for centuries. And that's what they were doing here. Why are European structures so similar to Soviet ones? And they were deliberately made in such a way that they approached the Soviet ones. Misha Gorbachev traveled everywhere and spoke about a common European home. And what is it? And the negotiations (I have the documents of the Central Committee) went on like that, that the European structures should be built in such a way that they fit the Soviet ones. -

And in the USSR they were loyal to these ideas? — Absolutely. Under Gorbachev, yes. If we take the period before Gorbachev, then in Moscow they were extremely negative about this. Everything began to change in 1985, when Moscow came to the conclusion that convergence was the way out. The problems are so big that one cannot cope with them alone.

What was "new thinking"? These were rehashings of social democratic ideas. We've been following this closely. And when the eastern part collapsed, the west remained, and they continue to build it here. Is it mostly France? — France and

Germany. Are you doing this on behalf of some

organization? Yes, there are a lot of organizations. They are called here

Euroskeptics. Although it's weird.

You can be a skeptic about what you don't know, but what known for sure.

There are dozens of these organizations. There is a whole party that is gaining a lot of votes in elections - this is the United Kingdom Independence Party. I know all these groups. And in other countries there are many such groups and parties that are trying to resist this process. But they are still very fragmented. 2003

## **The collapse of Russia is inevitable, and the EU will collapse**

(Interview for the newspaper "Delfi", Lithuania) The well-known Soviet dissident Vladimir Bukovsky lately appears more and more often at various events of the Russian opposition forces. He believes that clashes with the current regime in the Russian Federation are inevitable, for which, in turn, one must be prepared. His opinion may be uncomfortable for both the West and Russia. Unlike many, he does not idealize the current structure of the EU, calling the European commissioners "commissioners in dusty helmets", as well as being very critical of the current Russian authorities.  
- Vladimir

Konstantinovich, it is clear that you constantly followed the events in Russia, but what made you pay closer attention to what is happening in the Russian Federation, to the point that you were ready to run for president? - The explanation for this is very simple.

It's gotten so bad that something needs to be done. I understood that it would be bad back in 1993. Then I realized that things would not go forward. We did not dare to go forward. It was necessary to carry out a trial on communism, start decommunization, a lustration process, but Yeltsin and his team simply did not dare to do this. That's why I left in 1993. I realized that there would be a restoration, and I wrote about it both in my book and in foreign magazines. And I followed what was happening in Russia, but I followed with one eye, because it was clear what would happen, but it was not interesting to watch it in detail. I knew that the nomenklatura would return to power, which, in general, happened not only in Russia, but in a number of former republics of the USSR. But in 2000, everything in Russia quickly began to return to the Soviet Union. And I was especially hurt that the authorities began to return to psychiatric repressions, and this hurt me personally, because at one time I gave more than one year of my life to stop this form of persecution.

- Did you seriously believe that you would be allowed to participate in presidential elections?

— No, of course not. This presidential candidate scheme was just a way to get into Russia. Seriously, we didn't even think about it. The official press was silent about me, well, thank God.

- How do you assess the current state of affairs in Russia and why does Russia take such a position in relation to Ukraine, Georgia? - On the one

hand, they want to restore the former sphere of Soviet influence, and therefore the Russian authorities react very painfully to the fact that these countries left them. Especially Ukraine. It absolutely pisses them off. The fact that Ukraine is not with Russia destroys the Soviet myth about the brotherhood of peoples, etc. Putin is a man who did not understand why the Soviet Union collapsed. Imagine their psychology. After all, these are small "KGB" colonels and majors, they did not see the impending collapse of the Soviet system from their belfry, unlike us (dissidents. - Delfi), who have seen this since the 60s. For them, there was a surprise, and therefore, it was the result of some kind of conspiracy. At one time, Hitler blamed the Jews for Germany's defeat in World War I. Similarly, all these Putins who seriously believe that the collapse of the USSR was the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century. They instinctively try to restore the positions of the USSR, realizing, however, that this will not be completely successful. But they try as much as possible. Therefore, they put pressure on Georgia, Ukraine, the Baltic states and even Poland. Why create this tension? - This is the ideology of the current Russian government.

They built a lot on this. This is a way to keep control over the country. They want everyone to feel like they are in a besieged fortress, where only they, strong Chekists, can protect us. I live in the West, I know many people, I communicate widely and I will say that there is no enmity towards Russia. Sometimes I'm even surprised it's not there. It seems like it should be, but it isn't. And they (the Russian authorities) understand that this helps them inside the country. A certain element, completely brainwashed by propaganda, sees them as protectors, and it turns out that in this way they exercise control. I

I strongly doubt that any Putin or Ivanov seriously believes that Estonia poses a threat to Russia's security.

- At the last conference of Democrats in St. Petersburg, I saw Oleg Basilashvili. Cultural figures again support the opposition?

This has been observed in our time as well. This is a phenomenon of the Soviet times. Element of spiritual rejection. We did it automatically, the Khrushchev thaw was marked by the revival of some kind of counterculture. Think theatres, magazines, and so on. Then it was cultural figures who showed a desire for spiritual independence. Russia is a very literary country, so we always play everything first at the level of literature. Therefore, the most famous figures of our resistance were Vysotsky, Galich and so on. The "post-Stalinist" government was still afraid to behave like a cavalry with culture, because the system realized that it was not profitable for it. — In your latest book you criticize the European social

democracy, say that there is no democracy in the West now.

— The EU is a project of convergence, so initially the EU structures were built very similar to the Soviet ones, so that they fit together. For Europe, this is a dead end project. The fact that the EU will collapse, like its prototype, is a matter of time. Until 1985, both Moscow and European countries were against both the common market and the further integration of Europe. After 1985, they (left. - Delfi) changed their point of view. According to their estimates, socialism has entered the stage of crisis. They began to lose everywhere and everywhere. And in Europe they realized that socialism cannot be built in a separate country, but together and through

a non-democratic structure it is possible. — What are your predictions regarding the system

built by Vladimir Putin? - The Putin system will also not last long. Because it doesn't have a solid foundation, and besides, they (the Kremlin) make amazing mistakes. They use oil and gas as a strategic weapon, not a commercial commodity. As soon as oil prices fall, this will inevitably weaken the political center and immediately lead to the growth of separatism on the periphery. And they, like drug addicts, constantly increase their dose. The country can be torn into several pieces. And not along ethnic lines. It will be economic

fragmentation. And these "pieces" will gradually rebuild their foundations, and in the future we can unite in the form of a confederation. It is impossible to consider such an option neither a disaster nor a boon. Russia as a state has never been rebuilt. They never built a foundation, that is, local self-government. Ato, what is happening now is the management of the country in 12 time zones from one office in Moscow, madness. But no matter what forecasts are made, this question (the question of disintegration) hangs over us. 2008

## Russia would not have won the war with Poland

(Interview for the Rzeczpospolita newspaper, Poland. Hosted by P. Zykhovich. Translated from Polish by V.

Glinsky) Piotr Zykhovich: Dmitry Medvedev condemned the Soviet purges of 1937. Many in Poland were inspired by this and supported the Russian president.

Vladimir Bukovsky: And there was no reason, it was all just a game. Medvedev is not an independent person, he is not a real president. He was only named president. It performs a special function in this regime that dominates Russia today. He must represent the so-called liberal physiognomy of the regime. Deceive people. What he says doesn't matter. These are just words. Medvedev likes to talk about how there should be more democracy in the country, that the courts should be independent, and the like. Medvedev and Putin is the old game of good and evil investigator. Take it easy.

PZ: And who is this game designed

for? VB: Of course, in order to deceive the West and Russian intellectuals who are frustrated by the lack of democracy and freedoms in their country. They listen to these speeches, admire them and because of this they sit quietly and calmly.

They do not oppose the regime because they believe that there is a liberal current in it that may someday get a vote. They can say to themselves: since our president says such things, it means that not everything is so bad. And the situation will improve. Although all this is just a pipe dream.

PZ: Medvedev's words may remind many of 1956 and Khrushchev's report. VB: It's

true. If you carefully analyze what he said, then, of course, you can see that he is speaking like Khrushchev. That his speech was in the spirit of the well-known report from the 20th Congress. Namely, that in 1937 it came to regrettable "mistakes and distortions", but they should not obscure the great achievements and



successes of the Soviet Union. One way or another, the Putin regime is turning to the Soviet tradition. Sometimes to Stalin's, sometimes to Khrushchev's.

PZ: And what then is the state that is today between Ukraine and Alaska. Russia or another post-Soviet monster? VB: This is a post-Soviet monster. The Soviet

nomenklatura - after several years of confusion in the early 90s -

regrouped, launched a counteroffensive and occupied the most important posts in the state. Both in the world of politics and in business. Acting behind the scenes, and the Soviet secret services became the engine here, the communists returned to power. We can say that we are now in the phase of the restoration of the Soviet regime. Something in the style of the return of the Bourbons after a little Napoleonic period. PZ: But after all, the two-headed eagle became the

coat of arms of this state, and the tricolor banner became the flag. V.B.: And the anthem is an old Soviet

anthem written by Sergei Mikhalkov for Stalin. The army still uses a red flag, and red stars are painted on the tails of military aircraft. What kind of historical schizophrenia we are dealing with in Russia is best evidenced by the incident in St. Petersburg. The city, to which its real name was returned, but which is still the center.

Leningrad region. When Putin unveiled a monument to KGB chief Yuri Andropov, he said that Soviet security agencies "always defended the interests of the people." And that means in 1937, when several million of its representatives were destroyed. PZ: How can you combine

two opposite traditions - Russian and Soviet? VB: Such an experiment was quite consistently carried out by

Joseph Stalin. When the war with Germany began in 1941, Soviet soldiers en masse went over to the side of the enemy, surrendered to the Germans in whole divisions. A total of several million people. And it was a conscious political decision. These people did not identify themselves with the communist regime and with the Soviet Union. On the contrary, they hated him from the bottom of their hearts and wished for his destruction. They were not going to defend the collective farms and the Gulag. The state that brought down such terrible misfortunes on them.

PZ: So you think that if Hitler would have treated better Russian, then he would have won the war in the East?

VB: He was blinded by his ideology, considered the Slavs subhuman and did not use the anti-Soviet attitude of the Russians and other peoples oppressed by the Soviets. And it ruined him. Hitler was not much different from the communists, he was a dogmatist and a fanatic. Let us return, however, to Stalin: he quickly realized that if he fought only under the banner of communism, he would lose this war. In order to save himself, he then decided to appeal to the Russian patriotic feeling. In a well-known speech, he addressed the people with the words "brothers and sisters", and not comrades. He asked for help from the Russians, whom he had terrorized and oppressed for so many years. He opened churches, introduced ministries instead of commissariats, and also returned officer ranks and shoulder straps. But earlier the very word "officer" was cursed! And since the old Georgian Bolshevik was able to play the role of a Russian patriot in the 40s, why can't former KGB agents do this today?

PZ: Is history repeating itself?

VB: It's still the same game. Since the opportunity has presented itself, I will tell you about one interesting story related to the Soviet special services and Russian nationalism. In the early 90s, the KGB founded, and then nurtured and directed the most extreme and chauvinistic organizations of Russian nationalists. It was about presenting the "vile face of the Russian people", the evil instincts that were supposed to sleep in it. For what? Thus, they wanted to scare the liberal intellectuals. "If you go too far in your fight against the Soviet legacy, if you don't compromise with us, then fascism will come to power in Russia." PZ: And how does Russian society react to the strange

the historical politics of the regime?

VB: People are disoriented. It is enough to look into the new encyclopedia. The heroes of the Russian people there are recognized as individuals who in no way could get along with each other. On the one hand, the white generals Denikin, Wrangel or Kolchak, and on the other, Lenin, Stalin, Beria or Khrushchev. But they are mortal enemies, which represented opposite camps. On the one hand, Russians, and on the other, those who hate

Russian Bolsheviks. The situation is similar to Kafka. Recently, the regime found the remains of some white general somewhere, brought them to Russia and buried them with honors, and during this ceremony the Soviet anthem was played. I'm amazed this man didn't jump out of his grave

when he heard this! PZ: Let's imagine that we put Putin and his colleagues in a time machine and transferred them to 1919. Which side would they fight on? White or red?

VB: Of course, on the side of the Reds! These people came from the Soviet special services. And there is no doubt which side they would have taken during the Civil War. After all, it was thanks to the victory of the Reds that they were able to build their positions and achieve today's influence. Actually, Putin's uncle worked in the Cheka, and his father in the NKVD. This is a KGB clan that has been fighting Russian patriotism for several decades.

PZ: Why is the Kremlin playing such a strange game in relation to the Katyn crime? VB:

Because in the early 1990s, Russian politicians were so stupid that they declared today's Russia the rightful heir of the Soviet Union. They did so because it gave them some benefits. They took over from the Soviets a place in the UN Security Council, were not forced to ratify all international treaties and the like. However, in this way they also inherited debts from the Soviets. Namely, the reparations that they are obliged to pay to Poland, Afghanistan, the Baltic countries and all those countries that were damaged by the Soviets.

Such a scenario would be a nightmare for the Kremlin, which is why it reverts to the Stalinist lie that the Germans killed at Katyn. The regime is afraid of lawsuits from the families of the killed officers. He fears a precedent that would open Pandora's box.

PZ: But the Katyn case fits into the broad context of Russia's hostile policy towards Poland. VB: They want to scare you,

and, unfortunately, they succeed quite well. I am very critical of the policy of your current government, Donald Tusk. Despite all the unpleasant, provocative gestures on the part of the Kremlin, Tusk keeps talking about "improving relations", "the need for compromise", "reducing

spore temperature" and the like. I am not an expert in the language of diplomacy, but I see that someone here is playing an unequal game. Russia is becoming more and more like the Soviet Union, wants to return its sphere of influence and is an open enemy of Poland, which did nothing wrong. Just recently, the Kremlin simulated a nuclear attack on your country! It's unseen! And despite this, your prime minister is always smiling and talking about "improving relations with the Russian partner." This is a big mistake! PZ: How

should Poland react? V.B.: Speak in a language understandable for this "partner". That is, in the language of power. It is necessary to speak firmly and decisively with the current Russian regime. Tusk is making the same mistake as the West, which does not understand with whom it is dealing. These are people from the KGB! Their psyche and way of thinking are diametrically opposed to those of normal people. If you want to come to a compromise with them, then they regard it as your weakness. They think that you succumb to their pressure, which means that their tactics are correct. What needs to be done is to increase the pressure even more. After all, the normal mode of operation of the

KGB is blackmail. PZ: You remembered the next Russian military exercises, directed against Poland. Should we be afraid of Russia?

VB: No. Although today you will find yourself under the strongest pressure from her. When you were betrayed by the United States, which abandoned the plan to place a missile defense shield on your territory, the Kremlin decided that you were "wounded." He felt the blood and, probably, will now "tighten the screws." However, this is all just a game. Russia in the foreseeable future will not attack Poland, because it has nothing. There is no discipline in the Russian army, the weapons are in a deplorable state. This army is degenerating and falling apart. Actually, this is no longer an army, but a horde of marauders. Of course, you have seen pictures of tattered Russian soldiers in T-shirts who conquered Georgia in 2008. What was enough for a small state will not be enough for Poland. PZ: Our army does not impress

either. VB: I recently explained the same thing to Ukrainians. I spoke on their television, where I was asked if Ukraine would be "next". I told them not to be afraid. If the Russian army entered

to Ukraine, then she would immediately run away to towns and villages and start drinking vodka en masse. Ukraine is famous for the production of its vodka. Thanks to her, within a few minutes after crossing the border, the Russian army would have disappeared. The generals could not find a single soldier to give him orders. You're laughing, but I'm being serious. You have nothing to fear.

PZ: And what about Russia? Do you foresee the possibility of destroying the current regime? VB: The situation is very unstable.

What this state is still holding on to is high oil and gas prices. When these prices suddenly go down - as they must someday - the whole system will fall apart and be disintegrated. The scenario of 1991 will be repeated. Or the next stage of the collapse of the territorial colossus, which was the Soviet Union, will come. This time, however, it will not be divided along ethnic lines, as it was in 1991. Now the Soviet republics will not be detached. This time, Russia itself will be divided. PZ: How? VB: Most foreigners do not know what role the regions play in Russia and the hostility between them. Moscow has never been particularly popular. This is a city that has always been considered a city of dictators, which, like a polyp, sucks the life-

giving juices out of Russia.

Try driving 200 kilometers from Moscow and you will see how many people hate it. I think that Siberia will be the first to enter the line of fire, which is increasingly gravitating towards the Far East and where separatist sentiments are very strong. Then the turn of the Russian North will come: Karelia, Arkhangelsk and, of course, St. Petersburg, which has very strong ambitions of its own and which hates Moscow. Once the unity of Russia was kept by the tsar, then by Soviet terror, and today by gas. When this gas escapes, Russia will be able to

fall apart. 2008

## **The way out of the political crisis in Russia will be in the further fragmentation of the country**

(Interview with Ekho Rossii radio. Hosted by S. Medvedev) Medvedev:

On a direct line from London Vladimir Bukovsky. Vladimir Konstantinovich, good evening. Bukovsky: Good evening. Medvedev: Well,

I don't even know how to

introduce you. You know, I'll say "dissident". Can you still be presented as a dissident? Bukovsky: Yes, I don't really care, but I'm a neurophysiologist by profession. Medvedev: You

are a neurophysiologist by profession, so you defended your thesis at Cambridge, right? Bukovsky:

Yes, and he worked. Basically I'm known, of course, as

author of several books.

Medvedev: Well, if we talk about dissidence. So to speak, because there are no former dissidents, just as there are no former intelligence officers. So say, once a dissident, forever a dissident. Bukovsky: Probably,

I don't know. It's hard for me to judge, I've never looked seriously at my own past. It didn't seem important enough to me to analyze. I lived as I lived, I simply refused to lie from childhood, to lie. And it was uncomfortable, uncomfortable for me, uncomfortable for everyone around, uncomfortable for the state. Hence, tensions arose that escalated into a war. Medvedev: Which have already turned into a war. Well, at least, you know, in our perception, in my personal perception, you

remain such, I don't know, the model of a dissident. Maybe for you even now it is not so important.

But, in general, a person who lived and lives not by lies. And I think this is where we would like to start our conversation. You are the first time, as I

understand it, that this protest was realized quite early, at the age of 14. 1956, this is the report of Khrushchev and Hungary.

Bukovsky: Approximately yes. In general, some process of rethinking started very early for me. Well, this is how life happened, such were the events at that time. Let's say I was ten years old when Stalin died, and it was a colossal shock.

Medvedev: For you, too, or for those around you?

Bukovsky: For everyone, and for me too. I grew up in the full conviction that he is God and our collective dad. And suddenly dad died and turned out to be not a god, because the gods still should not die. And I remember this feeling very keenly, when people around there roared, shouted, fought in hysterics. I had some strange

feeling that, firstly, there is no more power and, most likely, will not be. We associated the concept of power with Stalin, who never sleeps and always thinks for us. This is probably a childish perception, but I think that adults are not far from it. Here we were shown a picture: everywhere in Moscow it is dark, and in the Kremlin a fire is burning in one room, there Comrade Stalin thinks for us. Here the light went out, so you have to think for yourself.

Dmitry Medvedev: Think further by yourself. And what happens next in 1956? For you, some kind of realization comes, how the veil falls from your eyes, or did it gradually come? Bukovsky:

Well, I say, this process, in general, started with me from childhood, when everything seemed very strange. You know, it is impossible for children to comprehend everything at this age, especially to formulate. Children are almost like hamsters - they lay everything by the cheek, in order to digest it later. And so, as a child, I laid everything behind my cheek, all these impressions, so that later. Grow up and rethink.

And this process went on all the time. Leaders changed there, we went into leapfrog, which, in general, also did not contribute to any respect, the emergence of respect for the regime. The portraits disappeared, we were told at school: "Children, open the textbook of the history of the USSR on the 37th page, there is a portrait of Comrade Beria. Take the blade and carefully cut it and give it to me." And we cut out, and so every week or two another portrait. In general, the textbook was melting before our eyes, nothing remained of the history of the USSR. But, of course, Hungary was the biggest shock, as it proved that the regime was not

has changed.

Medvedev: At what point did you realize. Well, so to speak, your point of no return, your point of departure from the regime?

Bukovsky: I think Hungary.

Medvedev: Already at the age of 14, did you realize that you did not associate

yourself with this regime? Bukovsky: Yes. Moreover, I am not compatible with him. That's what I realized at this age somewhere. I'm incompatible with him, it's pointless, useless to pretend. I do not know how to pretend and I will not pretend, therefore, this incompatibility is the inevitability of a collision, a conflict.

Medvedev: Did you realize the criminality of the Soviet Union even then?

Bukovsky: Of course. Khrushchev told us about it, about crime.

Medvedev: Well, not the Soviet Union, but still he Stalin's crimes spoke.

Bukovsky: Well, yes, but he could call it whatever he wanted, but we understood that these were the crimes of the Soviet Union. Stalin alone was not able to kill 30 million people, or how many there were. It's clear that this is the whole regime. We had a rejection from the older generation, we did not believe him. Here they are - accomplices of mass murder. By default or by participation, but they are accomplices. Therefore, we had an absolutely irreconcilable attitude towards the older generation. Dmitry

Medvedev: You - who?

Is this such a strong generational thing, did you have a lot in your generation who also realized? Bukovsky: Well, not everyone chose to insist on this all their lives. You know, a person wants to fulfill some of his dreams, his plans, to realize his abilities. Therefore, many did not do this anymore, they went about their own business. But they did not accept Soviet power, and never did.

It was generational.

Medvedev: It was generational. This year marks the 40th anniversary of your process of 1972, January 1972 was, your process was completed.

Bukovsky: This was the fourth time I was imprisoned.



Medvedev: Fourth, yes, yes, of course. But that is already the final process, after which there was your exchange for Corvalan, expulsion and your famous final speech. But over the years, how much has the situation changed in the confrontation, so to speak, between dissent and the authorities, the opposition and the authorities? How has the regime changed? Or do you see the return of some of these old patterns as you watch our evolution over the past 20 years? Now we are talking for the first time about the new year 1937, about the return of repressions. What are your feelings about this? Bukovsky:

Well, of course, it is wrong to compare this with 1937, it is not similar in scale. The important thing is that the repressions have returned, yes, the fear has returned, which, in general, we hoped, has already disappeared forever. And you can't

compare in scale. Well, what can I say? I just talked about this in advance, and in 1993, it really came out in 1995, I wrote a book called The Moscow Trial, where I said directly that if we don't finish off this regime, we won't hold the Nuremberg Trials on the communist system then everything will come back. You have to finish it off, it's like a wounded animal, you can't leave it, you have to finish it off.

Medvedev: Do you think that what has sprouted now are the remains of the communist regime, or, perhaps, some more such, eternal structures? That Russia that comes from Ivan the Terrible yet?

Bukovsky: This is an attempt to restore the Soviet regime. Moreover, of course, both above and below, people understand that it is impossible to restore it to the end - not those times, other technical possibilities. But they are trying to restore it, starting with the anthem, starting with the red flag in the army, and then with all the stops - and repressions, and censorship, and so on, and spy mania, when every person who meets with a foreigner is already a spy, and so on. This, of course, is the return of everything old, this is a restoration, a deliberate restoration.

Medvedev: Vladimir Konstantinovich, I want to clarify. Restoration. Perhaps, after all, some kind of restoration is even more like that. Well, where am I going? To a certain problem of the rut of this Russian, Russian system, this authoritarian system, into which we fall from century to century. In the 20th century, this track was called the Soviet way, but, in principle, Grozny probably drew it.

Bukovsky: I wouldn't go that far. You know, compared to what it was in the 20th century, everything else pales. And Grozny, well, what is he there, shook the boyars a little, just think. At that time, the same thing was done in Europe, in France, Cardinal Richelieu did no less, in England at that time everyone who was executed. No, compared to the Middle Ages, what we saw, or at least found the remnants, it was a nightmare, it was beyond. It will never get worse, I just don't see what could be worse, it's physically impossible.

Well, here I am saying, to correct this geopolitical mistake, the catastrophe that we are told about, in the form of the collapse of the Soviet system, this, of course, is very naive. This shows how the current people in power do not understand what is happening and what happened. For some reason, in the 1960s, we knew that the Soviet regime must collapse. How did we know? You have to open your eyes and look around, and think a little, and it becomes quite obvious that this regime was not viable. My friend Andrei Amalrik even wrote a book, in 1969 he published it, which was called "Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984

of the year".

Medvedev: Yes, I was a little mistaken. Bukovsky: Yes, for a couple of years. Medvedev: Well, look, speaking about the current people in power, you have already started this conversation. Well, remember Brodsky: "Thieves are dearer to me than bloodsuckers." Maybe these current thieves are some new type? Here, let's say, to compare the incredible disintegration that is now taking place at the top of power, well, and those who, in fact, are in charge of the power structures?

Bukovsky: You know, by their psychological types and by their psychological reactions, by their mentality, these people are absolutely part of the old regime, they were made by this regime. Look, these are mostly security officers, and security officers, as we have already said, they cannot be former. Here they are, and all their reactions are Chekist. Why are they so predictable? Because we have seen it all, for us it is a repetition of the past. Medvedev: How do you compare them with those security officers with whom you

fought for decades, and here are the current security officers, this

generation?

Bukovsky: Well, the current ones, of course, degenerated, they were very disqualified. I, laughing, tell my friends that today they are at the level of the Zaraisk police department. They can't help but get caught, they fail all the time. Well, look how many murders they did abroad - they all failed. I'm not talking about the last episode, when they were caught somewhere in America by a whole brigade.

Medvedev: In America, with Anna Chapman, when this failure happened. Okay, well, speaking of Chekists, Putin, is he a typical Chekist

for you? Bukovsky: Yes, absolutely typical. I, as soon as I saw him, even before the elections, he had just been declared the heir, I looked and said: "Well, these are exactly the ones who ran after me through the

gateways and along the subway." Medvedev: What is your assessment of Putin

over this 13th anniversary, 1999-2013, is he changing? Bukovsky: He is changing, he was much more nervous at the beginning, he felt very dependent, he looked like a first grade student who reported the lesson. Here he reported and looks at the teacher - did he say everything correctly? This is how he behaved. Now he feels much more free, confident, less complex. Although his complexes are very deep anyway, they don't go anywhere, but somehow he calmed down.

Medvedev: What complexes do you

think? Bukovsky: As you remember, at first I could not stand any ridicule, criticism, well, I simply could not stand any. And now a little philosophical began to relate to this. Now, I think that he was tired of all this for a long time, the impression is that he would be glad to go somewhere to Guatemala, but, as they say, sins are not allowed.

Medvedev: Yes, yes. What do you think drives him, what are his internal motivations? Bukovsky:

Well, at the very beginning, when he was just appointed to this position, well, he received a task - he must be completed. Then, when he began to feel more confident, the realization came that you can't jump off this tiger, the tiger eats. And just like that, it's impossible to put everything together and leave. He thought about it clearly in 2007 before

how to nominate Medvedev. He obviously didn't want any third term, he could have done it easily. Who in the then Russian system could prevent him? No, he didn't want to and thought of somehow jumping off. It was visible. But I realized that no, they wouldn't let me, that's all, the mousetrap slammed shut.

Medvedev: In your opinion.

Bukovsky: Now, I think, he has a feeling. If you still can't get out of this adventure alive, at least something needs to be done. Here he has the feeling that he must do something, after all.

Medvedev: In your opinion, is he a reactive person, not a proactive one, does he have his own mission?

Bukovsky: He is a person who is not prone to reflection, not prone to introspection, he manages himself rather poorly, although he thinks that he is such a sphinx of the KGB. Nothing like that, all the emotions on his face. And we saw this during the last elections with his these emotional outbursts.

Medvedev: Well, yes, I think he is still offended. On opposition, he was clearly offended with all this protest.

Bukovsky: Yes. So it's all visible. He is an emotional person. Well, my psychological assessment of him, I immediately gave, back in 2000: he is a weak person, he is petty, vengeful, not looking far ahead, we will live until Monday and thank God.

Medvedev: Well, of course, yes. Well, what, in fact, in the ruler and throughout Russia, there is a lack of a project, a lack of an image of the future, a lack of any long-term thinking.

Well, speaking of, say, other security officers in power. Do you also somehow see them, feel them? Bukovsky:

To be honest, I didn't pay much attention to them. Well, it's like officials, officials, appointees. Well, who do you want to talk about? Medvedev: Well, I don't know, Sechin, or

they are talking about Kirill. Bukovsky: About whom? Medvedev:  
About the patriarch.

B. Bukovsky: Ah, Kirill. Well, listen, it's still a church, it's a little different. And I have a rather negative attitude towards the Russian Orthodox Church, since it is not a repentant church. Do not forget that they, paraphrasing Pushkin, prayed for Tsar Herod

decades, right? Therefore, they still need to repent, and many of them simply served in the KGB, we know this, very many were, if not officers, then KGB officers, informers, and so on. This is, of course, disgusting. Well, there was such a time, for example, but repent, that's what the church is for. And how can other people repent in this church if the hierarchs have not repented. Dmitry Medvedev: Well, there is even a certain parallel here. On the one hand, as you

say, we did not have such a process of secular repentance, there was no Nuremberg trial, there was no post-communist lustration. On the other hand, there was no process of repentance in the church. Bukovsky: Yes, unfortunately. Hence the turbidity of our time, when there is still a huge number of people in Russia, I judge from the

Internet, from comments, from reactions, from documentaries, until now most people, I think, have not realized, say, the fact that the Soviet the system was criminal, that the Soviet system was doomed, that it collapsed naturally. All the time, mind you, they are looking for some kind of conspiracy, the CIA, the Zionists, the aliens, the mystic. Although everything was logical, everything was absolutely logical and predictable. Why? Because they can't come to terms with their role in all of this. Here, a huge number of people passively perceived it all, and now, in order to re-realize it, you need to admit to yourself that in fact you collaborated with this government, you helped it, you helped evil. And you need to realize this, you don't need to be afraid of it, you need to realize it. In order to move on, in

order, like the Germans, after the defeat in World War II, to take off their jackets and start building a new life, building destroyed cities, for this they had to admit their guilt. Medvedev: To the Germans in a sense. Bukovsky: This did not happen in Russia. Medvedev: Yes. The Germans were, in a sense, "lucky" to be the losers in the war and to be occupied. The process of denazification, of course, took place under a very strong

external push.

Bukovsky: Yes, of course, in this sense, we can say they were lucky. It is more difficult for us, but we still need to understand the task

historical moment.

Dmitry Medvedev: Do you think a trial of the CPSU was possible? Here is 1992, let's say 1993? Bukovsky:

Very, very even. I tried to persuade the then Russian leadership, and in 1991, immediately in August. I had a visa for the 25th of August, as providence doesn't care. The coup only failed, and I could come. And I came, talked to everyone, and persuaded everyone that such a process should be carried out. Not because there is someone to punish, to find the guilty, the innocent, it is almost impossible to do in the Soviet system, there were all the guilty, plus or minus, but in order for there to be a rethinking, a historical reassessment occurred in people, which would open the way to new. Dmitry Medvedev: Why didn't this happen? Bukovsky: I did not persuade him. I persuaded the majority of the then Russian leadership, but they did not persuade Yeltsin.

Yeltsin rested: "No, there is no need to rock the boat, everything has already happened, our victory is final, it will not change, the old ones will not return back." And no matter how much his assistants tried to persuade him, no.

Medvedev: What is your assessment of Yeltsin in general? Here I am enough I read, I think our listeners also know your sharply negative assessment of Gorbachev, that he also needs to be judged, but what about your assessment of Yeltsin's activities?

Bukovsky: You know, he is a very complex figure, very controversial. I blame him for all the missed opportunities. So he did very well during the putsch, all his speeches from the tank, the ban on the CPSU, and then Belovezhskaya Pushcha, the dissolution of the USSR. I approve of all this. But the fact is that much more had to be done, and the moment allowed, and he disappeared for three months. This is the first time in the history of mankind, well, modern mankind, the case when the supreme ruler did nothing in the first hundred days.

Medvedev: Yes, before the collapse of the USSR, yes, September, October, November. Four even practically. Well, yes, Belovezhskaya Pushcha, September 6, after the collapse of the USSR.

Bukovsky: Yes, it's unparalleled, it's a hundred days. We measure according to Napoleon, who, having returned from the island of Elba, managed to make war with the whole world in a hundred days and lose. This is an example of the maximum

saturation of the first 100 days. And they always measure any president, prime minister, and so on, politics. Yeltsin set a record,

I think he did nothing at all. Medvedev: Speaking of our rulers, speaking of the current regime again, do you see any signs of disintegration, the beginning of disintegration and such insanity of the regime, comparable to what you observed in the 70s in the Soviet Union?

Bukovsky: Of course, of course, I am watching. Well, firstly, since they are trying to return to a deliberately losing model, without realizing it, to an unviable one, they run into all the same problems that the Soviet Union ran into. In particular, again the enmity with the West, in particular, again the arms race, which even then the Soviet Union could not pull. This is on the one hand. On the other hand, the scheme of what they are doing is generally an illiterate scheme. This means that they do not have a single strategically thinking person at all.

So they relied on all these oil and gas prices, as they say, lived on the "pipe". Well, they don't understand that prices are changing, that prices will go down? Well, someone probably told them, but nothing was done, absolutely nothing. The feeling is that the current authorities, they do not think about the future, they do not even think about tomorrow, they live according to the well-known proverb of the concentration camp: "You

die today, oh - tomorrow." Medvedev: Do you see any similarities between those singles who opposed the Soviet regime and the current opposition movement?

Bukovsky: Well, you see, there are both similarities and differences. The similarity, of course, is that the opposition, as always, is small. And there were probably 3,000 of us for the entire union. That's 300 million, right? Now there is much more. Secondly, it is very fragmented, because it is united only by the rejection of the modern regime, and no one has any general schemes, models of what needs to be done. They are not common, they are different for everyone. This is typical, it was the same with us, in general. In general, we talked least of all about models of the future, we didn't have time for this. God bless there.

Medvedev: Did you each work on your own plots? After all, there was no general structure of our opposition,

comparable to Polish, for example.

Bukovsky: No, we didn't. It was deliberate. We kind of consciously decided that we don't need structures. Structures made any opposition movement very vulnerable. Structures in general are very vulnerable to infiltration, to manipulation. We had a kind of molecular, we always compared it more like a bee hive, where everyone knows what to do.

Medvedev: Well, yes, cells, just like now, a kind of network structure.

Bukovsky: Yes, and it is the most tenacious and most effective, by the way.

Medvedev: Opposition leaders, yes.

Bukovsky: But organizational structures - they make it very inflexible, immobile, difficult to modernize, change and very costly. But such a system is the most economical and the least vulnerable. Medvedev: Yes, the most invulnerable, just like the Internet is

invulnerable, for example. Bukovsky: Yes. Medvedev: And the leaders of the

opposition,  
someone calls you more  
attention, more interest, who could you bet on?

Bukovsky: Well, I have known most of them personally and for many years and treat them with sympathy. And besides, Boris Nemtsov, and Garik Kasparov. These are all people I have known for many years. And, in general, I kind of wish them well, and in case they ask me for something to advise, I am always ready to give advice. Another thing is that they seem to have little organizational beginning. In general, this is typical for opposition structures in Russia.

And it was like that with us, and in general, if you go, as if building a network model, then there are no leaders and by and large. They need more managers. We, of course, did not have such a task that they have. Their task is to organize mass

movement, and we are talking about a mass movement.

Medvedev: Well, yes. How much do you rate.

Bukovsky: Their task is to bring half a million people out into the street man, we had no such task.

Medvedev: How do you assess the prospects for mass participation? Here is the process, which we have been celebrating for a year now, what was 5



December 2011, after all, he was somehow blown away. It was recorded this year, but this mass movement has lost momentum. Bukovsky:

You know, when it started a year ago, I think I was in Georgia at that time. And my first impression was based on the shots that they showed me, that these are young people, intelligent youth, these are students, young specialists, and so on. And that this is like the last and decisive battle for them, each of them discusses in his head whether there is any prospect in this country or not. If not, you need to leave. If there is, it must be implemented. I had the feeling that it was some kind of surge of desperate hope: "Now we will

try to change something." They tried, they didn't change. I'm afraid half of them are already somewhere in the United States. It was just by definition, it was important for them to decide at the moment,

whether it makes sense to stay or not.

Dmitry Medvedev: Well, it seems to me that more people are determined to stay here and try to change something. Look at the increased number of election observers. Even if not such mass protests, but still such an increased

network activity.

Bukovsky: Well, you see, everyone would like to live at home and achieve such conditions under which one can live at home. But, you see, when people face the impossibility of such a prospect for the next 10-15-20 years, then purely human, as it were, qualities begin to speak in them. Everyone still wants to somehow realize himself, to do in life what is given to him by nature, laid down.

Dmitry Medvedev: Do you think it's impossible?

Bukovsky: 30 years to sit and wait for the weather by the sea is pointless. I do not blame these people, I myself would never have left if I had not been taken out by force.

Medvedev: By force,

yes. Bukovsky: These are personal things. And in principle, they, in general, act logically. If a scientist, a young scientist, cannot do anything in today's Russia - so what, he should bury all his ideas, plans, thoughts? Of course he will leave. And the protest movement as such will not disappear, of course. It will have ups and downs, and, of course, qualitative changes. Here is the clean one

the intellectual youth moment that was a year ago - it can change, more severe people can come. Medvedev: Like Udaltsov, for example. Bukovsky: For whom the

OMON is not an obstacle. And God forbid, but it will be. It will be precisely because of the stubbornness of the authorities, the unwillingness to somehow correct themselves, this will inevitably happen.

Medvedev: Yes. Here you are leaving on an interesting topic, which I also wanted to develop: the intelligentsia, the role of the intelligentsia in the protest, the intelligentsia and the people. That's when your movement was, how did you feel a certain unity with the people, or is it all Leninist: "The circle of these revolutionaries is narrow, they are terribly far from the people"? To what extent are the people of

Russia ready to change? Bukovsky: We had very different people, and there were people who had no idea how the country lives. Say, the same Sakharov, a wonderful person, but he lived until the age of 40 as a secret academician. He did not know how to buy bread, he did not know anything about how life was developing in Russia. But at the same time he was a wonderful person, honest and so on.

And I just knew the country well, I traveled a lot, and went on expeditions, and so on. I spent a lot of time with criminals, this is also a way to get to know your people. And I had a complete feeling that we are one. The people treated the Soviet government much more gloomily than the intelligentsia.

Dmitry Medvedev: And now there is this unity, in your opinion? Here, in fact, this creative Moscow protest. Bukovsky: I

think it is still there. If you somehow develop it and allow it to manifest, it will manifest itself. You understand, if a person with the prospect of engaging in intellectual work finds the regime impossible, then a person who would like to have his own small business or a repair shop, and so on - for him it is simply doubly impossible, given the racketeering, and extortion, and all protection these, and so on.

This is an even more dead end situation. And ordinary, as it were, ordinary people with us - well, most of them are not interested in social life at all, as we know. It's a matter of

survival. Especially now with rising prices. They will take to the streets for social reasons, because they have nothing to

pay for an apartment or for gas, that's what they will go for.

Medvedev: Here, yes, there may be some kind of merger. This is what young people tried, perhaps, to do during these spring-summer Occupiers, to try to merge the civil and political protest of the creative class with the social protest of the broader masses. Bukovsky: I think this will inevitably happen,

because while some kind of protest lives on, new and new sections of the population always seem to be considering whether it is time for them to join, and in despair, when they see that it is impossible to live otherwise, they go. It will definitely happen.

How massive it will be, I don't know. You see, after all, do not forget that Russia is a bloodless country. There was a genocide for 70 years, the extermination of the best, the most energetic, the most capable. That's what the Soviet government was doing: the best workers, the best artisans, the best intelligentsia - they were all exterminated. They are. The man who had the initiative, he was immediately punished. There instilled lack of initiative in people and so on. Therefore, of course, we have the percentage of the most active people - it is much less than in a normal country. Medvedev: Less than in the West. And tell me, here is the West, the role

of the West in the current situation - do you think the West has surrendered Russia, surrendered the Russian democratic movement, reconciled with Putin? Well, another Eastern oil dictator? Bukovsky: Yes, of course. The West has never considered

itself entitled or obliged to change anything in Russia. Even in Soviet times, when there was a cold war, when nuclear missiles were aimed at each other, they still said here: "Changing inside is your concern, we will deal with it." Medvedev: Excuse me, there was the Helsinki process, Carter; was, in the end, the boycott of the

Olympics-80, which you actively called for, among other things. Bukovsky: Yes. Medvedev: And now, you think, the West. Bukovsky: Yes, but then they had

to react. They

rather reacted to the situation, you know?

Still a boycott of the Olympic

games - we proposed on the issue of human rights, and Carter also in connection with the war in Afghanistan.

These are slightly different things. They reacted, they had to do something. The Soviet Union behaved like a bear, so they took it and invaded the country without any need. For no reason, no provocation. And they have to react, and they have problems of collective defense. And that is why at that time they at least somehow reacted in connection with this, although very little, I repeat, and much less than they should have. And now? And now they do not see any threat. Russia as such for them

poses no threat.

Medvedev: I don't know, is the Magnitsky list, for example, a first sign for you, or are such larger boycotts, lists, restrictions, sanctions hardly possible?

Bukovsky: You see, these things are organized from the bottom up, they are not organized from above. We still somehow, already much worse than before, but the mechanisms of democracy work. And if public sentiment is whipped up, then politicians are forced to accept it. They do it passively and reluctantly, but they are forced to. It was the same in our time, say, with the correction of Jackson Vanik, right?

This, too, was not invented by politicians. The politicians figured it out, after all. And now our public mood is very critical towards Russia, towards the Putin regime. And the authorities, in general, would like to live peacefully and in no way

climb.

And, of course, public sentiment erupts. Here is Magnitsky's list - this is the best example of how society has made politicians take some specific rather tough steps against human rights violations in Russia. Medvedev: And if there is a deterioration in the human rights situation, say, do you see the possibility of such a thing as a boycott of the Sochi Olympics or a boycott of the World Cup?

Bukovsky: Right now, such an opportunity is much less than it was under Soviet rule. Less sense of danger, less sense of need for action. Current politicians say: "Well, what can we take from them? They always do. Well, live, something will change. They don't want to get involved actively. It's not good for them, it's

gives nothing. Moreover, it is clear that Russia is a huge country, nothing can be done with it. By and large, nothing. Medvedev: Well, yes. Do you

know what I would like to talk about now? Here we are talking about this topic of boycott. Well, an example is that there was a boycott of the Olympics-80, or suppose that in a situation of a sharp deterioration in human rights in Russia there will be a boycott of the Olympics in Sochi. Are these things comparable to patriotism for you? Bukovsky: Of course. Patriotism lies in love for the

Motherland, and not in agreement with it. Moreover, one should not confuse the regime and the country.

This is that I have been here for 35 years, for 35 years I have been explaining to the West that there is no need to confuse the regime and the people. The regime is one thing, the people is another. The regime may be hostile to you, but the people may be friendly. So it was in Soviet times. Medvedev: Yes, here I recall your wonderful statement in

your closing speech at the trial in 1972 that the criminal is not the one who brings dirty linen out of the hut, but the one who litter in the hut. Actually, here it is. It seems to me that it is also very difficult for these people to understand when. You know, not only for these people, but for the young

generation is very difficult to understand.

Here I am a teacher myself, I often even encounter the reaction of my seemingly very liberal, open, thinking students from the Higher School of Economics. When I start criticizing somehow the order, they say: "You don't love your country. How can you talk about Russia like that? How can you speak of the Soviet Union like that? This is our country, this is our past!" Here I am with this more and more. Bukovsky: A rather strange position. Agree, even a not too deep analyst, a psychologist understands that the one who goes to prison for his

country, he loves it more than those who imprison these people, right? Medvedev: Yes. Here, you know, on this occasion I always remember the wonderful thing from Solzhenitsyn, when the prisoners in the camp talk about the Chekist Frenkel, how he

hated Russia. And he replies: "Ek you glorified Frenkel. The one who hated Russia was Chaadaev, because he had the right, because he loved. This is absolutely wonderful.

Bukovsky: Well, we don't get to the point of hatred and never did. Always regret, a feeling of terrible regret that again Russia did not do what was needed. This is a feeling that haunts me all my life: "Well, what are they again, well, what is it, huh? After all, there was a chance! I, speaking somewhere, said: "Russia always reminds me of a woman who is ten months pregnant. Everyone shouts to her: "Push, give birth! Push!" and she says, "I'm not ready." This is my image, you understand? It causes annoyance, it causes pity, it causes sadness.

It does not cause hatred.

Medvedev: Good words: disappointment and sadness. What feelings do you have and what images does the current European Union evoke?

Bukovsky: The current European Union gives me a feeling of déjà vu. Iya already said and wrote about this 12 years ago. They, without realizing it, are trying to create a kind of Soviet Union. A pale likeness, frankly speaking, not going as far as they went in the Soviet Union, but a likeness nonetheless. And when I explained this 12 years ago, the authorities snorted at me and

got angry. And society very quickly perceived. I proposed a term for the name of the European Union: EUSSR. Just google "EUSSR" and you'll find millions of links. That was the public response. People immediately realized that yes, indeed, that this is a vicious model, it is not necessary to do it.

Medvedev: Is this some kind of dissident idea or is it already more or less like that? Moreover, there is a well-established critical view of the European Union in Britain.

Bukovsky: You know, according to the latest public opinion polls, more than 70% of us would vote for leaving the European Union if we were given a referendum. They don't give us. They understand very well: give a referendum - that's it, they will have to leave the European Union. Remember the vote on the constitution. Even in France the majority was against it, in Holland, in Poland. No, people understand, people on average are not that stupid, by golly. "Average

thinking is better than higher education," my supervisor once told me. And this is so, they are quite, as it were, reasonable somewhere within their limits, and they understand that this is not for them.

it is necessary that this is cumbersome, that we will have even less influence on this than on our own government. And why then is it?

Medvedev: Do you think that everything is moving towards the collapse of the European Union, especially given the

current financial crisis? Bukovsky: Well, it's hard to say how they will get out of the current euro crisis. Actually, there is no good way out of it. But I have a feeling that they will try to maneuver, that they will leave, as it were, the core of countries, and send the rest. Now they are talking about a new scheme in which France, Germany and the Benelux countries will remain, but will become an absolutely single country with a single budget, taxes, salaries, pensions and so on. And the rest will be told: "Well, as you wish, guys. Stay if you want, leave if you want." There will be some reformatting of the European Union. They won't give it up easily, the people who run it. It's too important for them, it's too profitable for them.

Medvedev: Is this about bureaucracy?

Bukovsky: So everyone will come up with new models, formulas, and so on. But in the end, I am absolutely sure, I am ready, as they say, to make a bet with anyone that the European Union will disintegrate. Medvedev: As you once predicted the collapse, now I remember, with someone in a conversation. And, with Netanyahu, in my opinion, you predicted in 15 years.

Bukovsky: Yes, he reminded me much later. I forgot. I told him in 1979, it turns out, I said. When he asked what was there, in the Soviet Union, I said: "What about the Soviet Union, in 15 years it will not exist." Medvedev:

You said it after Amalrik, didn't you? Bukovsky:

That was the general point of view. Amalrik simply formulated it all very well. And we thought about equally.

And by the way, he didn't mean the calendar year 1984. I asked him at the same time, I said: "Andrei, are you talking about exactly 1984?" He says: "No, of course, this is an analogy with Orwell, a reference to Orwell."

Medvedev:

Yes, yes. And in this sense, how much do you give the European Union then?

Bukovsky: The European Union is a maximum of five years.

S. Medvedev: Well, what about today's Russia? What is your forecast for today's Russia, especially considering the crisis of governance that we just talked about and the growing social contradictions? Bukovsky: Also a few years. I think it

will grow rapidly. Understand that Russia has another Achilles heel that the West does not have, namely its attachment to oil and gas production and prices. And in connection with the general credit crisis, I think that oil prices will go down very sharply, and gas - now there is an intensive development of shale gas.

And it is clear that no one will need this gas from Gazprom soon.

Medvedev: And in what form, in your opinion, can it happen, what can happen in a few years? The collapse of Russia? Bukovsky: Well, you know, I wrote about it in 1993, I have a book like this, it's called the Moscow Trial. She left in Russia.

And there already (and I wrote it in 1993) I said that if Russia did not go forward, then it would go back, that there would be a restoration. I'm writing this there, but it's already there. And that the way out of this crisis is likely to be in the further fragmentation of the country. Since there will be no internal forces to keep the unity of this country and no longer exist, it will most likely be fragmentation. Well, maybe temporary, maybe in 20-30 years these fragments will unite again into some kind of confederation, I don't know. But that the period of such fragmentation will be, I am sure. Dmitry Medvedev: Will some kind of core remain?

Just as the core of the first founding countries of the European Union remains in the European Union: the Benelux, Germany, France, so does some more historical core of Russia remain? Do you mean it?

Bukovsky: Well, yes, probably, the Moscow principality, I  
I guess.

Medvedev: Understood. And what can be done to prevent all this?

Bukovsky: There

is no way to prevent it. If now a large serious political force within the country appeared, which would oppose the current regime, but at the same time unite



social forces—that would be the force that would make it possible to make the transition without disintegration. But such a force is not visible, and it is not visible that it is formed. There is no such process. And if so, the weaker the center, the sooner fragmentation begins. Medvedev:

Well, yes. It is interesting to see you at the end of the year, especially considering that now people have very strong apocalyptic moods, and at the end of 1991, too, the flag was lowered over the Kremlin, the Soviet Union collapsed. But nevertheless, that's when one of your prophecies came true. Well, Vladimir Konstantinovich, thank you for this conversation. I also want to remind you of one more date, that on December 30 you turn 70 years old. So I.

Bukovsky: Yes. But I don't celebrate. Celebrate such holidays stupid. There is more to be sad about.

Medvedev: Why be sad? I want to tell you that the first 70 years of your life were spent fighting the forces of injustice. I wish that in the next 70 years of life, these forces of injustice will leave the historical arena. Bukovsky: You are a great optimist in

both senses. Medvedev: Well, it seems to me, Vladimir Konstantinovich, you too.

Otherwise you wouldn't be doing what you are doing and what you already are.

Bukovsky: We had a principle like this: "Do what you can, and nothing else matters".

Medvedev: And come what may. Bukovsky:  
Yes. 2012